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Résumé 
Le Traité de Marrakech stipule que le commerce et le développement 
économique devraient être orientés de manière à permettre l’utilisation optimale 
des ressources mondiales, conformément à l’objectif de développement durable. 
Combiné aux dispositions du Protocole de Kyoto et du Traité de Copenhague, 
les gouvernements poursuivent de politiques nationales favorisant les 
producteurs nationaux au détriment des étrangers. Cette mémoire propose une 
analyse des règles de l’OMC, dans le but de déterminer les mesures 
disciplinaires possibles contre le Canada à l'égard de ses mécanismes de support 
de l’énergie renouvelable. Une analyse des règles énoncées dans le GATT, 
l’Accord sur les subventions et les mesures compensatoires et divers accords 
multilatéraux conclus dans le cadre de l’OMC permet de déterminer si elles 
pourraient s’appliquer aux mécanismes de support de l’énergie renouvelable. 
Une analyse des programmes du Québec et de l’Ontario permet une prise de 
position quant à leur conformité aux règles commerciales de l’OMC. 
Mots-clés : OMC, GATT, commerce international, droit international, droit de 
l'environnement, nation la plus favorisée, traitement national, TRIMs, obstacles 
techniques au commerce, garanties, subventions, subventions à l'exportation, 
subventions domestiques, droits compensateurs, contenu national, contenu 
local, énergie , énergies renouvelables, énergie verte, énergie éolienne, énergie 
solaire, développement durable, électricité, développent durable, mécanismes 
de soutien à l'énergie renouvelable, Programme TRG Ontario, tarifs de rachat 
garantis, appel d’offres énergie éolienne Québec. 
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Abstract 
The Marrakesh Agreement’s preamble states that trade and economic 
development should be conducted to allow for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development. This, 
combined with the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord, 
allows governments to pursue their domestic policies in such a way as to 
unfairly favor domestic producers over foreign ones. This thesis provides a 
review of WTO law to assess the potential for disciplinary measures against 
Canada with regard to renewable energy support mechanisms. An analysis of 
the rules outlined in the GATT, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures and various other WTO multilateral agreements allows us to 
determine whether such rules can apply to renewable energy support 
mechanisms. Furthermore, an analysis of the programs in support of renewable 
energy production available in Québec and Ontario sheds light on such 
mechanisms’ compliance with WTO trade rules. 
Keywords : WTO, GATT, International Trade, International Law, 
Environmental Law, Most-Favored Nation, National Treatment, TRIMs, 
Technical Barriers to Trade, Safeguards, Subsidies, Export Subsidies, Domestic 
Subsidies, Countervailing Duties, Domestic Content, Local Content, Energy, 
Renewable Energy, Green Energy, Wind power, Solar power, Sustainable 
Development, Electricity, Renewable Energy Support Mechanisms, Ontario 
FIT Program, Feed-in Tariff, Québec Wind Tenders. 
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Abbreviations 
Community CFT HQ’s 500 MW Call for Tenders A/O 2009-02 
Community CFT PPA The standard PPA provided as an annex to the 
Community PPA 
DSB Dispute Settlement Body 
DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding 
Electricity Act Electricity Act, 1998 (Ontario), S.O. 1998, c. 15 
FIT Feed-in Tariff 
FIT Contract FIT Program standard PPA 
FIT Directive The September 24, 2009 FIT directive issued by the 
MEI 
FIT Program OPA FIT program 
FIT Rules FIT Program rules 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GATT 1947 Original GATT 1947 text, including amendments prior 
to GATT 1994 
GATT 1994 GATT 1947, as amended by the WTO Agreement 
GEA Green Energy Act, 2009 (Ontario), S.O. 2009, c. 12 
HQ Hydro-Québec 
HQD Hydro-Québec Distribution 
Hydro-Québec Act Hydro-Québec Act (Québec), R.S.Q. c. H-5 
kW Kilowatt 
kWH Kilowatt-Hour 
MEI Ontario’s Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure 
MFN Most-Favored Nation 
MW Megawatt 
MWh Megawatt-Hour 
NT National Treatment 
OPA Ontario Power Authority 
PPA Power Purchase Agreement 
SCM Agreement Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Subsidies Code Agreement on Interpretation and Application of 
Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 
TBT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
TRIMs Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures 
WTO World Trade Organization 
WTO Agreement Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization 
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 To truly transform our economy, protect our security, and save 
our planet from the ravages of climate change, we need to 
ultimately make clean, renewable energy the profitable kind of 
energy. 
Barack Obama, Address to the Joint Session of Congress, 2009 
Introduction – The WTO, Subsidies and 
Renewable Energy 
Most stories involving contemporary trade issues begin in a Havana conference 
room in 1947 with the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT 1947”)1. Still reeling from the aftershocks of the Second World War, 
the international community believed that peace would be guaranteed through 
the establishment of global institutions. The United Nations, the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank had already been pen-stroked into 
existence. With international security, finance and development seemingly 
covered, the nations of the world turned their collective eye towards tackling 
issues surrounding trade. 
And so it was that in Havana twenty-three countries, including Canada, began 
                                                 
1 We refer to GATT 1947 as that version of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 (30 Oct. 1947) (the “GATT”) adopted in 1947, as amended from time to time, up 
until the signing of the WTO Agreement. Supra, note 3. 
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the effort of regulating trade on a global level. This resulted in the signing of 
the GATT, which initially promised the establishment of a permanent body, the 
International Trade Organization, to oversee the treaty’s application. That 
organization never came to fruition, partly due to objections within the United 
States Congress. Instead, member states oversaw the GATT and applied its 
rules without the stability of a governing institution. Successive rounds of 
negotiations between GATT members (Dillon, Kennedy, Tokyo) yielded 
additional rules on international trade, generally striving toward lower tariffs. 
As tariffs were gradually eliminated, nations increasingly focused their 
attention on non-tariff barriers to trade. Governmental subsidy programs 
embody one of the best known and most frequently used non-tariff barrier, and 
in a world of low tariffs even a small subsidy can affect production levels of 
another country.2 
Developments in subsidy regulation abound, particularly since the signing of 
the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994 at the culmination of the Uruguay Round and 
                                                 
2 Terence P. STEWART (ed), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), 
vol. 1: commentary, Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p. 812. 
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the creation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).3 The WTO’s 
permanent nature, along with its dispute resolution mechanism, ensured an even 
larger membership amongst trading nations and an ever-increasing number of 
subsidies-related clashes, since clear recourses and sanctions were now 
available to trading states seeking to discipline other members’ programs.4 
The use and misuse of subsidies has therefore remained an important part of 
international trade relations, and the apparent stalemate in the current Doha 
round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations means that the existing 
framework will continue to apply for the foreseeable future. By one estimate, 
global subsidies may amount to more than a trillion dollars per year or 4 percent 
                                                 
3 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (15 
April 1994) (hereinafter referred to as the “WTO Agreement”). The Uruguay Round would 
result in the signing of the WTO Agreement. The WTO Agreement includes an amended 
version of the GATT 1947 (the “GATT 1994”), along with numerous annexes. Much of the 
WTO’s substantive law is not contained within the WTO Agreement. Annex 1A of the WTO 
Agreement contains the WTO’s multilateral agreements, such as the GATT 1994 and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (15 April 1994) (“SCM 
Agreement”). Annex 1B includes the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (15 
April 1994) (“GATS”). Annex 2 contains the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (15 April 1994) (“DSU”). Annex 3 includes the 
trade policy review mechanism. Finally, Annex 4 contains various plurilateral trade agreements, 
such as the Agreement on Government Procurement. All of these agreements are appended to 
the WTO Agreement and form part of a single undertaking. 
4 Since 1995, 83 cases (out of a total of 411 cases so far) have been adjudicated at the WTO 
with respect to the SCM Agreement, subsidies and countervailing measures. See 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A20#selected
_agreement, compared to a total of approximately 100 cases during the entire GATT 1947 
period with respect to all matters. See 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm.  
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of world GDP.5 Subsidies are not necessarily undesirable however, and 
governments have always had incentives to implement them to solve economic, 
social, and political problems. As GATT Director-General Oliver Long so 
eloquently stated three decades ago: 
A principle difficulty is to draw a distinction between 
subsidies granted by governments in pursuit of valid 
economic and social policy and those which, directly or 
indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, have the effect of 
distorting world trade and depriving other countries of 
legitimate trade opportunities.6 
The distinction between “legal” and “illegal” subsidies, “actionable” and “non-
actionable”, “permitted” and “prohibited”, “green light” and “red light” – 
“good” or “bad” – is particularly relevant in an era of increased environmental 
sensitivity. This sensitivity to humanity’s effect on our planet, and particularly 
its climate, has begun to have marked effects on all manners of economic 
policy, international trade being no exception. 
The seriousness with which the international community considers the potential 
                                                 
5 Gross Domestic Product. See WTO SECRETARIAT, World Trade Report 2006: Exploring 
the Links Between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO, Geneva, World Trade Organization, 2006, p. 
45. 
6 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (ORGANIZATION), The Tokyo 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Report by the Director-General of GATT, 1979, p. 
53. 
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effects of climate change is evidenced by the contents of the Kyoto Protocol7 
and recent Copenhagen Accord8. These agreements also serve as a perfect 
example of the disconnect Director-General Long touched upon: 
The tension between the two regimes could be described as 
resting on two assumptions: international trade increases 
domestic welfare through the quantifiable benefits it delivers 
to consumers, while environmental regulation increases 
domestic (and global) welfare by protecting the environment 
against harm and furthering the preferences of citizens of the 
regulating country.9 
Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol and Article 4 of the Copenhagen Accord allow 
Annex 1 countries such as Canada a significant amount of flexibility with 
respect to domestic policies in order to meet emissions targets, while Article 3.5 
of the accords’ governing document, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change10, states that “measures taken to combat climate 
change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.” 
Furthermore, the WTO Agreement’s preamble provides that trade and 
economic development should be conducted so as to allow for the optimal use 
                                                 
7 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 ILM 22 (11 December 1997) (the “Kyoto Protocol”). 
8 Copenhagen Accord to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Copenhagen (18 December 2009) (the “Copenhagen Accord”). 
9 Marie-Ève RANCOURT, “Promoting Sustainable Biofuels Under the WTO Legal Regime”, 
(2009) 5 McGill J.S.D.L.P. 73, at para. 28. 
10 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (21 March 
1994). 
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of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development. All of these various factors combine to allow governments to 
“pursue their domestic policies in such a way as to unfairly favor domestic 
producers over foreign ones.”11  
In sum, contrasting the need for control of governmental subsidies, as required 
by the WTO system, are national efforts to support local renewable energy 
production in order to meet fossil fuel and carbon output reduction strategies 
required by Kyoto and Copenhagen. Governments have implemented various 
support measures to buttress renewable energy production which over the past 
decade have been primary drivers behind increased adoption of renewable 
energy in the electricity distribution networks of developed countries.12 
The four most common methods by which governments can directly or 
indirectly support renewable energy13 production in their jurisdictions and 
communities are: 
                                                 
11 ZhongXiang ZHANG and Lucas ASSUNÇÂO, Domestic climate policies and the WTO, 
FEEM Working Paper No. 91, December 2001, p. 2. 
12 See data concerning increased renewable energy production throughout INTERNATIONAL 
ENERGY AGENCY, Renewables Information 2010, OECD/IEA, 2010 and 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, World Energy Outlook 2009, OECD/IEA, 2009. 
13 Renewable energy is generally defined as energy obtained from natural and persistent flows 
of energy occurring in the immediate environment, and is contrasted by non-renewable energy 
which is obtained from static sources that remain underground unless released by human 
interaction. See John TWIDELL and Tony WEIR, Renewable Energy Resources, 2nd ed., 
Taylor & Francis, 2006, p. 7. 
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(i) financial support schemes that reduce the commercial uncertainty 
related to the production and sale of renewable energy (uncertainty 
which may be due to the existence of an electricity market with 
variable and unpredictable short to long-term electricity prices) in 
the form of a feed-in tariff (“FIT”), guaranteed purchase price per 
megawatt hour (“MWh”) of electricity sold or requirements for 
electricity distributors to purchase a minimum portfolio of energy 
sourced from renewables; 
(ii) local content rules in renewable energy tenders or renewable energy 
sourcing legislation requiring renewable energy facility developers 
to employ locals and purchase locally-manufactured goods for the 
development, construction and operation of their facility as a pre-
condition to entering into a power purchase agreement and/or 
receiving the relevant financial support; 
(iii) encouragement of community participation in the development of 
renewable energy facilities, through the requirement for minimum 
local participation (i.e. of the municipality or residents of same) in 
the economic benefits associated with the facility or through the 
flow-through of tax revenues associated with the relevant facility 
directly to the local community; 
(iv) direct government, or government supported, investment in 
    
8 
electricity infrastructure, such as renewable energy compliant 
electricity transmission infrastructure (smart grids).14 
Where these support mechanisms have an effect on international trade, they 
may be challengeable under WTO law. For instance, the existence of a 
government sponsored financial incentive within a specific domestic industry 
can be actionable under WTO subsidies regulations, while domestic content 
rules could be considered trade related investment measures or as having trade 
diverting effects contrary to the WTO’s founding principles. 
A review of WTO law so as to determine the acceptability of renewable energy 
support mechanisms is paramount in order to assess the potential for 
disciplinary measures. Since WTO law contains no provisions specifically 
applicable to electricity,15 an analysis of the rules outlined in the GATT 1994, 
the SCM Agreement and the various other WTO multilateral agreements will 
allow us to determine whether such rules may potentially apply to renewable 
energy support mechanisms. Furthermore, a review of the programs in support 
                                                 
14 Michael J. TREBILCOCK and James S.F. WILSON, The Perils of Picking Technological 
Winners in Renewable Energy Policy: An Energy Probe Study, Energy Probe, 5 March 2010, p. 
8. See also Pierre-Olivier PINEAU, “Electricity Subsidies in Low-Cost Jurisdictions: The Case 
of British Columbia”, (2008) 4(3) Canadian Public Policy 379, at p. 381; See also Jonathan 
PERSHING and Jim MACKENZIE, Removing Subsidies: Leveling the Playing Field for 
Renewable Energy Technologies, Thematic Background Paper, International Conference for 
Renewable Energies, Secretariat of the International Conference for Renewable Energies, 
March 2004, p. 15. 
15 Indeed, it is unclear under WTO law whether electricity should be treated as a good or a 
service. Supra Part III, Section 3 regarding GATS. 
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of renewable energy production in place in Québec and Ontario will focus our 
analysis and illustrate the potential for compliance with WTO trade rules.16 
We must highlight the fact that renewable energy subsidy programs, including 
local content requirements therein, have not yet been the subject of an 
international trade dispute.17 Nevertheless, as one author notes, renewable 
energy subsidies “are likely to result in trade disputes of different kinds”.18 
These programs are clearly not immune to WTO sanctions. In fact, it is possible 
that a challenge to such mechanisms will be brought soon, as evidenced the 
comments made by Japan in May of 2010 with respect to Ontario’s FIT 
program: 
Japan, at the meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods on 21 
May 2010, expressed concern over what it said were local-
content requirements in a renewable-energy programme in 
Canada’s province of Ontario. It asked Canada to explain the 
consistency of the requirements with various WTO 
agreements, including the GATT 1994 provision on equal 
treatment for imports, and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
                                                 
16 China’s renewable energy supports mechanisms’ closely resemble those used in Quebec and 
Ontario, particularly with respect to local content requirements. See a review of China’s 
programs’ compliance with WTO law in Joanna I. LEWIS, A review of the Potential 
International Trade Implications of Key Wind Power Industry Policies in China, Report for the 
Energy Foundation’s China Sustainable Energy Program, Center for Resource Solutions, 1 
November 2007. 
17 “Because most governments provide such […] assistance, and do not wish to set a precedent 
that would call into question their own expenditure, there has so far been little interest shown by 
governments in challenging public support for demonstration projects.” in James CUST and 
Karsten NEUHOFF, The Economics, Politics and Future of Energy Subsidies, Report from 
Climate Policy Initiative Workshop, DIW Berlin, 21 March 2010, p. 6. 
18 Thomas COTTIER et al, Energy in WTO law and policy, NCCR Trade Regulation, Working 
Paper No 2009/25, May 2009, p.12. 
    
10 
Investment Measures.  
The European Union and the United States expressed interest 
on this matter.19 
Part I of our study analyses Ontario and Québec’s renewable energy production 
programs in order to highlight the characteristics of such programs that may be 
actionable under WTO law. Both offer a form of financial assistance to new 
renewable energy facilities and impose local content restrictions. Part II 
provides an overview and analysis of the development and current extent of 
subsidies regulation under international trade law, focusing primarily on the 
SCM Agreement. In Part III, we examine the more fundamental principles of 
WTO law, namely the national treatment and most-favored nation rules, as well 
as three other relevant WTO multilateral agreements. Throughout Parts II and 
III, we discuss how the various rules studied relate to subsidies discipline and 
apply them to renewable energy support mechanisms, while theorizing on the 
applicability of WTO law to Québec and Ontario’s programs. 
An apparent dichotomy exists between the recent push toward increasing 
overall renewable energy production and continued efforts to limit trade 
distorting subsidies. Our study allows us to provide insight into one effect of 
this disconnect: the actionability of renewable energy support mechanisms. 
                                                 
19 WTO COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS, Japan questions local-content requirements in 
Canadian province’s energy programme, News Release, 21 May 2010. 
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If the government spends money in the regions of the UK it is 
called subsidy. But if it pours it down the gullet of the cities 
and counties in south-east England it is called essential 
support of the infrastructure. 
John Forsyth 
Part I – Ontario and Québec’s Renewable Energy 
Support Mechanisms 
The last decade has seen both Québec and Ontario source electricity through 
successive renewable energy production programs, more recently with the 
development in Ontario of a permanent renewables FIT program and in Québec 
of a 500 MW community focused wind tender.  
In Québec, Hydro-Québec Distribution (“HQD”) obtained its first non-
hydroelectric renewable energy in 2003 when it issued a 1,000 MW wind 
tender.20 From 2005 to 2008, a second wind tender was in effect, this time for 
                                                 
20 Regulation respecting wind energy and biomass energy, 2003 G.O. II, 1278; Décret 
concernant les préoccupations économiques, sociales et environnementales indiquées à la 
Régie de l’énergie à l’égard de l’énergie éolienne et l’énergie produite avec de la biomasse, 
(2003) 135 G.O. II, 1778. 
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2,000 MW of electricity sourced from wind energy.21 In July 2010, HQD closed 
its third renewables tender, seeking 500 MW of wind energy from projects 
developed in conjunction with the province’s communities and First Nations 
(the “Community CFT”).22 Throughout this period, other tenders have sourced 
renewable energy from small-hydro (i.e. less than 50 MW – Hydro-Québec 
Production maintains its monopoly for developing hydroelectric production 
                                                 
21 Regulation respecting the second block of wind energy, (2005) G.O. II, 1278; Regulation 
amending the Regulation respecting the second block of wind energy, (2007) 139 G.O. II, 2755; 
Décret 926-2005 Concernant les préoccupations économiques, sociales et environnementales 
indiquées à la Régie de l’énergie à l’égard du second bloc d’énergie éolienne, (2005) 137 G.O. 
II, 5867B; Décret 1016-2005 concernant une modification aux préoccupations économiques, 
sociales et environnementales indiquées à la Régie de l’énergie à l’égard du second bloc 
d’énergie éolienne, (2005) 137 G.O. II, 6426; Décret 96-2007 concernant une modification aux 
préoccupations économiques, sociales et environnementales indiquées à la Régie de l’énergie à 
l’égard du second bloc d’énergie éolienne, (2007) 139 G.O. II, 1373. 
22 Call for Tenders A/O 2009-02, issued April 30, 2009 pursuant to Orders-in-council (“O.C.”) 
No. 1043-2008 and 1045-2008 respectively enacting the Regulation respecting a 250 MW block 
of wind energy from Aboriginal projects and the Regulation respecting a 250 MW block of wind 
energy from community projects, the O.C. No. 179-2009 and 180-2009 adopted March 4, 2009 
respectively enacting the Regulation to amend the Regulation respecting a 250 MW block of 
wind energy from community projects and the Regulation to amend the Regulation respecting a 
250 MW block of wind energy from Aboriginal projects, the O.C. No. 520-2009 and 521-2009 
adopted April 29, 2009 respectively enacting the Regulation to amend the Regulation 
respecting a 250 MW block of wind energy from Aboriginal projects and the Regulation to 
amend the Regulation respecting a 250 MW block of wind energy from community projects, the 
O.C. No. 468-2010 and 469-2010 adopted June 2nd, 2010 respectively enacting the Regulation 
to amend the Regulation respecting a 250 MW block of wind energy from Aboriginal projects 
and the Regulation to amend the Regulation respecting a 250 MW block of wind energy from 
community projects, and the O.C. No. 1044-2008 and 1046-2008 Concernant les 
préoccupations économiques, sociales et environnementales indiquées à la Régie de l’énergie à 
l’égard d’un bloc de 250 MW d’énergie éolienne issu de projets autochtones and Régie de 
l’énergie à l’égard d’un block de 250 MW d’énergie éolienne issue de projets communautaires 
adopted October 29, 2008 (the “1044-2008 and 1046-2008 Decrees”) and the O.C. No. 67-
2010 and 68-2010 adopted January 26, 2010 Concernant une modification aux préoccupations 
économiques, sociales et environnementales indiquées à la Régie de l’énergie à l’égard d’un 
bloc de 250 MW d’énergie éolienne issu de projets autochtones et Concernant une modification 
aux préoccupations économiques, sociales et environnementales indiquées à la Régie de 
l’énergie à l’égard d’un bloc de 250 MW d’énergie éolienne issu de projets communautaires. 
The Community CFT also had appended to it a standard form of PPA, the “Community CFT 
PPA”. 
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sites of more than 50 MW) and biomass, however the wind tenders are by far 
the most significant. 23 
Québec wind tenders are structured so as to provide winning projects with a 
guaranteed purchase price of electricity throughout the twenty year term of the 
power purchase agreement (“PPA”) signed with HQD. The tenders have 
consistently incorporated high local content requirements.  
In Ontario, developments in renewables generation have been no less 
significant. Three renewable energy supply tenders have been issued by 
Ontario’s Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure (“MEI”) leading to 
approximately 1,500 MW of electricity sourced from renewables since 2004.24 
The province of Ontario has been particularly aggressive in its industry support 
initiatives over the past year. The Green Energy Act, 200925 (the “GEA”) was 
adopted with the goal of “fostering the growth of renewable energy projects, 
which use cleaner sources of energy, [of] removing barriers to and promoting 
opportunities for renewable energy projects and [of] promoting a green 
economy.” 
                                                 
23 Consult a complete list of signed contracts pursuant to such tenders at 
http://www.hydroquebec.com/distribution/en/marchequebecois/contrats.html.  
24 Tender documentation and model renewable energy supply contracts (PPAs) available at 
OPA Generation Procurement website: 
https://testopa1.powerauthority.on.ca/GP/Page.asp?PageID=749&SiteNodeID=149. 
25 S.O. 2009, c. 12. 
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Pursuant to the GEA, Ontario initiated in September of 2009 a FIT program 
mandating that producers of renewable energy which meet the program’s 
eligibility conditions receive a guaranteed above-market price per kilowatt-hour 
(“kWH”) of electricity sold (the “FIT Program”). Since Ontario has an 
electricity market, enabling a market-driven and fluctuating price of electricity, 
the FIT allows renewable energy developers a level of certainty with respect to 
price inputs, enabling them to compete with coal and natural gas facilities by 
offsetting the comparatively high price per MW of renewables production 
versus conventional generation sources.  
The FIT Program’s local content rules are also particularly restrictive, but are 
justified by the MEI as a way of increasing the development of local 
manufacturing capacity and renewable energy expertise in the province. The 
success of the FIT Program so far in attracting renewable energy development 
in Ontario has been remarkable: following the program’s launch in December 
2010, 184 projects were submitted in the program’s first four months to the 
Ontario Power Authority (“OPA”), totaling a potential of approximately 2,500 
MW of new renewable energy.26 
In the following sections, we examine the characteristics of the Community 
                                                 
26 ONTARIO POWER AUTHORITY, Ontario Announces 184 Large-Scale Renewable Energy 
Projects, News Release, 8 April 2010. 
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CFT and FIT Program, with a particular focus on the financial incentives 
offered by such programs as well as their local content requirements. In 
addition, we review the relationship between HQD, the OPA and their 
respective province’s electricity sectors. Finally, we examine the applicability 
of WTO law to provincial industry support measures.  
Section 1 – Ontario 
1.1 The OPA and Ontario’s Electricity Market 
Ontario’s electricity market is largely governed by the Electricity Act, 199827, 
which liberalized the sector by breaking up the province’s electricity monopoly, 
Ontario Hydro, into five independent entities: (i) Hydro One Inc. (which owns 
and operates electricity generation and transmission facilities), (ii) Ontario 
Power Generation Inc. (which owns and operates electricity generation 
facilities), (iii) the Independent Electricity System Operator (which regulates 
the province’s electricity transmission and distribution network), (iv) the 
Electrical Safety Authority and (v) the Ontario Electricity Financial 
Corporation. 
In addition, the Electricity Act established the OPA as a statutory corporation 
without share capital. The objects of the OPA include: (i) forecasting electricity 
                                                 
27 S.O. 1998, c. 15 (hereinafter “Electricity Act”). 
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demand and the adequacy and reliability of electricity resources for Ontario for 
the medium and long term, (ii) supporting the goal of ensuring adequate, 
reliable and secure electricity supply and resources in Ontario, and (iii) 
facilitating the diversification of sources of electricity supply by promoting the 
use of cleaner energy sources and technologies, including alternative energy 
sources and renewable energy sources.28 
In order to pursue these objectives, the OPA enters into contracts for the 
procurement of electricity supply using alternative or renewable energy sources 
to assist the Government of Ontario in achieving goals in the development and 
use of alternative or renewable energy technology and resources, either 
pursuant to a direction of the MEI or pursuant to a procurement process.29 In 
2009, the Electricity Act was amended to allow the MEI to direct the OPA to 
develop a FIT program.30 On September 24, 2009, the MEI issued such a 
directive (the “FIT Directive”): 
I direct you to develop a feed-in tariff program that is 
designed to procure energy from a wide range of renewable 
energy sources. The development of this program is a key 
element of meeting the objectives of the Green Energy and 
Green Economy Act, 2009 and is critical to Ontario’s success 
                                                 
28 Electricity Act, s. 25.2(1). 
29 Electricity Act, s. 25.2(5) and 25.32(1) and (4.1). A list of all directives issued to OPA are 
available here: http://www.powerauthority.on.ca/Page.asp?PageID=122&ContentID=6268. 
30 Electricity Act, s. 25.35. 
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in becoming a leading renewable energy jurisdiction.31 
The FIT Program launched the same day, as Canada’s first renewable energy 
FIT.32 
1.2 The FIT Program 
Contemporaneously with the FIT Directive, the OPA issued final FIT Program 
standard rules (the “FIT Rules”) and PPA (the “FIT Contract”).33 Developers 
are allowed to submit an application to the OPA at anytime.34 If the application 
meets the requirements outlined in the FIT Rules, the OPA may award the 
developer a FIT Contract which will be signed by the OPA. There are several 
general requirements which must be met by a proposed generating facility 
under the FIT rules. The facility must be located in Ontario and have a contract 
capacity which does not exceed the limits set out in the FIT Rules. Obviously, 
the facility must also generate electricity exclusively from a renewable source 
(meaning wind, solar (PV), renewable biomass, landfill gas or waterpower) and 
connect to an electricity distribution network and transmission system. 
                                                 
31Consult the FIT Directive 
here:http://www.powerauthority.on.ca/Storage/106/15420_FIT_Directive_Sept_24_09.pdf. 
32 A similar program may soon be deployed in British Columbia. On June 3, 2010, the Clean 
Energy Act, S.B.C. 2010, c. 22 received royal assent, containing similar provisions as the GEA 
and allowing the government to direct the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority to 
establish a FIT program. See Section 16 of the act. 
33 The FIT Rules and FIT Contract are continuously updated and our review is based on Version 
1.3.1 of the FIT Rules and FIT Contract, issued July 2, 2010. They can be downloaded on the 
FIT Program Website: http://fit.powerauthority.on.ca/ 
34 Hence, contrary to a tender, there is no closing date for submission of proposals. The FIT is 
ongoing and there is no planned date for its closure. 
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1.2.1 Financial Assistance 
Once awarded a FIT Contract, the facility will benefit from a FIT. For wind 
powered on-shore facilities, a FIT of 13.5 ¢/kWh (or $135/MWh) over the 20 
year term of the PPA is provided (indexed to take inflation into account). Since 
Ontario has an open electricity market, these rates are paid out by the 
province’s main distributor of electricity, Hydro-One Inc., or by any of the 
nearly 100 local distribution companies with electricity distribution networks 
located throughout the province. The increased cost of purchasing electricity 
from FIT facilities is ultimately passed on by distributors to end-user 
consumers. Facilities can also sell their power directly into Ontario’s open 
electricity market, in which case the OPA will cover the difference between the 
actual price obtained on the open market per kWH and the relevant FIT price, 
paying such amount directly to the generator.35 
Annexed hereto, Table 1 provides a complete list of the FIT prices granted to 
the various renewable energy facility types. The prices may not seem 
significant, however they must be compared to the prices actually paid by retail 
customers (regulated prices, see Table 2) and on the open electricity market 
(see Table 3). The margin available to renewable energy suppliers is 
                                                 
35 Conversely, if the FIT facility receives on the open market a price per kWH that is higher 
than that which it is afforded under the FIT pricing, it will reimburse the difference to the OPA. 
See FIT Contract Section 3.1 and Exhibit B.  
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considerable. For instance, in May of 2010 a supplier could obtain 4.04 ¢/kWh 
on the open market for electricity. Were it to be a photovoltaic36 energy facility 
benefiting from a FIT, it would notwithstanding the market price receive, 
depending on the facility’s size, anywhere between 44.3¢ and 58.8¢ for each 
kWh sold.  
1.2.2 Local Content Requirements 
The FIT Rules and FIT Contract mandate that a minimum of Ontario-sourced 
expertise and equipment be used in the development and construction of a 
renewable energy facility sourcing power from wind turbines or solar 
photovoltaic Panels.37 Although demonstrating local content is not an eligibility 
requirement for the purposes of a FIT Program application, the FIT Contract 
awarded requires that facilities obtain the minimum required local content 
levels as a condition precedent to receipt of the FIT. Furthermore, failure to 
achieve the levels can lead to the OPA terminating the FIT contract.38 The local 
content levels for on-shore wind power projects with a generating capacity 
greater than 10 kW is 25% for facilities with a milestone date for commercial 
                                                 
36 Whereas most electricity generation techniques involves the movement of a magnetic field 
and a conductor, meaning an engine or turbine – powered by the burning of a fossil fuel, the 
movement of the wind or water – photovoltaic generation uses solar cells, which produce 
electricity directly from sunlight. See John TWIDELL, note 13 above, p. 182. 
37 FIT Contract, Section 2.2(f). Currently, no local content rules apply to facilities sourcing 
power from other renewable sources. As such, the analysis contained in this thesis dealing with 
local content provisions would not apply to those facilities. 
38 FIT Contract, Sections 2.4(b)(iii), 2.6 and 9.1(b). 
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operation39 prior to January 1, 2012 and 50% thereafter. For solar (PV) projects 
with a generating capacity greater than 10 kW, the levels are 50% for facilities 
with a milestone date for commercial operation prior to January 1, 2011 and 
60% thereafter.40 
In order to assist developers in determining whether they achieve the minimum 
local content levels, the OPA has provided a table outlining a number of 
designated activities that qualify as local content under the FIT Contract.41 
Where a designated activity has been performed in relation to the facility, the 
facility is allocated the corresponding qualifying percentage. For example, 
having wiring and electrical hardware sourced from an Ontario supplier will 
provide 9% toward meeting the 25% requirement. Wind turbine blades cast in a 
mould in Ontario and instrumentation within such blades assembled in Ontario 
provide 16%. 
Section 2 – Québec 
2.1 Hydro-Québec and Québec’s Electricity Market 
The Hydro-Québec Act42 established Hydro-Québec (“HQ”) in 1964 to “supply 
                                                 
39 Meaning the date the facility achieves substantial completion with a demonstrated ability to 
continuously generate electricity and the OPA’s various conditions-precedent to commercial 
operation are met. See FIT Contract, Section 2.6(a). 
40 FIT Contract, s. 2.2(f). 
41 FIT Contract, Exhibit “D”. 
42 R.S.Q. c. H-5 (the “Hydro-Québec Act”). 
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power and to pursue endeavors in energy-related research and promotion, 
energy conversion and conservation, and any field connected with or related to 
power or energy”. It may generate, acquire, sell, transmit and distribute 
electricity. HQ’s electricity distribution division, HQD, is tasked with procuring 
and selling electricity to industrial, commercial and residential consumers. It 
must provide a minimum of 165 terawatt-hours of electricity to Québec 
consumers. Electricity is principally sourced from HQ’s electricity production 
division, Hydro-Québec Production, which owns and operates all of the 
province’s hydro-electric facilities with a generation capacity greater than 50 
MW. 43 
Although HQ enjoyed a complete monopoly over Québec’s electricity supply 
for decades, changes were brought about as a result of efforts to liberalize the 
North-American electricity market. Since HQ wished to supply foreign markets 
with electricity, it needed to allow companies access to its market. Furthermore, 
the total annual demand for electricity in Québec exceeded the capacity of 
Hydro-Québec Production’s existing generation facilities beginning in the late-
90s. As such, HQD began to source electricity from private developers through 
tender processes for the purchase of electricity, recently focusing its efforts on 
                                                 
43 Hydro-Québec Act, s. 22 and 29; An Act respecting the Régie de l'énergie, R.S.Q. c. R-6.01 
(the “Régie de l’énergie Act”), s. 52.2(1). 
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sourcing additional capacity from wind energy facilities.44 
2.1 Community CFT 
Following the success of its previous wind tenders, HQD issued the 
Community CFT on April 30, 2009.45 The tender called for a 250 MW block of 
wind energy sourced from facilities developed, owned and operated in 
partnership with local communities and/or municipalities and a 250 MW block 
from facilities partnered with First Nations. The facilities could be located 
anywhere in the province, so long as they provided local communities and First 
Nations groups with designated ownership and control levels over the project. 
The Community CFT was therefore seen as a community empowering tender. 
When the Community CFT closed on July 6, 2010, HQD had received more 
than double the tender’s request: 31 bids totaling 732 MW for the community 
block, and 13 bids totaling 319 MW for the First Nations bloc.46 
2.2.1 Financial Assistance 
Bidders determine the price offered to HQD for electricity sourced from the 
                                                 
44 Claude GARCIA, How would the privatization of Hydro-Québec make Québecers richer?, 
Montreal Economic Institute Research Papers, February 2009, p. 19. The tender processes are 
administered by HQ, but overseen by the Province’s energy board, the Régie de l’énergie, see s. 
74.1 the Régie de l’énergie Act. 
45 See Community CFT Website here: 
http://www.hydroquebec.com/distribution/en/marchequebecois/ao-200902/index.html 
46 HYDRO-QUÉBEC DISTRIBUTION, Appel d’offres de 500 MW d’énergie éolienne : 
Hydro-Québec Distribution reçoit 44 soumissions totalisant 1 051 MW, News Release, 7 July 
2010. 
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eventual facility. The Community CFT provided that bidders could offer a 
maximum price of $125/MWh in 2009 dollars for electricity generated at their 
facility. Evidently, bidders who offered a lower price were ranked higher and 
therefore increase the likelihood of being offered a PPA.47 Unlike in Ontario, all 
electricity rates paid by retail and industrial customers are established by an 
independent energy board, the Régie de l’énergie48 and paid directly to HQD. 
2.2.2 Local Content Requirements 
Sixty percent of costs relating to the bidder’s wind farm project must be 
incurred in Québec, including thirty percent in the province’s Gaspésie-Îles-de-
la-Madelaine administrative region (regional county municipality of Matane).49 
The bidder must guarantee that it will meet these requirements.50  
In addition, bidders can only source the wind turbines used in their facility from 
so-called “designated manufacturers”: HQD approved turbine manufacturers 
who have invested in Québec through the establishment of manufacturing 
facilities for turbines in the Gaspésie-Îles-de-la-Madelaine administrative 
region. These requirements have resulted in numerous companies establishing a 
                                                 
47 Community CFT, s. 1.7. 
48 See Régie de l’énergie Act, s. 1, 31(1), 32(1) and 48. 
49 See 1044-2008 and 1046-2008 Decrees, note 22 above, para. 6-7. 
50 Community CFT, s. 1.5. 
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manufacturing and supply-chain presence in Québec.51  
Where a bidder awarded a PPA with HQD fails to achieve the local content 
requirements, penalties are imposed that effectively remove much of the 
financial benefits associated with the generation facility.52 Furthermore, the 
bidder must warrant that its wind turbines will be sourced from Gaspésie, 
failing which HQD may terminate the PPA.53 
Section 3 – Applicability of WTO law 
Considering the central focus of this study is an analysis of two provincial 
renewable energy support mechanisms, it is relevant to determine whether 
WTO law applies to such provincial programs. The issue stems from the 
structure of the Canadian Constitution which, at Articles 91 and 92 of the 
Constitution Act, 186754, distinguishes between those areas of legislation that 
fall upon the federal Parliament (Article 91) and the provincial legislatures 
(Article 92). Treaties however are not specifically addressed by these articles. 
As such, even where the power to ratify treaties vests exclusively with the 
                                                 
51 Community CFT, s. 1.5.3. See also Joanna I. LEWIS and Ryan H. WISER, Supporting 
Localization of Wind Technology through Large Utility Tenders in Québec: Lessons for China, 
Center for Resource Solutions for the Energy Foundation’s China Sustainable Energy Program, 
8 June 2006, p. 5 and 6. 
52 A shortfall points system is provided, with penalties ranging from $4,000 to $12,000 per 
point, per megawatt of contract capacity. See Community CFT PPA, s. 29.2.  
53 Community CFT PPA, s. 35.1(j). 
54 The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3. 
    
25
federal executive, the power to implement them is divided between federal and 
provincial governments. As such, the matter dealt with in a treaty falls within 
provincial jurisdiction under Article 92, the decision of whether to pass 
implementing legislation in performance of the treaty obligation is provincial.55 
A comprehensive trade agreement however, such as the WTO Agreement56, 
addresses not only direct barriers to trade such as tariffs (or custom’s duties), 
which fall under federal authority, but also provincial practices that 
discriminate against goods of another country and that constitute indirect or 
non-tariff barriers to trade between agreeing countries.57 Québec has 
specifically implemented the WTO Agreement, through the Act respecting the 
implementation of international trade agreements58. Ontario has not passed 
similar legislation. Absent this form of implementing legislation, it may be 
possible for Ontario to contest the applicability of the WTO Agreement to the 
FIT Program were Canada to decide to force Ontario to abide by the WTO 
Agreement or any WTO ruling pursuant thereto.  
Notwithstanding this, Canada cannot set-up its domestic constitutional 
                                                 
55 R.E. R SULLIVAN, “Jurisdiction to Negotiate and Implement Free Trade Agreements in 
Canada: Calling the Provincial Bluff”, (1987) 24 U. W. Ontario L. Rev. 63, p. 68. 
56 Implemented in Canada through the World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation 
Act, S.C. 1994, c. 47. 
57 Peter W. HOGG, Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 1, Carswell, 5th ed. supp., 2010, p 11-
18. 
58 R.S.Q. c. M-35.2, s. 2 (adopted in 1996). 
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arrangements to excuse non-conformity with WTO obligations before a WTO 
adjudicating body.59 The WTO Agreement provides at Article II(2) that the 
various WTO agreements and texts are “binding on all Members”. More 
specifically, every member country is required to “ensure the conformity of its 
laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations” under 
WTO law. Canadian provincial measures have indeed already successfully been 
contested before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”), as evidenced by 
the recent softwood lumber disputes between Canada and the United States, 
which specifically dealt with provincial subsidization schemes.60 
Having reviewed the structure of Ontario and Québec’s electricity market and 
the requirements of the FIT Program and Community CFT, we now turn in 
Parts II and III to an examination of WTO law in order to determine whether 
such programs are actionable under said law. 
                                                 
59 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331 (23 May 1969), Article 27: “A 
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty.” 
60 See United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, 
WT/DS264/AB/RW (1 September 2006). Note that this case concerned measures taken by 
British Columbia which, like Ontario, has not adopted WTO implementing legislation. 
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Manufacturing and commercial monopolies owe their origin 
not to a tendency imminent in a capitalist economy but to 
governmental interventionist policy directed against free trade 
and laissez faire. 
 Ludwig Mises, Socialism¸1951 
[…] la vraie politique d’un pays doit tendre à affranchir tout 
tribut envers l’étranger, mais dans le secours honteux des 
douanes et des prohibitions. L’industrie ne peut être sauvée 
que par elle-même, la concurrence est sa vie. Protégée, elle 
s’endort; elle meurt par le monopole comme sous le tarif. 
Honoré de Balzac, Le médecin de campagne, 1833 
Part II – Subsidies Regulation and Renewable 
Energy 
Balzac and Mises’s words indicate they recognized the importance of free trade, 
the negative effects of subsidization and a belief that subsidies protected against 
competition and inevitably led to non-competitive, inefficient, bloated and 
wasteful domestic industries. An analogous belief existed amongst trading 
nations’ governments of the negative effects of subsidies. They understood that 
unbridled and competing national subsidies undermined global prosperity.  
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The international community has been fashioning guidelines that distinguish 
between acceptable and unacceptable national subsidy measures for nearly a 
century. In Sections 1 to 3 below, we outline the history of international 
subsidies regulation, to allow for a fuller understanding of subsidies regulation 
developments that eventually led to the discipline’s broad applicability to 
international trade and domestic policy. 
In Section 4, we cover in greater detail the SCM Agreement and analyze its 
potential applicability to Ontario and Québec’s renewable energy support 
mechanisms.  
Section 1 – The Life of a Subsidy Before the GATT 
Prior to the advent of global rules applicable to subsidies, national 
countervailing duty61 laws were the only effective means by which countries 
could neutralize the adverse effects of subsidies. The laws were designed to 
offset subsidies by increasing the tariffs placed over the applicable imported 
good equal to the delta between the subsidized good and the theoretical 
unsubsidized version of it.62 
In the United States for instance, a countervailing duty law was first enacted in 
                                                 
61 Countervailing Duty is a “Duty” imposed as a “Countermeasure” against another country’s 
imports: see Annex 1 hereto. 
62 Terence P. STEWART, note 2 above, p. 812. 
    
29
1890 to deal with export subsidies (i.e. subsidies afforded to local industry that 
lower the cost – thereby increasing the amount – of exports) on sugar.63 In 
1897, the U.S. enacted a general countervailing duty law which “required that a 
countervailing duty equal to the net amount of the subsidy (“bounty or grant”) 
bestowed be imposed on dutiable merchandise which had received, directly or 
indirectly, a bounty or grant on exportation.”64 Similar laws have since been 
enacted in Canada65, Australia, the European Community, Chile and Japan.66  
Section 2 – GATT 1947 and the Debut of International 
Subsidies Regulation 
During negotiations surrounding the GATT 1947, members decided to include 
rules dealing with subsidies. The provisions incorporated into the final 
document represented a balancing act between sound economic doctrine and an 
understanding of what was possible with subsidies regulation at the time. 67 On 
the one hand, negotiators were persuaded that any subsidy would interfere with 
the optimum allocation of resources on a global and national level. 68 On the 
other hand, “drafters understood that most countries maintained various 
                                                 
63 Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 584 (1890). 
64 Tariff Act of 1897, 30 Cong.Rec. 1634 (1897). 
65 Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-15 (hereinafter the “Special Import 
Measures Act”), s. 6. 
66 Terence P. STEWART, note 2 above, p. 813.  
67 John W. EVANS “Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in the GATT: Present Law and 
Future Prospects”, (1977-1978) 3 Int’l Trade L. J. 211, p. 213. 
68 Id. 
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domestic subsidies, often with desirable social purposes, the international 
effects of which were negligible or virtually impossible to measure.”69 The 
result was a GATT that contained some guidance on the issue of subsidies, but 
little substance. 
2.1 Countervailing Duties 
National laws generally follow a procedure by which countervailing duties are 
imposed following a governmental investigation into another trading country’s 
use of subsidies.70 Investigations were – and still are – sparked by requests 
made by local industry who feel their products are disadvantaged by a foreign 
government’s subsidy practices.71 
The GATT 1947’s Article VI imposed restrictions on countries seeking to apply 
domestic countervailing measures. First, it defines countervailing duty as “a 
special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy 
bestowed, either directly or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or 
export of any merchandise”. Second, the amount of any countervailing duty 
imposed by a GATT signatory is limited to “an amount equal to the estimated 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 Edmond MCGOVERN, International trade regulation: GATT, the United States, and the 
European Community, Exeter, Globefield Press, 1986, p. 331. 
71 In Canada, see Special Import Measures Act, s. 31. 
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bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted.”72 A country’s ability to 
levy a duty is restricted to those cases where the party seeking to impose a duty 
can demonstrate that subsidization was “such as to cause or threaten material 
injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the 
establishment of a domestic industry.”73 Other than these restrictions, the 
original GATT 1947 afforded members discretion in the design and functioning 
of their countervailing regime. 
2.2 Subsidies 
The most important restrictions on the use of subsidies are located in Article 
XVI of GATT 1947. The article is divided in two: section A deals with 
notification and consultation procedures, while section B tackles export 
subsidies. 
2.2.1 Notification and Consultation 
GATT 1947 Article XVI, Section A provides that GATT members (or 
“contracting parties”) are bound to notify other members when they consider 
that the latter’s acts constitute subsidies and that discussions on the possibility 
of “limiting” the subsidy must be entered into between the relevant contracting 
parties. Not surprisingly, many signatories took the position that merely 
                                                 
72 GATT 1947, Article VI(3). 
73 GATT 1947, Article VI(6)(a). 
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entering into discussions discharged them of their obligations under Article 
XVI.74 A working party on EC refunds on exports of sugar observed however, 
that the committee preparing the GATT 1947 subsidies provisions believed the 
intention was to oblige subsidizing members to participate in discussions 
concerning the subsidy at an international level and to provide for “limiting” 
subsidization so that its prejudicial effects might be reduced.75 The word 
“limiting” was therefore used to reinforce members’ obligation to maintain 
subsidization at as low a level as possible and remind them that the gradual 
reduction of subsidy payments over time was sought-after.76 Nevertheless, these 
notification and consultation requirements were often ignored: 
The role of Article XVI in providing the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES with accurate information about the nature and 
extent of subsidies in individual countries has been partly 
frustrated by the failure of some contracting parties to notify 
the subsidies they maintain. […] a contracting party can be 
required to consult concerning a subsidy, whether or not it has 
been notified. There seems, therefore, [to be] no advantage to 
a contracting party in refraining from notifying subsidies; on 
the contrary, notifications may dispel undue suspicions 
concerning those subsidies not previously notified.77 
                                                 
74 Edmond MCGOVERN, note 70 above, p. 331. 
75 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Report of the working party on EC refunds on exports of 
sugar, BISD 28S/80, 1982; Edmond MCGOVERN, note 70 above, p. 331. 
76 Id. 
77 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Guide to GATT Law and Practice, vol. 1: Articles I-
XXI, Geneva, World Trade Organization, 1995, p. 449.  
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2.2.2 Export Subsidies 
Although a 1955 review session had initially sought to develop more 
meaningful restrictions on the use of subsidies, that attempt largely failed.78 The 
result was a GATT 1947 that only regulated the use of export subsidies 
(subsidies that operate directly or indirectly to increase exports), completely 
ignoring the effects subsidizing domestic industries could have on global trade.  
Section B of Article XVI was introduced with the hope of limiting the growing 
use of export subsidies and countering their distorting effects on world trade. 
Unfortunately, no direct prohibition of export subsidies was included.79 The 
export subsidy provisions were further diluted by the inclusion of a distinction 
between primary and non-primary products. This distinction would be 
continued under the WTO regime with subsidies disciplined differently 
depending on whether they are applied to agricultural or non-agricultural 
products.80 
Article XVI, paragraph 4 governed non-primary products, but only with respect 
to those countries that had accepted the Declaration Giving Effect to the 
                                                 
78 John H. JACKSON and William J. DAVEY, Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations: Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International Regulations of 
Transnational Economic Relations, 2nd ed., St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1986, p. 727. 
79 Edmond MCGOVERN, note 70 above, p. 320-321. 
80 See Part II, Section 4 hereto. 
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Provisions of Article XVI:481 (the “Subsidies Declaration”). The Subsidies 
Declaration provided that accepting parties refrain from direct subsidization 
that resulted in the sale of a product for export at a price lower than the 
comparable price charged for a similar product to buyers in the domestic 
market. 
Surprisingly, the GATT 1947 did not provide a definition of “subsidy”. In fact, 
a 1961 Panel report concluded that an agreed interpretation was neither 
necessary nor feasible considering that it would be impossible to arrive at a 
definition which would at the same time include all measures that fall within 
the intended meaning of Article XVI and exclude others not so intended.82  
In sum, the rules applicable to subsidies remained limited and confused 
throughout this initial era of international subsidies regulation. As we have 
seen, not only were they drafted in such a way as to make compliance relatively 
voluntary (consider the notification procedures), but they used unclear language 
open to broad interpretation. The GATT 1947 therefore did not provide 
adequate regulation of subsidy policies and did not prevent the continued 
expansion of those policies. The initial shortcomings of the subsidy rules forced 
                                                 
81 Only 17 countries ever adopted the Subsidies Declaration, see Guiguo WANG, The Law of 
the WTO: China and the Future of Free Trade, Hong Kong, Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2005, p. 
647. 
82 GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES, Report of the Panel on subsidies, BISD 10S/201, 1962, 
p. 208; Edmond MCGOVERN, note 70 above, p. 319. 
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signatories to eventually decide to go back to the drawing board. 
Section 3 – The Tokyo Round Subsidies Code 
The period following adoption of the GATT and the beginning of the Tokyo 
Round negotiations in 1974 witnessed an unprecedented increase in the use of 
subsidies by governments, as their economies struggled to adapt to the post-
reconstruction economic reality. Then Director-General Oliver Long 
summarized the backdrop to the Tokyo Round subsidies negotiations as 
follows: 
Under the influence of political and social necessity, 
governments have embarked on massive financial 
commitments in order, among other things, to prop up ailing 
industries, to support depressed areas, to stimulate consumer 
demand or to promote exports. Subsidies have become an 
important instrument of protection.83  
Trading nations recognized the danger increased subsidization posed to market 
access and trade, but were divergent in their views on how to deal with the 
issue. Although some, like the United States, were particularly interested in 
strengthening the rules governing subsidies, most countries believed that 
stringent international regulation of domestic subsidies would amount to 
                                                 
83 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (ORGANIZATION), note 6 above, 
p. 53. 
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intolerable interference in domestic policy. 84  
Nevertheless, with the Tokyo Round about to begin, negotiators optimistically 
declared their intention to reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. 
Domestic subsidies, separate from subsidies used to buttress a country’s export 
industry, were therefore finally on the agenda.85  
The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the “Subsidies Code”) was the 
result of the Tokyo Round negotiations on subsidization.86 Instead of amending 
the multilateral text, drafters opted to create a separate agreement that 
interpreted the GATT 1947 subsidy provisions. The Subsidies Code had as its 
main purpose to counter the effects of subsidies and ensure that subsidization 
did not adversely affect the interests of other signatories to the Subsidies 
Code.87 It included four parts dealing with export subsidies, domestic subsides, 
countervailing duties and dispute settlement procedures.  
3.1 Export Subsidies 
Contrary to the situation under the Subsidies Declaration, where disciplining 
                                                 
84 Terence P. STEWART, note 2 above, p. 816. 
85 Id. 
86 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, reprinted in GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected 
Documents (BISD) 26th Supp. at 56 (1980). 
87 Subsidies Code, at Preamble.  
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export subsidies required a pricing determination, the Subsidies Code’s 
provisions on export subsidies included an illustrative list of deemed prohibited 
subsidies which were actionable regardless of their effect on other contracting 
parties’ domestic industry.88 Examples included governments directing 
subsidies to firms contingent upon export performance and the full or partial 
exemption of direct taxes related to exports. As in the GATT 1947 text, export 
subsidies on primary products were not generally prohibited.89 
Signatories of the Subsidies Code could however contest other contracting 
parties’ export subsidies in two ways by demonstrating: (i) that a subsidy was 
specifically prohibited pursuant to the Illustrative List; or (ii) in all other 
circumstances, that the subsidy caused injury to its domestic industry, 
nullification or impairment of benefits under the GATT 1947 or serious 
prejudice. This latter effect-based trigger to actionability would be further 
refined, as we shall see, under the SCM Agreement’s provisions governing 
actionable subsidies.90 
3.2 Domestic Subsidies 
Concerning domestic subsidies, the Subsidies Code recognized their important 
                                                 
88 Subsidies Code, Article 9(2). The Illustrative List of Export Subsidies was annexed to the 
Subsidies Code. 
89 Subsidies Code, Illustrative List of Export Subsidies. 
90 Subsidies Code, Article 13(4). 
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role in the development of national economies: they would therefore not be 
completely banned. Instead, the Subsidies Code reminded countries that 
domestic subsidies might have an unfavorable impact on the trade levels of 
other countries and that such affected countries had the right to take measures 
to offset that impact.91 
Hence, where the export of subsidized products led to injury to the industry of 
the importing country, the importing country was entitled to levy countervailing 
duties on imported products.92 In cases where the situation was particularly 
serious, the importing country was permitted to prohibit the import of certain 
products in order to maintain its competitive position. The exporting country 
subject to such measures was permitted to seek redress through consultation 
and dispute settlement mechanisms.93 
3.3 Countervailing Duties 
On the issue of countervailing duties, the Subsidies Code contained fairly 
specific provisions. It included rules on the means for determining the existence 
of subsidies, the examination of countervailing duty measures, as well as the 
circumstances under which interim protective measures could be taken. The 
Subsidies Code also contained rules on how to enact and enforce domestic 
                                                 
91 Subsidies Code, Article 11(1). 
92 See discussion of “injury” in Section 4.5.1 and Annex 1 hereto. 
93 WANG, note 81 above, p. 658; Subsidies Code, Article 11. 
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countervailing duty laws. This represented a significant step in that the 
Subsidies Code removed some of the discretion GATT signatories had in 
applying countervailing measures and offered guidance on the appropriate use 
of countervailing measures.94 
3.4 Dispute Settlement 
Concerning notification, consultation and dispute settlement, the Subsidies 
Code again represented a significant improvement over the original GATT 
1947 text.95 With respect to dispute settlement, it emphasized full utilization of 
the consultation process: any contracting party could request bilateral 
consultations with parties that had allegedly violated the Subsidies Code. 
Countries were then obliged to comply with the request in order to attempt a 
mutually satisfactory solution. If consultations failed, a signatory could refer the 
dispute to a committee composed of one representative from each of the 
contracting parties. That committee would examine the facts of the dispute and 
recommend solutions. Where the dispute remained unresolved, the parties could 
request that a Panel be appointed to examine the matter and suggest a 
solution.96  
Notwithstanding the various improvements the Subsidies Code offered, it 
                                                 
94 WANG, note 81 above, p. 659; Subsidies Code, Articles 4 and 5. 
95 WANG, note 81 above, p. 660. 
96 See Subsidies Code, Articles 3, 7, 12, 13, 18. 
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nevertheless failed to resolve the problems associated with subsidies in 
international trade, namely their identification and the enforcement of rules 
meant to limit their use. As the Tokyo Round drew to a close, negotiators 
proclaimed its failure for not providing any substantive solutions to these basic 
issues.97 
Section 4 – The SCM Agreement and Renewable 
Energy 
As trading nations gathered for the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations around an ambitious agenda, they signified their intent to once 
again devote considerable time and effort on subsidies regulation. Negotiations 
would be based on a review of the Subsidies Code and of Articles VI and XVI 
of the GATT 1947 in order to improve regulation of subsidies and 
countervailing measures affecting international trade. A negotiating group was 
established to deal with these issues.98 
The next section reviews the efforts undertaken during the Uruguay Round to 
improve international subsidies regulation. We then provide a detailed 
explanation of the result of those efforts: the SCM Agreement. Throughout, we 
                                                 
97 Terence P. STEWART, note 2 above, p. 821; Jeffrey S. THOMAS and Michael A. MEYER, 
The New Rules of Global Trade: A Guide to the World Trade Organization, Toronto, Carswell, 
1997, p. 153. 
98 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (Punta Del Este Declaration), GATT Doc. 
No. MIN. DEC. (Sept. 20, 2986), p. 7. 
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analyze the SCM Agreement’s applicability to Ontario and Québec renewable 
energy support mechanisms. 
4.1 Background 
Following the adoption of the Subsidies Code, the effects of subsidization on 
international trade continued to be problematic: 
There has been a substantial increase in the use of subsidies in 
industry […] during the 1980s. Subsidies […] have become 
an important element in world trade to the extent that, in some 
sectors, financial ability to subsidise exports has overridden 
competitive reality.99 
While international trade law attempted to regulate subsidies to facilitate market 
access, some countries began to use anti-subsidy and countervailing measures 
in order to increase barriers to markets. Furthermore, the form and content of 
national subsidization policies were modified in order to circumvent existing 
GATT subsidies rules.100 
In 1985, less than six years after the conclusion of the Tokyo Round, a GATT 
report identified subsidies as being at “the root of the most serious and 
intractable trade disputes that have been brought before the GATT”.101 The 
                                                 
99 Terence P. STEWART, note 2 above, p. 809. 
100 Guiguo WANG, note 81 above, p. 644. 
101 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (ORGANIZATION), Trade 
Policies for a Better Future, 1985, p. 39. 
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report provided detailed information on specific problems associated with 
subsidies regulation following the Tokyo Round. It served as a key discussion 
document that would frame negotiations surrounding subsidies regulation 
throughout the Uruguay Round. Selective findings include: 
Under the present rules, export subsidies on manufactured 
products are banned except for developing countries. […] 
Although domestic subsidies are permitted, they are subject to 
retaliation if they damage the trade interests of other 
countries. 
[…]  In the case of domestic subsidies, their full effects often 
emerge only some time after they are granted. If these effects 
are limited to the country where the subsidy is given, they are 
solely the affair of its citizens, but if international trade is 
affected, other countries may be legitimately concerned. In 
either case, more open procedures for considering subsidies 
can only be helpful. 
Actions against subsidies must also be brought within clear 
rules: some measures now being taken against subsidies […] 
are illegal and therefore unfair, as are domestic procedures 
which permit harassment or importers. The rules defining 
injury should be clarified, and the type of offsetting 
procedures and actions permissible more strictly defined. 
Every effort should be made to bring all GATT members 
within the scope of the improved subsidy rules. 
[…] Moreover, GATT should be the place where it can be 
determined what is acceptable under whatever rules are 
adopted. GATT’s complaint procedures for subsidy cases 
should be broadened and strengthened. Only then will the 
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system be able to determine what is fair and what is not.102 
Although many delegates of the Uruguay Round GATT Negotiating Group 
were reluctant to give up their freedom to subsidize, they were able to 
successfully include the SCM Agreement in the WTO Agreement. In doing so, 
they ensured that subsidies regulation would form part of the multilateral 
framework applicable to all WTO members and that domestic subsidies would 
finally be regulated.103 
4.2 Structure 
The SCM Agreement104 includes thirty-two articles divided into eleven parts. 
Seven annexes are also attached. The most substantive features are located in 
Parts II through V, with Parts II, III and IV dealing with subsidies and Part V 
with countervailing duties. The agreement buttresses the subsidy and 
countervailing duty provisions contained within the GATT text and Subsidies 
Code, while at the same time dealing new substantive and procedural rules. 
In addition to providing a definition of what constitutes a subsidy, the SCM 
Agreement continues the Subsidies Code’s prohibition of subsidies contingent 
on (i) export performance or (ii) the use of domestic over imported goods. 
                                                 
102 Id.; Jeffrey S. THOMAS, note 97 above, p. 153-154. 
103 Terence P. STEWART, note 2 above, p. 812. 
104 See copy in Annex 3 hereto. 
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Other subsidies may still be actionable if they cause adverse effects to the 
interests of other WTO members, such as an injury to such member’s domestic 
industry. This categorization of subsidies reflects the understanding the “certain 
subsidies are trade distorting per se, while others are either potentially trade 
distorting and still others are not trade distorting at all”105. Finally, the SCM 
Agreement offers detailed provisions governing remedies available to WTO 
members seeking to discipline a fellow members’ subsidization measures. 
4.3 Definition of Subsidy 
One of the more interesting debates during the Uruguay Round centered on the 
fact that neither the GATT text, nor the Subsidies Code, offered a definition of 
subsidy. As discussed, this apparent failure reflected a belief within the trading 
community that any attempt to define the term “subsidy” would be either under-
inclusive or over-inclusive.106 
The SCM Agreement thankfully does provide at Article 1(1) a definition of the 
                                                 
105 Debra P. STEYER, “The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement: Ahead of its 
Time or Time for Reform?”, (2010) 44(4) Journal of World Trade 779, p. 782. 
106 See Part II, Section 2.2.2 hereto 
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term “subsidy”.107 The definition elucidates a three-part test: only when each 
component of the test is met can one conclude the existence of a subsidy. As 
such, the definition acts as a gate which, once all of its elements are met, 
unlocks to enable the SCM Agreements various disciplinary provisions. The 
components of the test are as follows: 
(i) The subsidy must constitute a financial contribution or some form of 
income support by a domestic government or a public body; which 
(ii) confers a benefit to its recipient; and 
(iii) which is granted to a specific recipient.108 
4.3.1 A Financial Contribution 
The SCM Agreement’s Article 1.1(a)(1) provides examples of government 
financial contributions that would be considered to fall under the scope of the 
first part of the test:  
(i) a direct transfer of funds or liabilities (e.g. grants, loans, equity 
                                                 
107 With respect to energy subsidies, the United Nations Environment Program offers a simple 
definition which nevertheless captures some of the intent of the SCM Agreement, and which 
allows us to focus in on the application of subsidies to renewable energy production: “An 
energy subsidy is any government action that lowers the cost of energy production, raises the 
price received by energy producers or lowers the price paid by energy consumers.” in UNITED 
NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM, Reforming Energy Subsidies – An explanatory 
summary of the issues and challenges in removing or modifying subsidies on energy that 
undermine the pursuit of sustainable development, United Nations Environment Program and 
the International Energy Agency, 2002. 
108 Petros C. MAVROIDIS, SHOENBAUM, Thomas J. and Mitsuo MATSUSHITA, The World 
Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2006, p. 336. 
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infusions and loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not 
collected (e.g. tax credits); 
(iii) the provision of goods or services other than general infrastructure; 
or 
(iv) payments to a funding mechanism, either directly or indirectly 
though a private body, carrying out one or more of the type of 
functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be 
vested in the government.109 
As such, a financial contribution can therefore be made either by a government 
directly or indirectly through a private body under direct or indirect government 
control. Furthermore, a financial contribution can take many forms, including 
the supply of moneys or other goods.  
Meaning of Financial Contribution 
The Panel in US – Softwood Lumber III110 analyzed the extent of the notion of 
financial contribution and determined that such a notion must be broadly 
interpreted. Under a Canadian government program, persons wanting to harvest 
timber on lands owned by the Canadian government were required to first enter 
into licensing agreements with the appropriate provincial government. The 
licensing agreements allowed the licensee to harvest timber on the relevant 
                                                 
109 SCM Agreement, Article 1.1(a)(1). 
110 United States – Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, Report of the Panel, WT/DS236/R (27 September 2002). 
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land. As a condition-precedent to entering into such license agreements 
however, the licensees had to commit to various service and maintenance 
obligations, including road-building and fire prevention. The licensees were 
also technically required to pay a stumpage fee – a fee charged in order to 
maintain the right to harvest timber – however no price per unit of timber was 
levied by the federal government. The timber was therefore provided for 
harvest for free.  
The issue arose as to whether this granting of timber would qualify as a 
financial contribution under the SCM Agreement’s Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) relating 
to goods and services other than general infrastructure. According to the Panel, 
it did:  
[…] we find that through the Canadian provincial government 
stumpage programmes, Crown timber is being supplied to 
tenure holders. Standing timber is a valuable input for logs 
which may be processed by sawmills into softwood lumber 
[…] there is no basis in the text of the SCM Agreement to 
limit the term “goods” to tradeable products with a potential 
or actual tariff line […] we consider that standing timber, 
trees, are goods in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the 
SCM Agreement. (emphasis added)111 
Direct or Indirect Financial Contributions 
With respect to indirect financial contributions – through a private body – 
                                                 
111 Id., para. 7.29 
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Panels have determined that although an explicit government instruction given 
to an entity to provide a financial contribution would satisfy the requirements of 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv), such explicit instruction is not absolutely necessary. 
Circumstantial evidence may suffice and a case-by-case analysis called for.112 
Hence, in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS113, the Appellate 
Body analyzed the extent of the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv), providing that 
the concept included situations where government cedes responsibility to a 
private body or exercises governmental authority over a private body.114  
With respect to direct financial contributions – through a public body – the 
Panel in EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAMS Chips115 provided that 
where entities are state-owned, “all that is required [to satisfy the first part of 
the SCM Agreement’s test with respect to the existence of a subsidy] is 
evidence that a financial contribution did occur”.116 
As seen, the FIT Program guarantees renewable energy facilities an above-
market price for electricity. In Québec, guaranteed purchase prices are 
provided. As such, we can surmise that both programs provide developers with 
                                                 
112 Petros C. MAVROIDIS, note 108 above, p. 344. 
113 United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors (DRAMs), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS296/AB/R (27 June 2005). 
114 Id., para. 116. 
115 EC – Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access Memory Chips from Korea, 
Report of the Panel, WT/DS299/R (17 June 2005). 
116 Petros C. MAVROIDIS, note 108, p. 345 
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a financial contribution, particularly considering the broad interpretation of the 
concept illustrated in the US – Softwood Lumber III case. 
With respect to electricity (as with all sources of energy, including oil and gas) 
subsidy funding can be “provided directly by energy users or through the 
general budget” of the relevant governmental entity.117 The issue is therefore 
whether the FIT Program and Community CFT’s financial contribution can be 
considering as stemming (indirectly or directly) from a governmental entity, 
thereby placing such financial contributions to facility developers under the 
SCM Agreement’s lens. The European Court’s PreussenElektra case analyzed 
whether minimum-price purchase requirements for electricity sourced from 
renewable energy contained in the German FIT program were considered “state 
aid”.118 The Court concluded that payments under such program could not 
constitute governmental aid, since they did not involve the direct or indirect 
transfer of government moneys. Rather, the Court noted that an obligation was 
being placed on third parties, such as electricity distributors, to pay the FIT to 
eligible facilities.119 
This analysis would not necessarily be cogent under WTO law. Indeed, since 
                                                 
117 James CUST, note 17 above, p. 5.  
118 PreussenElektra Aktiengesellschaft v. Schleswag Aktiengesellschaft, European Court of 
Justice, 13 March 2001, Case C-379/98. 
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the SCM Agreement’s Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) specifically contemplates 
purchasing goods120, “a situation where the government directs a private actor 
to purchase goods at a higher than market price [may be] included within the 
meaning of “financial contribution”, even if the government does not incur any 
cost itself”.121 
The OPA is a government controlled public body. It receives mandatory 
directives from the MEI by virtue of the Electricity Act. The FIT Program was a 
result of such a directive, whereby the government instructed the OPA to create 
the FIT electricity price support mechanism. Although payments are not in all 
cases made directly by the OPA (since they are often paid by electricity 
distributors), the government of Ontario has mandated a mechanism whereby 
publicly held or controlled entities, namely the OPA, as well as private actors, 
such as Hydro-One Inc., the various local distribution companies and ultimately 
end-users of electricity, must make FIT payments to renewable energy facilities 
for the purchase of its electricity.122 
                                                 
120 Note that electricity is generally understood to be a “good” under international trade law. See 
discussion supra Part III, Section 3. 
121 Robert HOWSE and Antonia ELIASON, “Countervailing Duties and Subsidies for Climate 
Mitigation: What Is, and What Is Not, WTO-Compatible?” in Richard B. STEWARD et al 
(ed.), Climate Finance, Regulatory and Funding Strategies for Climate Change and Global 
Development, New York University Abu Dhabi Institute, New York University Press, 2009, p. 
264. See also discussion with respect to cost to government not being a determining factor 
supra Part II, Section 4.3.2. 
122 See FIT Contract, Article 4 (Statements and Payments). 
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The situation for HQD is more straightforward, since the Hydro-Québec Act 
provides that HQD is a mandatary (or agent) of the province and that all of its 
property is the property of the province.123 All payments under the relevant 
Community CFT PPA are made by HQD and the plain meaning of the Hydro-
Québec Act is that such payments should be considered as sourced from the 
Québec government’s treasury.124 
As such, both Ontario and Québec renewable energy support mechanisms can 
be considered as providing a “financial contribution”, satisfying the first part of 
the SCM Agreement’s definition of subsidy. 
4.3.2 Conferring a Benefit 
Not all government actions conferring a financial contribution constitute 
subsidies under the SCM Agreement. The determination of a financial 
contribution calls for an analysis of the motivations and methods of the 
government – or government controlled – entity, as well as an examination of 
the recipient of such contribution. 
In United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, the Panel 
observed that a financial contribution only confers a benefit or advantage if it is 
                                                 
123 Hydro-Québec Act, s. 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 
124 Community CFT PPA, s. 15 
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provided on terms that are more advantageous than those available on the 
market.125 As such, the Panel decided that a government making loans at market 
rates would not be conferring a benefit to recipients. The Appellate Body, in US 
– Lead and Bismuth II issued a broader test, less focused on the machinations of 
the market, determining simply that “there can be no “benefit” to the recipient 
unless the “financial contribution” makes the recipient “better off” than it would 
otherwise have been, absent such contribution.”126 
It is therefore possible to make a financial contribution without it constituting a 
benefit. Conversely, a government might provide a benefit but not a financial 
contribution. For example, it could restrain exports: benefiting users of the 
product by lowering its domestic value without the need for direct financial 
contributions.127 Finally, the Canada – Aircraft case analyzed the extent of the 
meaning of “benefit” in detail, removing any correlation with actual 
government expenditures from the determination. It concluded that:   
Canada insists that the concept of "cost to government" is 
relevant in the interpretation of "benefit". […] These 
situations cannot be excluded from the definition of "benefit" 
in Article 1.1(b), given that they are specifically included in 
                                                 
125 United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS194/R (29 June 2001), para. 8.73-8.74. 
126 United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and 
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate 
Body, WT/DS138/AB/R (10 May 1993), para 67. 
127 BRONKERS, Marco C.E.J. and Gary N. HORLICK, WTO Jurisprudence and Policy: 
Practitioners’ Perspectives, London, Cameron May, 2004, p. 322. 
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the definition of "financial contribution" in Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iv). We are, therefore, not persuaded by this 
argument of Canada.128 
Beneficiaries of the FIT Program and Community CFT are provided a financial 
contribution that grants terms more advantageous than those that would have 
been available on the market. The situation in Ontario is clear, considering the 
price per kWH that would be available to renewable energy facilities but for the 
FIT Program’s existence.129 Furthermore, that the province of Ontario or the 
OPA do not always incur a direct cost should not affect this analysis 
considering the Appellate Body’s analysis of the Canada – Aircraft case. 
In Québec, it is not immediately clear whether the price for electricity generated 
from an equivalent renewable energy facility would be less if the Community 
CFT was not available. Nevertheless, an application of the US – Lead and 
Bismuth II test indicates that winning bidders are indeed “better off” than would 
otherwise have been, absent the existence of the Community CFT, since they 
obtain a guaranteed price for electricity during the twenty year term of the PPA, 
need not compete with HQD’s comparatively lower cost of production hydro-
electric facilities, and are not subject to market fluctuations. As seen, there is 
furthermore a direct cost to government associated with the benefic since all 
                                                 
128 Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS70/AB/R (2 August 1999) (hereinafter “Canada – Aircraft”), para. 160. 
129 Compare Tables 1, 2 and 3 annexed hereto. 
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amounts are paid to the facility developers directly by HQD, which is itself a 
government-owned entity. 
Both the FIT Program and Community CFT therefore confer a “benefit” for the 
purposes of the second part of the SCM Agreement’s definition of subsidy. 
4.3.3 Which is Specific 
The applicability of the SCM Agreement to governmental subsidization 
measures is further conditioned by the definition of subsidy’s specificity 
requirement contained in Article 2. Subsidies must be “specific” to a particular 
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises and industries. By including this 
provision, negotiators highlighted their desire to ensure that only subsidy 
practices designed to help specific industrial sectors or enterprises are regulated 
and not generally available subsidies designed to achieve wider policy 
objectives.130 Hence, Article 2.1(a) of the SCM Agreement states that 
specificity will be found in cases where “the granting authority, or the 
legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, […] explicitly 
limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises […].”131 
                                                 
130 Petros C. MAVROIDIS, note 108 above, p. 353. 
131 For an example of a determination of specificity, see Indonesia – Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automobile Industry, Report of the Panel, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, 
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The SCM Agreement then provides at Articles 2.2 and 2.3 for three other 
situations where a subsidy will be presumed “specific”: (i) export subsidies; (ii) 
local content subsidies; and (iii) subsidies to companies in a specific region.132 
These types of subsidies are commonly referred to as being de jure specific: 
they will automatically be subject to discipline under the SCM Agreement.133 
Where none of the situations outlined above seem to apply – i.e. they are not 
granted to a specific enterprise and are not de jure specific – members are 
permitted to factually establish the existence of specificity. To do so, they may 
argue the actual use of a subsidy program by a limited number of enterprises, 
the granting of disproportionately large amounts of a broadly available subsidy 
to specific enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised 
by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.134 This 
determination will result in a subsidy being referred to as de facto specific. 
There is unfortunately little WTO jurisprudence dealing with the issue of 
specificity.135 However, both the FIT Program and Community CFT are by 
their very design and purpose limited to renewable energy developers and their 
                                                 
132 Petros C. MAVROIDIS, note 108 above, p. 354. 
133 Assuming, of course, that the first two parts of the definition of subsidy are met. 
134 SCM Agreement, Article 2.1 (c).  
135 LODEFALK, Magnus and Mark STOREY, “Climate Measures and WTO Rules on 
Subsidies”, (2005) 39(1) Journal of World Trade 23, p. 43. 
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corresponding facilities. Indeed, the Panel in US – Softwood Lumber IV136 
clarified that a finding of specificity should be arrived at even where a financial 
contribution conferred a benefit over an entire industry. This, combined with 
their respective local content requirements, would in our opinion lead to the 
programs likely being considered “specific” under the SCM Agreement. 
4.3.4 Renewable Energy Support Mechanisms as Subsidies 
As we have outlined above, both the FIT Program and Community CFT likely 
meet the three-tiered definition of subsidy contained in the SCM Agreement. 
Simply because a subsidy exists however, does not mean that it is actionable 
under international trade law. As such, with the general definition of subsidy 
out of the way, the SCM Agreement then divides subsidies into two distinct 
categories: prohibited (red light) and actionable (yellow light).137 Only those 
subsidies that fall under these two categories will be subject to countermeasures 
under the SCM Agreement. 
4.4 Prohibited Subsidies 
Part II of the SCM Agreement addresses so-called “red light” subsidies: export 
subsidies and local content subsidies. These subsidies are completely prohibited 
                                                 
136 United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada, Report of the Panel, WT/DS257/R (29 August 2003), para. 143. 
137 Jeffrey S. THOMAS, note 97 above, p. 157. 
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by the SCM Agreement and as such their disciplining does not depend on their 
ultimate effect on fellow WTO members such as whether they cause injury to 
foreign industries.138 
4.4.1 Export Subsidies 
Export subsidies are those contingent, in law or in fact, on export performance. 
Annex I of the SCM Agreement, similarly to the Subsidies Code, provides an 
Illustrative List of subsidies that are deemed prohibited export subsidies: 
A measure that falls within the scope of the Illustrative List is 
deemed to be prohibited export subsidy. In other words, a 
Member may establish that a measure is a prohibited export 
subsidy by going directly to the Illustrated List, without first 
demonstrating that a measure falls within the scope of Article 
3.1(a). […] measures in the Annex are ipso facto ‘subsidies 
contingent upon export performance’.139 
A subsidy falling under the auspices of the Illustrative List therefore renders an 
immediate determination of the existence of a prohibited – and therefore 
actionable – export subsidy. This is contrasted against a de jure or de facto 
export subsidy determination, which depends on an analysis of the legal 
requirements or factual circumstances surrounding the subsidy, the whole as 
provided by the Appellate Body in Canada - Aircraft, whereby the Appellate 
                                                 
138 ZHANG, note 11 above, p.5. 
139 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Recourse to Arbitration by Canada 
under Article 21.5 of the DSU, Decision of the Panel, WT/DS46/RW (9 May 2000), para. 6.31. 
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Body attempted to clarify the exact method by which a subsidy will be deemed 
contingent on export performance. It stated: 
De jure export contingency is demonstrated on the basis of 
the words of the relevant legislation, regulation or legal 
document. Proving de facto export contingency is a much 
more difficult task. There is no single legal document that will 
demonstrate, on its face, that a subsidy is ‘contingent […] in 
fact […] upon export performance’. Instead, the existence of 
this relationship of contingency, between the subsidy and 
export performance, must be inferred from the total 
configuration of the facts constituting and surrounding the 
granting of the subsidy […].140 
With respect to the FIT Program and Community CFT, the subsidies afforded 
under the renewable energy support mechanisms are in no way contingent on 
export performance and as such would not be considered a prohibited subsidy 
under the export subsidy provisions of Part II of the SCM Agreement. 
4.4.2 Local Content Subsidies 
The second category of prohibited subsidy is local content subsidies contingent, 
whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic 
over imported goods. Unlike Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, which 
refers to subsidies contingent “in law or in fact” on export performance, Article 
3.1(b) contains no such qualifier. Notwithstanding, the Appellate Body in 
                                                 
140 Canada – Aircraft, paragraphs 166-167. 
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Canada – Autos141 provided that a legal or factual analysis could be undertaken 
in order to determine whether subsidies were contingent on the use of domestic 
goods.  
The case considered a complaint by the European Communities and Japan on a 
Canadian measure that offered a duty exemption for the importation of certain 
motor vehicles if the importer had produced similar vehicles in Canada during a 
reference period. The complainants argued, among other elements, a violation 
of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. Canada countered, and the Panel 
agreed, that the measure was not in violation of Article 3.1(b) since it was not, 
in law, contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods, considering the 
use of domestic goods was one of several alternative conditions provided in the 
relevant regulations for receiving the subsidy. On appeal, the complainants 
argued that a determination of whether a subsidy is contingent “in fact” upon 
the use of domestic over imported goods should also have been made, since the 
configuration of facts surrounding the granting of the subsidy was such that the 
subsidy was granted only if the recipient used domestic over imported goods. 
The Appellate Body agreed and stated the following: 
Finally, we believe that a finding that Article 3.1(b) extends 
only to contingency "in law" upon the use of domestic over 
                                                 
141 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, 
WT/DS142/AB/R, (19 June 2000) (hereinafter “Canada – Autos”). 
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imported goods would be contrary to the object and purpose 
of the SCM Agreement because it would make circumvention 
of obligations by Members too easy.142 
The task of the DSB is therefore to analyze all legal and factual circumstances 
surrounding the subsidy in order to determine whether it is possible for the 
subsidized party to purchase imports instead of domestic goods and still receive 
the relevant subsidy.143 
The granting of a PPA under both Ontario and Québec programs is not 
immediately contingent on meeting the relevant local content requirements. 
Both programs allow developers to sign a PPA – and therefore potentially 
access the subsidy – without meeting local content requirements. Furthermore, 
both programs impose a percentage requirement of local content, such that they 
do not provide an absolute requirement that all inputs to the development and 
construction of the renewable energy facility be locally sourced. 
Nevertheless, the receipt of payments under both PPAs is contingent on 
meeting local content requirements when applying the configuration of facts 
analysis elaborated by the Appellate Body in the Canada – Autos case. Under 
the FIT Contract, not achieving the required levels leads to a termination 
                                                 
142 Id., para 142. 
143 Andrew GREEN, “Trade Rules and Climate Change Subsidies”, (2006) 5:3 World Trade 
Review 377, p. 397. 
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event.144 The Community CFT does not mandate termination of the relevant 
PPA in all cases: it imposes stiff penalties that remove much of the economic 
benefit associated with the renewable energy facility where the relevant Québec 
content is not achieved and the PPA’s termination in cases where the wind 
turbines are not sourced in Québec.145 
However, since WTO subsidies regulations oversee governmental policy146 the 
question of whether the FIT and Community CFT programs’ requirements are 
contractual – and not imposed by the relevant legislation – can justifiably be 
raised. We believe both Ontario and Québec renewable energy support 
mechanisms fail under a de jure and de facto analysis of whether receipt of the 
subsidy is contingent on the use of domestic goods. 
First, the FIT Directive clearly indicates that the OPA was required by the MEI 
to condition payment on local content requirements. It states: 
It is also important that the feed-in tariff program provide 
opportunity for Ontario manufacturers to participate in the 
economic benefits that will flow from the program. Therefore, 
I direct the OPA to require that each wind power and solar PV 
project […] contain a defined percentage of domestic content. 
[…] Domestic content provisions will be enforced through the 
FIT Contract. Developers who do not achieve the domestic 
content requirements should be subject to significant 
                                                 
144 FIT Contract, Article 9.1(a). 
145 Community CFT PPA, Article 29.2 and 32. 
146 See discussion on applicability of WTO rules to the programs in Part I, Section 3. 
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commercial consequences under the FIT Contract. (emphasis 
added)147 
In Québec, the regulations enacting the Community CFT specifically call for 
the sourcing of locally manufactured goods in the construction of the wind 
farm. They provide: 
La maximisation des retombées économiques au Québec en 
matière d’emplois et d’investissements doit se traduire, pour 
chaque projet, par la réalisation de dépenses au Québec 
correspondant à un minimum de dépenses au Québec 
correspondant à un minimum de 60 % des coûts globaux, 
incluant l’installation des éoliennes, étant entendu que les 
dépenses réalisées localement devront bénéficier d’un 
traitement préférentiel. 
La maximisation des retombées économiques en matière 
d’emplois ou d’investissements manufacturiers dans la 
municipalité régionale de comté (MRC) de Matane et dans la 
région administrative de la Gaspésie-Îles-de-la-Madeleine 
doit se traduire par la réalisation de dépenses, excluant 
l’installation des éoliennes, ou d’investissements 
manufacturiers correspondant à un  minimum de 30 % des 
coûts globaux, excluant l’installation des éoliennes, d’une 
production d’énergie éolienne équivalente à 250 MW. 
(emphasis added)148 
As such, applying a de jure analysis leads to a conclusion that the law mandates 
the use of local content in order to access the subsidy.  
One may however argue that receipt of the relevant benefits under the FIT 
                                                 
147 FIT Directive, page 2. 
148 1044-2008 and 1046-2008 Decrees, note 22 above, para. 6 and 7. 
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Program and Community CFT subsidy are conditional not only on domestic 
content, but also on the host of other factors contained within the relevant 
program rules and PPA. We believe this argument would not be tenable under 
WTO law when applying the Appellate Body’s reasoning in Canada – Autos 
with respect to de facto contingency.149 If we take wind energy projects as an 
example we note that under the FIT Program, the minimum required domestic 
content level is 25% for facilities entering into service prior to January 1, 2012 
and 50% for those entering into service thereafter. Regardless, the levels 
imposed render it impossible to construct an operational wind farm without 
meeting the required levels.150 Under the Community CFT, the situation is even 
clearer. The wind turbines used for the generation of electricity must be sourced 
from manufacturing centers based in the Gaspé region of Québec. Without wind 
turbines, there can be no wind energy facility.151 
Both programs therefore make receipt of the subsidy contingent, in law and/or 
in fact, upon meeting local content requirements and are likely to be considered 
prohibited under the SCM Agreement’s Article 3. 
4.5 Actionable Subsidies 
In order to provide a complete analysis of the actionability of Québec and 
                                                 
149 See discussion of case in Part I, Section 4.4.1. 
150 See Part I, Section 1.2.2 with respect to FIT Program. 
151 See Part I, Section 2.2.2 with respect to Community CFT. 
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Ontario renewable energy support mechanisms – since as seen it is altogether 
possible that they will not be considered prohibited outright under WTO law – 
we must also examine Part III of the SCM Agreement, which deals with so-
called “yellow light” subsidies: not immediately prohibited but nevertheless 
potentially actionable. The actionability of any such subsidy stems from article 
5 of the SCM Agreement which provides that no member should cause, through 
the use of any subsidy, adverse effects to the interests of other members. 
It is important to note that the SCM Agreement previously excluded certain 
subsidies from actionability, namely subsidies which, though specific, fall 
within the terms of paragraphs 2 (a) through (c) of Article 8, including for pre-
competitive research and development, regional development and 
environmental assistance. The relevant provisions were limited to a five-year 
application period before their continued applicability came under review. Their 
validity was not extended past December 31, 1999.152 Hence, all subsidies are 
now theoretically actionable under articles 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 of the SCM 
Agreement.153 
                                                 
152 See Anwaral HODA and Rajeev AHUJA, “Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures: Need for Clarification and Improvement”, 2005 39(6) Journal of World Trade 1009, 
p. 1022. 
153 Some authors have noted that re-instituting a “green-light” non-actionable category of 
subsidies deployed in furtherance of environmental goals should be considered as a way of 
accomplishing international carbon reduction requirements. See STEYER, note 105 above, p. 
796. 
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A complaining WTO member must, in order to establish an actionable subsidy, 
demonstrate that the measure causes an “adverse effect”, meaning:  
(i) some form of injury to another members’ domestic industry; 
(ii) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly 
to other Members under the WTO Agreements; or  
(iii) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.154 
Determining whether an adverse effect exists requires a predominantly fact-
based argumentation. The complainant must gather enough information to show 
how its domestic industry has been impacted. More importantly however – and 
more difficult – is the requirement to demonstrate causation between the 
alleged subsidy and adverse effect.155  
The US – Cotton156 case examined the extent of the causation requirement, 
finding that the causality threshold is not very high: the complainant does not 
need to provide detailed explanations on causality, nor quantify the subsidy and 
its effect on domestic industry. Rather, both the Panel and Appellate Body 
found that a strong correlation between the subsidy and domestic industry will 
                                                 
154 SCM Agreement, Article 5. 
155 GREEN, note 143 above, p. 402 - 403. 
156 United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS267/AB/R (3 March 2005) (hereinafter “US – Cotton”). See also Karen Halverson 
CROSS, “King Cotton, Developing Countries and the ‘Peace Clause’: the WTO’s US Cotton 
Subsidies Decision”, (2006) 9(1) Journal of International Economic Law 149. 
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suffice to meet the SCM Agreement’s causality requirement.157 This approach 
has been severely critiqued, since it sways from general legal standards, and 
“reduces the ability of the Panels and the Appellate Body to distinguish 
subsidies that are detrimental to international trade from those that are not[, 
sweeping] under the disciplines of the SCM Agreement subsidies that may not 
legitimately be of concern to international trade.”158 
4.5.1 Injury to domestic industry 
Article 15 of the SCM Agreement specifies that “injury” means material injury 
to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry, or 
material retardation of the establishment of such an industry. Article 16 of the 
SCM Agreement provides that the term “domestic industry” refers to domestic 
producers of like products or those whose collective output constitutes a major 
proportion of the total domestic production of those like products. A 
determination of injury or retardation must furthermore be based on positive 
evidence and involve an objective examination of the volume of the subsidized 
imports, the effect of the subsidized imports on prices in the domestic market 
for “like products”, and the consequent impact of these imports on domestic 
producers of such products.  
                                                 
157 US – Cotton, para 458. 
158 GREEN, note 143 above, p. 402 - 403. 
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The issue of “like products” is one of enormous complexity within WTO case 
law. The Indonesia – Autos case does however provide an excellent analytical 
example, as well as important guidance on the application of the criteria within 
the SCM Agreement. The Panel determined that whether a product is or is not a 
‘like product’ must be considered on a case-by-case basis and that Panels can 
only use their best judgment regarding whether in fact products are alike, 
depending on the evidence available to them.159 
As for the determination of a “threat of material injury”, Article 15 prudently 
specifies that such determinations must be based on facts and not on mere 
allegation, conjecture and remote possibility. The SCM Agreement also 
provides a list of factors to be considered when making a determination of 
threat of material injury, including: 
(i) the nature of the subsidy or subsidies in question and the trade 
                                                 
159 Indonesia – Autos, note 131 above, para. 14.173-14.174. The Panel also evidently provided 
its analysis factors: “In our view, the analysis as to which cars have ‘characteristics closely 
resembling’ those of the Timor logically must include as an important element the physical 
characteristics of the cars in question. This is especially the case because many of the other 
possible criteria identified by the parties are closely related to the physical characteristics of the 
cars in question. Thus, factors such as brand loyalty, brand image/reputation, status and resale 
value reflect, at least in part, an assessment by purchasers of the physical characteristics of the 
cars being purchased. Although it is possible that products that are physically very different can 
be put to the same uses, differences in uses generally arise out of, and assist in assessing the 
importance of, different physical characteristics of products. Similarly, the extent to which 
products are substitutable may also be determined in substantial part by their physical 
characteristics. Price differences also may (but will not necessarily) reflect physical differences 
in products. An analysis of tariff classification principles may be useful because it provides 
guidance as to which physical distinctions between products were considered by Customs 
experts.” 
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effects likely to arise therefrom; 
(ii) a significant rate of increase of subsidized imports into the domestic 
market;   
(iii) a substantial increase in the capacity of the exporter, indicating the 
likelihood of substantially increased subsidized exports to the 
importing Member’s market, taking into account the availability of 
other export markets to absorb any additional exports; 
(iv) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant 
depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would 
likely increase demand for further imports;  and 
(v) inventories of the product being investigated.160 
4.5.2 Nullification or impairment of benefits 
The footnote at Article 5(b) of the SCM Agreement explains that the term 
“nullification or impairment” is used in the same sense as it is used in the 
relevant provisions of GATT 1994.161 As such, a member can challenge an 
actionable subsidy to the extent that it nullifies or impairs the benefits of such 
member resulting from its participation in the WTO, for instance circumstances 
where the “effect of a tariff concession is systematically offset or counteracted 
by a subsidy programme”.162 
                                                 
160 SCM Agreement, Article 15.7. 
161 See GATT 1994, Article XXIII. 
162 United States — Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS217/R (16 September 2002), para. 7.127. 
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4.5.3 Serious prejudice 
Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement provides examples of where a subsidy may 
cause “serious prejudice” to the interests of another WTO member, including 
where the subsidy displaces or impedes the import of another member’s like 
product into the market of the subsidizing member. The DSB can also arrive at 
a finding of “serious prejudice” upon a global analysis of the measure, taking 
into account all evidence provided.163 Serious prejudice is, as such, somewhat 
easier to prove than “injury to a domestic industry” since the DSB is afforded 
greater discretion in its analysis.164 
Interestingly, Article 6.7 of the SCM Agreement provides exceptions in that no 
determination of a displacement or impediment will considered existing where, 
among others, such is due to a failure to conform to standards or other 
regulatory requirements concerning the relevant product in the importing 
country. 
4.5.4 Renewable Energy Support Mechanisms as Actionable Subsidies 
As discussed above, concluding the existence of an actionable subsidy under 
the SCM Agreement is effects-based, relying on the alleged measures’ impact 
                                                 
163 SCM Agreement, Article 6.8. 
164 GREEN, note 128 above, p. 402. 
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to and injury on another WTO member’s interests or its domestic industry. It is 
therefore difficult to surmise what fact-based arguments a member would raise 
against the FIT Program or Community CFT.  
Considering the various factors outlined above, although the success of such an 
action would depend on the strength of a complainant’s evidence, there does 
not appear to be any legal barrier preventing a WTO member from alleging – 
and potentially establishing – the programs’ actionability. Having concluded 
that the programs do indeed constitute a subsidy, a member could argue that a 
causal link exists between the FIT Program or Community CFT and a downturn 
in production renewable energy facility components sourced from its domestic 
industries, or the inability of its local renewable energy developers to source 
competitively priced components on international markets due to the Ontario 
and Québec market attracting a disproportionately high level of new and 
existing manufacturing capacity as a consequence of the subsidies granted. 
Having analyzed the various elements that must be proven in order to establish 
the existence of a subsidy, the following sections review the manner in which 
WTO members consult on, contest and eventually seek remedies against fellow 
members’ subsidization programs.  
4.6 Notification and Consultation 
Article 25 of the SCM Agreement calls for notifications and information 
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exchanges between WTO members in order to guarantee the proper functioning 
of the subsidy and countervailing duty regime. 
For instance, members must notify to the WTO’s Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures165 by July of each year the existence of any specific 
subsidy, as defined in Articles 1 and 2, granted or maintained within their 
territories. Members must also ensure that the notification contains information 
on, notably, the form of subsidy, its policy objective, its duration and statistical 
data permitting an assessment of the trade effects of the subsidy.166 We note 
that Canada has not notified with respect to either the FIT Program or the 
Community CFT in its recent 2010 report to the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.167 
The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures also serves as a 
forum of discussion between WTO members with respect to subsidization 
programs. In an effort to guarantee compliance, the SCM Agreement also 
provides that any member may request from another information on the nature 
and extent of any subsidy program maintained by the latter.168  On June 10, 
2010, a series of questions asked of Canada by Japan in relation to the FIT 
                                                 
165 Established pursuant to SCM Agreement, Article 24. 
166 SCM Agreement, Article 25.3. 
167 COMMITTEE ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES, Semi-Annual 
Report under Article 25.11 of the Agreement – Canada, G/SCM/N/203/CAN, March 17, 2010.  
168 SCM Agreement, Article 8. 
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Program was made public. We have reproduced the document hereto as Annex 
1, both to stress the relevance of our review of Québec and Ontario renewable 
energy support mechanisms and to highlight the process leading towards the 
disciplining of a subsidy under WTO law. Clearly, at questions (i) and (iv), 
Japan is attempting to determine whether the OPA is a public body making a 
financial contribution. Question (iii) seeks to determine whether a benefit is 
being conferred on the renewable energy developer. Questions (v) and (vi) seek 
to clarity whether the granting of the financial contribution is contingent on the 
use of domestic goods. In essence, we believe Japan is attempting to elucidate 
from Canada whether the FIT Program constitutes a prohibited “red light” 
subsidy.  
4.7 Remedies 
As we have seen, the FIT Program and Community CFT may be considered 
prohibited or actionable under the SCM Agreement. The SCM Agreement 
provides for a multilateral option and a unilateral option for counteracting 
subsidies.169 The following sections highlight the SCM Agreement’s dispute 
resolution mechanism (the multilateral option), as well as the procedure for 
imposing countervailing duties (the unilateral option), in order to address the 
                                                 
169 Petros C. MAVROIDIS, note 108 above, p. 364. No other remedies are possible, note 
Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement: “No specific action against a subsidy of another Member 
can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this 
Agreement.” 
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potential remedies that may be sought after by fellow WTO members against 
Canada.  
4.7.1 Dispute Mechanism 
Articles 4 to 7 of the SCM Agreement provide an adjudicative remedy to any 
WTO member who has reason to believe that a subsidy contrary to the SCM 
Agreement is being granted or maintained by another member. The process 
begins by a member requesting consultations with the other member who must 
then enter into such consultations as quickly as possible. It is important to note 
that the questions Japan asked of Canada and discussed above do not enter 
under the auspices of formal consultations within the context of a potential 
dispute.  
Following the request for consultations, if no solution can be reached within 30 
days (with respect to prohibited subsidies) or 60 days (in situations dealing with 
actionable subsidies), a member who was a party to the consultations may refer 
the matter to the WTO’s DSB in order to request the immediate establishment 
of a Panel. When prohibited subsidies are alleged, the Panel may ask for the 
assistance of the Permanent Group of Experts170 – a group of five individuals 
highly trained in subsidies and trade – who are then to review the evidence and 
                                                 
170 The Permanent Group of Experts is a SCM Agreement institution established by the 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures pursuant to Article 24.3 of the SCM 
Agreement. 
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report findings back to the Panel. 
The Panel must distribute a report to the parties in the subsidies dispute within 
90 days (prohibited subsidies) or 120 days (actionable subsidies) of its 
establishment. The DSB then adopts the report within 30 days, unless either of 
the parties signifies its intention to appeal the report. Once appealed, the 
Appellate Body is generally required to render a decision quickly, but in no 
case more that 60 days days (prohibited subsidies) or 90 days (actionable 
subsidies). The Appellate Body’s decision will then generally be adopted by the 
DSB, unless otherwise unanimously agreed to by the parties to the dispute.171 
If the Panel or the Appellate Body finds a subsidy to be prohibited or actionable 
and the respondent does not correct the disallowed policy, the DSB can grant 
authorization to the complaining member to take appropriate countermeasures 
such as the elimination of tariff concessions or permission to grant its domestic 
industry commensurate subsidies.172 As for the form and amount of 
countermeasures that will be deemed appropriate, the WTO’s dispute settlement 
bodies have been careful not to limit these to simple nullification and 
impairment of subsidies. The following clarifies the situation:  
 […] requiring that countermeasures in the form of suspension 
                                                 
171 SCM Agreement, Article 4.6 and 7.7. 
172 SCM Agreement, Article 7.9., 7.10 and 9.4. 
    
75
of concessions or other obligations be equivalent to the level 
of nullification or impairment would be contrary to the 
principle of effectiveness by significantly limiting the efficacy 
of countermeasures in the case of prohibited subsidies. 
Indeed, concessions or obligations may not always be feasible 
because of their potential effects on other Members. This 
would be the case of a counter-subsidy granted in a sector 
where other members than the parties compete with the 
products of the parties. In such a case, the Member taking the 
countermeasure may not be in a position to induce 
compliance.173 
Disputes on the appropriateness of the countermeasures are taken to arbitration 
in accordance with Article 22 of the DSU. 
4.7.2 Countervailing Measures 
Article 10 of the SCM Agreement allows members to unilaterally decide on the 
existence of a subsidy and impose countervailing duties against fellow WTO 
members insofar as the imposition is made in accordance with the provisions of 
the SCM Agreement and the GATT. Furthermore, members can only impose 
countervailing duties pursuant to the investigations initiated and conducted in 
accordance with the SCM Agreement.174 Similar to the original GATT 1947 
text, a “countervailing duty” is understood as a special duty levied for the 
                                                 
173 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, note 139 above, paragraphs 3.57-3.59. 
174 Article 10 is closely linked to GATT 1994 Article VI. In fact, a member will violate Article 
10 if it imposes a countervailing duty that is not “in accordance with” Article VI of the GATT. 
See Edwin VERMULST and Folkert GRAAFSMA, WTO Disputes: Anti-Dumping, Subsidies 
and Safeguards, London, Cameron May, 2002, p. 377 and 418. See also procedures for 
imposing countervailing duties provided in the Special Import Measures Act. 
    
76 
purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the 
manufacture, production or export of any merchandise. The term is itself not 
defined within the SCM Agreement, but rather at Article VI, paragraph 3 of 
GATT 1994. 
As discussed, countervailing duty actions have been part of the international 
trade landscape for over one hundred years. The SCM Agreement builds on this 
history by imposing a series of procedural obligations that must be met by 
members in applying countervailing duties against allegedly subsidized 
imports. It represents, in terms of its length and detail, a significant 
achievement in international trade law in that it carefully addresses the various 
issues and avenues present in any countervailing duty context.175 
As a consequence to the various support mechanisms deployed by Ontario and 
Québec, subsidized renewable energy may become available for export to the 
United States.176 Furthermore, the benefits accruing to local component 
manufacturers buttressed by the various local content rules may be contested. 
We therefore turn to an examination of the SCM Agreement’s provisions on 
countervailing measures. Our focus is on those rules dealing with 
countervailing investigations and the eventual imposition of duties, thereby 
                                                 
175 Jeffrey S. THOMAS, note 91 above, 1997, p. 163. 
176 Or, through wheeling arrangements, to Mexico and beyond, depending on the extent and 
integration of future electricity transmission networks. 
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illustrating how countervailing duties may eventually be unilaterally imposed 
on Canada by a fellow WTO member such as Japan or the United-States as a 
result of Ontario and Québec’s renewable energy support mechanisms.177 
Initiation and Subsequent Investigation 
The requirements for initiating an investigation into the possibility of applying 
countervailing measures are addressed at Article 11 of the SCM Agreement. 
Such investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged 
subsidy may only be initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of a 
domestic industry.178 Furthermore, the request must provide sufficient 
information on the existence of a subsidy, the injury to a domestic industry as 
provided for in the definition of countervailing duty and the causal link between 
the subsidized imports and the alleged injury. It must also contain the additional 
information specified in subparagraphs (i) through (iv) of Article 11.2.179 
Once this request has been obtained, domestic authorities review the accuracy 
and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether 
                                                 
177 Throughout this Section we reference the provisions of the relevant United States legislation, 
the Tariff Act of 1930, Pub.L. 103-465, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974, Public Law 93-
618 (the “US Trade Act”), in order to showcase how national legislation conforms to the 
relevant WTO provisions and the provisions of US law that may be used in order to impose 
countervailing duties against Canada. 
178 US Trade Act, note 177 above, s. 702 (b)(1). 
179 Including (i) the identity of the applicant; (ii) a description of the allegedly subsidized 
product; (iii) evidence with regards to the existence and amount of the subsidy; and (iv) 
evidence of the alleged injury to domestic industry. 
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it is sufficient to warrant the initiation of an investigation.180 The SCM 
Agreement places numerous conditions on the pursuance and functioning of a 
countervailing duty investigation. For example, authorities must refuse to 
investigate the matter further if they determine that the subsidization is de 
minimus or the injury negligible.181 Investigations will generally be concluded 
within one year, and in no case more than eighteen months, after their initiation. 
Evidence 
Article 12 of the SCM Agreement deals with specific issues surrounding the 
gathering of evidence during a countervailing duty investigation. WTO 
members, as well as other parties, such as exporters or foreign producers, 
named in an investigation must be given notice of the information which the 
authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence 
considered relevant to the investigation.182 
Consultation 
Article 13 provides detail on consultations between members affected by the 
countervailing duty investigation. Essentially, WTO members the products of 
                                                 
180 US Trade Act, note 177 above, s. 702 (c). 
181 The de minimus requirement means those cases where subsidization is less that one percent 
of a product’s value, see SCM Agreement, Article 11.9: “There shall be immediate termination 
in cases where the amount of a subsidy is de minimis, or where the volume of subsidized 
imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible.” 
182 US Trade Act, note 177 above, s. 702 (b)(4). 
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which may be subject to an investigation must be invited for consultations in 
order to clarify the situation and hopefully arrive at a mutually agreed solution. 
Furthermore, such members preserve the right to request consultations 
throughout the period of the investigation. 
Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy 
At some point during a countervailing duty investigation, a country will attempt 
to calculate the amount of a trading partner’s subsidy in order to correctly 
evaluate its impact. Article 14 of the SCM Agreement provides that the amount 
of a subsidy for countervailing duty purposes is calculated on the basis of its 
benefit to the recipient.183 It goes on to provide four additional guidelines for 
the drawing up of a calculation method in paragraphs (a) through (d) of Article 
14. In all cases, the calculation method used must be spelled out in a transparent 
and adequately explained statute or regulation of the member seeking to use 
countervailing measures.184 
Determination of Injury 
A determination of injury is a necessary prerequisite to the lawful application of 
countervailing measures. As seen, the SCM Agreement dutifully provides 
                                                 
183 See Jeffrey S. THOMAS, note 97 above, p. 166. For discussion on meaning of benefit, see 
infra Part II, Section 4.3.2.  
184 US Trade Act, s. 706, 771A, 771B, 772, 773, 773A, 777A. 
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guidelines for the evidencing of injury.185 
Provisional Measures 
In certain circumstances, provisional measures such as temporary 
countervailing duties can be applied during the investigation process.186 Article 
17 of the SCM Agreement details how and when these are to be used. 
Provisional measures may only be applied in circumstances where a 
countervailing duty investigation has been initiated. Furthermore, a preliminary 
affirmative determination that a subsidy exists and that there is injury to a 
domestic industry caused by the subsidized imports must be arrived at prior to 
the imposition of provisional measures. Finally, the investigating member’s 
authorities must judge such measures necessary to prevent further injury being 
caused during the investigation. 
Undertakings 
In some cases, WTO members may agree to eliminate the investigated subsidy 
in order to avoid any possible countervailing duty. These “undertakings” are 
provided for in Article 18 of the SCM Agreement.  Proceedings may be 
suspended or terminated without the imposition of provisional measures or 
                                                 
185 See infra Part II, Section 4.5.1. US Trade Act, note 177 above, s. 701 (a). 
186 US Trade Act, note 177 above, s. 703. 
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countervailing duties upon receipt of a satisfactory voluntary undertaking 
whereby, generally, the member agrees to eliminate or limit the subsidy or take 
other measures concerning its effects, or agrees to revise its prices so that the 
investigating authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the subsidy is 
eliminated. Undertakings must be completely voluntary and cannot be sought or 
accepted unless a preliminary determination of subsidization and injury has 
been made.  
Imposition and Collection 
Once a WTO member determines the existence of a subsidy and the injury 
caused thereby, it may impose a countervailing duty in accordance with Article 
19 of the SCM Agreement.187  The countervailing duty must be levied on a non-
discriminatory basis on imports of the countervailed product and from all 
sources found to be subsidized and causing injury. Nonetheless, no duty should 
be levied on imports from those sources which have renounced any subsidies in 
question or from which undertakings have been accepted. Furthermore, and in 
keeping with the purpose of countervailing measures, no duty shall be levied on 
any imported product in excess of the amount of the subsidy found to exist, 
calculated in terms of subsidization per unit of the subsidized and exported 
product. 
                                                 
187 Id., s. 705. 
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Duration and Review 
Article 21 of the SCM Agreement deals with the duration of countervailing 
duties and provides that they shall remain in force only as long, and to the 
extent, as is necessary to counteract the subsidization causing injury. This 
article also provides an important new obligation, often referred to as the 
“sunset” clause, whereby a duty can remain in place no more than five years, 
unless it is specifically determined prior to the end of that five-year period that 
the elimination of the duty would lead to continued or reoccurring 
subsidization. Furthermore, Article 23 requires WTO members to maintain 
appropriate domestic adjudicative bodies that allow interested parties, namely 
the members against which countervailing duties are levied, the ability to 
review and contest the relevant measures.188  
  
                                                 
188 Jeffrey S. THOMAS, note 97 above, p. 171. See US Trade Act, note 177 above, s. 761 and 
762. For more information on the relevant US rules, consult the website of the US International 
Trade Administration’s Import Administration at http://www.trade.gov/ia/. 
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I believe that trade opening and reducing trade barriers, has 
been, is and will remain, essential to promote growth and 
development, to improve standards of living and to tackle 
poverty reduction. The World Trade Organization remains the 
most efficient and most legitimate forum to open and regulate 
world trade. The most efficient because it works at the service 
of all the participants and because of its modern system to 
solve trade disputes. The most legitimate, because it is the 
fairest system of all, as all the decisions are taken by all the 
members, large or small, strong or weak. 
Pascal Lamy, 2009 
Part III – The WTO, the SCM Agreement and 
Renewable Energy 
An organization’s objectives are fundamental to its design and rules. The WTO 
Agreement’s preamble sets out the ultimate objectives of the WTO. These 
include raising standards of living, ensuring full employment along with growth 
in income levels and demand, developing the full use of the world’s resources 
through expansion of production and trade, the whole in accordance with 
sustainable development and the protection of the environment. To accomplish 
these goals, the preamble lays out what has become the day-to-day objective of 
the WTO: entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements 
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directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to 
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.189 The 
WTO therefore, at least theoretically, sees itself as an organization devoted first 
and foremost to lifting the people of the world out of poverty through 
sustainable development and ever freer and fairer trade.  
We must however acknowledge that the various WTO multilateral and 
plurilateral agreements do not exist in a vacuum, but rather in concert with each 
other and the larger WTO system. For instance, although the SCM Agreement 
must notionally obey the WTO’s larger objectives, it seems at first glance to 
defy those objectives by implicitly and explicitly accepting that in certain 
circumstances barriers to trade can be legitimate. This incoherence is systemic 
of an organization that is still defining its role vis-à-vis international trade.190 As 
such, an understanding of the WTO’s other components, along with an 
examination of the relationship between the various WTO agreements and 
principles that combine to regulate a large portion of international trade, will 
allow us to gain a fuller understanding of the potential actionability of 
renewable energy support mechanisms.  
We begin by assessing the relationship between the SCM Agreement and the 
                                                 
189 WTO Agreement, Preamble and Article II. 
190 P. J. LLOYD, “The Architecture of the WTO”, (2001) 17 European Journal of Political 
Economy 327, p. 336-337. 
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WTO’s various other multilateral agreements as a matter of treaty 
interpretation, in order to better understand whether the potential conflicts 
create avenues whereby domestic renewable energy support mechanisms may 
be excepted from WTO contestability. Next, we analyze two of the most basic 
principles of international trade: most-favored nation (“MFN”) and national 
treatment (“NT”), deciding on how their nature is affected by subsidies 
regulation and determining whether renewable energy support mechanisms are 
in violation of such principles. Finally, we examine the GATS and certain other 
relevant WTO multilateral agreements. Throughout, we comment on the 
applicability of such agreements to Québec and Ontario renewable energy 
support mechanisms.191 
Section 1 – WTO Treaty Interpretation  
Harmonizing the apparent conflicting objectives of the various WTO 
agreements requires treaty interpretation. On this issue, some guidance is 
provided by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, applicable to all 
treaties between states.192 The convention’s third section elaborates rules on the 
interpretation of treaties. Article 31, for instance, states that treaties must be 
                                                 
191 We do not discuss the relationship between the WTO and the various plurilateral trade 
agreements entered into between countries, such as MERCOSUR or NAFTA. For a discussion 
on this, see Tegan BRINK, “Which WTO Rules Can a PTA Lawfully Breach? Completing the 
Analysis in Brazil – Tyres”, (2010) 44(4) Journal of World Trade 813, p. 813-847. 
192 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, note 59 above. 
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interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
The article goes on to specify that the context for the purposes of treaty 
interpretation must include the preamble and annexes. 
The various WTO agreements sometimes include specific priority rules. 
Furthermore, the WTO Agreement’s General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A 
indicates that in the event of a conflict between a provision of the GATT 1994 
and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A, the provision of the other 
agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict. This expresses the basic 
legal principle of lex specialis: specific rules trump general ones. In sum, all 
instruments apply simultaneously, with more specialized and recent treaties 
being of preferred application when compared to general rules. 193 
As the WTO shed its infancy however, it became clear that the various WTO 
agreements and understandings, forming part of a single treaty and thus legally 
of the same date, are not well coordinated.194 For example: 
First, there are no rules in case a conflict does not exist. 
Second, there is no priority rule between the various Annex 
1A agreements[, only between them and the GATT 1994]. It 
                                                 
193 Thomas COTTIER and Matthias OESCH, International Trade Regulation: Law and Policy 
in the WTO, The European Union and Switzerland – Cases, Materials and Comments, London, 
Cameron May, 2005, p. 90-91. 
194 Id. 
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is not obvious whether provisions of two agreements can 
operate concurrently or whether one should be considered lex 
specialis to the other in case of conflict or simply in case of 
overlap.195   
Panel and Appellate Body jurisprudence has therefore attempted to provide 
guidance on the relationship between WTO agreements. In an early ruling, the 
Appellate Body examined the GATS and GATT by reading the two agreements 
as complementary documents. It concluded that the entry into force of the 
GATS, did not diminish the scope of application of the GATT 1994.196 Later, in 
Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from 
Mexico, the Appellate Body refined its thinking on the complementarity rule in 
WTO agreement interpretation, stating that special or additional provisions 
prevail only where WTO agreements cannot be read as complementing each 
other.197 
Most important, however, are the Appellate Body’s teachings in the Argentina – 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear Case. In that instance, the 
Appellate Body was asked to clarify the relationship between GATT Article 
XIX (emergency action on imports of particular products) and safeguard 
measures. Once again, it found that the two concepts must be applied 
                                                 
195 Ibid., p. 91. 
196 Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS31/AB/R (30 June 1997), p. 18. 
197 Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, Report 
of the Panel, WT/DS60/AB/R (19 June 1998), paragraph 65. 
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concurrently: 
The GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards are both 
Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods contained in 
Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, and, as such, are both 
"integral parts" of the same treaty, the WTO Agreement, that 
are "binding on all Members". Therefore, the provisions of 
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the provisions of the 
Agreement on Safeguards are all provisions of one treaty, the 
WTO Agreement. They entered into force as part of that 
treaty at the same time. They apply equally and are equally 
binding on all WTO Members […] a treaty interpreter must 
read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives 
meaning to all of them, harmoniously.198 
In sum, the DSB encourages complementarity among WTO instruments, 
thereby avoiding a finding of conflict between WTO agreements and 
understandings. 
Section 2 – The WTO’s Founding Principles 
Due to their importance, MFN and NT have sometimes been referred to as 
constitutional principles of the international trading system.199 Together, they 
establish one of the WTO’s core concepts: that of non-discrimination between 
the treatment of local products and foreign ones. In this section, we clarify the 
meaning of the MFN and NT principles, while illustrating their association with 
subsidy disciplinary measures, their possible non-application in matters of 
                                                 
198 Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS121/AB/R (14 December 1999), paragraphs 80-81. 
199 Thomas COTTIER, note 193 above, p. 346. 
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environmental or health policy and their potential disciplining of renewable 
energy support mechanisms. 
2.1 Most-Favored Nation 
MFN has represented a central aspect of trade for at least one millennia and 
possibly longer. Its genesis is generally attributed to the year 1055, when the 
Holy Roman Emperor Henry III granted the city of Mantua all customs 
privileges granted to any other town.200 One of its earliest surviving MFN 
clauses, found in a treaty between England and Brittany, dates from the year 
1486. It states: 
[…] les marchans d’Angleterre auront et pourront avoir et 
tenir ès villes de Bretagne et soyront illecques de toutes et 
pareilles franchises comme les autres marchans estrangiers 
qui ont entrecours et communication de marchans en 
Bretagne, et seront tractez aussi doulcement et gracieusement 
comme les autres nations frécantans en icelui Paris, ville et 
lieux d’icelui, et pareillement les marchans de Bretagne 
auront et pourront avoir et tenir ès villes du dit royaume 
d’Angleterre, Irland, ville et marche de Calays et joyront des 
dites franchises et aussi seront traités comme dessus est dit 
des dites marchans d’Angleterre.201  
Its meaning has changed little since those far away days. Essentially, MFN calls 
for a country to grant every country with which it has signed a MFN treaty the 
                                                 
200 Le Baron Borin NOLDE, “La Clause de la nation la plus favorisée et les tarifs préférentiels”, 
(1932) 1932 R.C.A.D.I. 23, p. 25. 
201 Id., p. 26. 
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most favorable treatment that it grants to any other country with respect to 
imports, exports and related regulations. The only exception to this blanket 
requirement is if the preferential treatment is applied as part of a preferential 
trade agreement, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement.202 
Although the expression suggests offering some sort of special privilege to a 
trading partner, the intent is in fact quite the opposite. MFN’s main objective is 
to prevent discrimination by generalizing concessions made to a fellow trading 
partner.203 GATT 1994 Article 1(1) contains the main MFN obligation imposed 
on WTO members. It reads: 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind 
imposed […] any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating 
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties. (emphasis added) 
The provision therefore refers to an unconditional form of MFN: a contracting 
party will be afforded the privilege whether or not they reciprocate. A 
conditional form of MFN, where its granting is subject to a reciprocal 
                                                 
202 GATT Article XXIV. The exception must not be considered too broad and cannot 
circumvent the WTO’s rules, as BRINK, note 19 above, explains at p. 842: “[…] if Article 
XXIV could excuse breaches of WTO rules that were not necessary for the creation of PTAs 
sanctioned by these rules, Article XXIV would become a black hole into which the ashes of the 
WTO’s cornerstone MFN principle would disappear for good.” 
203 Michael J. TREBILCOCK and Robert HOWSE, The Regulation of International Trade, 3rd 
ed., New York, Routledge, 2005, p. 49. 
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treatment, is exceptionally present within the GATS at Article VII.204 
Nevertheless, the principle is generally applied in its unconditional form and 
numerous GATT/WTO disputes have interpreted MFN, broadening or 
narrowing its extent as required.  
United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna centered on a Mexican 
allegation that a US act violated Article I of the GATT 1994 by establishing 
discriminatory and unfavorable conditions for a specific geographical area. 
Essentially, the act forbade the use of the label “Dolphin Safe” to tuna products 
harvested in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (“ETP”) Ocean using nets that did not 
meet criteria specified in the law. According to the Panel: 
By imposing the requirement to provide evidence that this 
fishing technique had not been used in respect of tuna caught 
in the ETP the United States therefore did not discriminate 
against countries fishing in that area […]. The labeling 
regulations governing tuna caught in the ETP thus applied to 
all countries whose vessels fished in this geographical area 
and thus did not distinguish between products originating in 
Mexico and products originating in other countries.205 
Hence, the term “unconditionally” used in GATT 1994 Article I does not mean 
                                                 
204 Dominique CARREAU and Patrick JUILLARD, Droit international économique, 2e ed., 
Paris, Dalloz, 2005, p. 175 and 177; COTTIER, note 165 above, p. 349-350. The unconditional 
form of MFN has been criticized for encouraging the “Free Ride” effect. Basically, countries 
that do not wish to liberalize can benefit from another member’s concessions without applying 
their own. 
205 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, not adopted, DISD 
39S/155 (3 September 1991), para. 5.43.  
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that no conditions can be imposed on supplier countries in order for them to 
have access to a privilege. Conditions can be imposed as long as they do not 
result in discrimination.206 
In Indonesia – Autos, a complaint was lodged against a series of measures 
adopted by Indonesia with respect to imported motor vehicles, parts and 
components. The case considered a measure which conditioned the granting of 
customs duties and sales tax exemptions with respect to imported products on 
whether Indonesia’s national car company had made a deal with the foreign 
exporter to assemble the car in-country. The Panel made the distinction between 
conditions imposed on a product per se, as opposed to a product originating 
from a specific country, opining that the measures violated GATT 1994 Article 
I, which provides that benefits accorded to the products of one member must be 
afforded “immediately and unconditionally” to the like products of all other 
members.207 
In United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European 
Communities208, the United States increased certain bond requirements on 
imports in order to secure the payment of new import duties imposed in 
                                                 
206 TREBILCOCK, note 203 above, p. 61. 
207 Indonesia – Autos, note 131 above, para. 14.147. 
208 United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, 
Report of the Panel, WT/DS165/R (17 July 2000); United States – Import Measures on Certain 
Products from the European Communities, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS165/AB/R 
(11 December 2000).  
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retaliation to certain EC measures. Examining the measures’ consistency with 
the MFN obligation, the Panel applied the principle in a straightforward 
manner, deciding that: 
We find that the […] additional bonding requirements 
violated the most-favoured-nation clause of Article I of 
GATT, as it was applicable only to imports from the 
European Communities, although identical products from 
other WTO Members were not the subject of such additional 
bonding requirements. The regulatory distinction (whether an 
additional bonding requirement is needed) was not based on 
any characteristic of the product but depended exclusively on 
the origin of the product and targeted exclusively some 
imports from the European Communities. (emphasis added)209 
The Panel therefore concluded that a condition must produce discrimination 
between countries for it to violate Article I; discrimination between products 
themselves would theoretically not violate MFN.210 
Numerous exceptions to the general MFN principle exist within the WTO 
system, particularly the provisions of Article XX discussed later on. 
Furthermore, the SCM Agreement itself allows members the ability to impose 
countervailing duties. Countries therefore may, in the carefully defined limits of 
a countervailing duty measure, unilaterally decide to ignore the MFN principle 
and apply discriminatory conditions on a fellow trading nation in order to offset 
                                                 
209 United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, 
Report of the Panel, note 180 above, paragraph 6.54. 
210 TREBILCOCK, note 203 above, p. 61. 
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a purported subsidy. Contrary to the MFN principle therefore, a WTO member 
can therefore discriminate between subsidizing and non-subsidizing members.  
Hence, although the relationship between the MFN principle and the rights and 
obligations of the SCM Agreement are complex, the DSB would likely decide 
to interpret the concepts in a manner complementary to the objectives of 
both.211 As such, with respect to Ontario and Québec’s renewable energy 
support mechanisms, clearly such measures do not constitute a violation of 
MFN in that they do not impose a distinction between products originating from 
various WTO members. Quite the opposite, foreign products are being treated 
equally, insofar as they all do not qualify under the FIT Program or Community 
CFT’s local content provisions regardless of their country of origin. Therefore, 
although the programs could not therefore be easily challenged under the MFN 
rules, as we shall see in the next section the situation with respect to NT is 
entirely different. 
                                                 
211 See discussion regarding the relationship between the SCM Agreement and NT supra Part 
III, Section 2.2 below. Although we were unable to find any GATT or WTO dispute that 
expressly discusses the relationship between MFN and the SCM Agreement, both the Panel and 
Appellate Body have elaborated on the issue with respect to other Annex 1A agreements. The 
Appellate Body in Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, Report of the Appellate 
Body WT/DS22/AB/R (21 February 1997), p. 15 stated that “the relationship between the 
GATT 1994 and the other goods agreements in Annex 1A is complex and must be examined on 
a case-by-case basis. Although the provisions of the GATT 1947 were incorporated into, and 
became part of the GATT 1994, they are not the sum total of the rights and obligations of WTO 
members concerning a particular matter.” See also Panel report Brazil – Measures Affecting 
Desiccated Coconut, Report of the Panel, WT/DS22/R (17 October 1996). 
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2.2 National Treatment 
NT provides that a party to a trade treaty which includes an NT provision must 
not discriminate against imports once they have crossed the border by treating 
them less favorably than domestic products with which they are in competition. 
NT, as opposed to MFN which regulates a product’s treatment “at the border”, 
governs internal policies: after the product has passed customs.212 This may 
appear to be a fairly simple and straightforward dictum: treat the foreign 
product as you would your own domestic ones. The intricacies of applying NT 
can however at times be quite daunting.  
The WTO’s provisions on NT are principally located at Article III of GATT 
1994, dealing with the concept by specifically limiting discriminatory treatment 
of foreign products with respect to taxes and other domestic laws: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall 
be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use 
(our emphasis).213 
NT has been interpreted extensively, both during the GATT 1947 era and more 
recently by the DSB, and is intimately linked with the concept of “likeness”. In 
                                                 
212 TREBILCOCK, note 203 above, p. 83. 
213 GATT 1994, Article III:4. 
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Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the Appellate body determined that simply 
showing a formal difference in treatment between imported and like domestic 
products was not sufficient to show a violation of Article III(4). The issue of 
concern is whether or not imported products are treated "less favorably" than 
like domestic products.214  
Certainly, the most important pre-WTO dispute regarding NT is Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages, where an origin neutral taxation provision was found to 
violate GATT 1947 Article III(2).215 The EC’s complaint centered on a 
Japanese tax measure that categorized alcoholic beverages according to various 
qualities and set different tax rates on each category. The EC believed that such 
a measure violated Article III(2) by taxing imports at higher rates than “like” 
domestic products and by affording protection to “directly competitive and 
substitutable” domestic products. Japan countered that it was free to classify 
products for tax purposes in whatever way it chose, and the likeness issue was 
totally irrelevant in the context of a law that treated domestic and foreign 
                                                 
214 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS169/AB/R, 
(11 December 2000), para 128. 
215 Article III, paragraph 2 reads “The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or 
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, 
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise 
apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner 
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.” 
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products in exactly the same way.216 
Having determined that an examination of likeness was necessary considering 
the wording in Article III(2), the Panel found that many of the EC products 
were “like” Japanese products. Furthermore, it noted that tax rates on imported 
and special grade whiskies and brandies (which it considered “like products”) 
were considerably higher than tax rates on first and second grade whiskies and 
brandies. Since most of the spirits imported from the EC were of higher grade, 
the Panel found that because of the differential taxation of these “like products”, 
almost all whiskies and brandies from the imported EC were subject to the 
higher tax rates, whereas more than half of the whiskies and brandies products 
in Japan were subject to a lower rate.217 This was ruled as constituting 
discrimination in violation of the NT principle.  
Not long after the WTO was established, a second Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages218 dispute commenced, centered on essentially the same facts as the 
first. The Appellate Body, seeking to refine the meaning of NT, began by 
clarifying that the concept obliges WTO members to provide equality of 
competitive conditions for imported products in relation to domestic 
                                                 
216 TREBILCOCK, note 203 above, p. 86. 
217 Id., p. 87. 
218 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Panel, WT/DS10/R WT/DS11/R 
WT/DS8/R (11 July 1996); Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate 
Body, WT/DS10/AB/R WT/DS11/AB/R WT/DS8/AB/R (04 October 1996). 
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products.219 With respect to the issue of likeness, as applicable in all WTO 
matters generally and in NT matters specifically, the Appellate Body rendered 
the determination process essentially a case-by-case matter:  
The concept of “likeness” is a relative one that evokes the 
image of an accordion. The accordion of “likeness” stretches 
and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the 
WTO are applied. The width of the accordion in any one of 
those places must be determined by the particular provision in 
which the term “like” is encountered as well as by the context 
and the circumstances that prevail in any given case to which 
that provision may apply. We believe that, in Article III:2, 
first sentence of the GATT 1994, the accordion of “likeness” 
is meant to be narrowly squeezed.220 
Next, the Appellate Body provided that following a determination of likeness, 
the only remaining step to determine the conformity of an internal tax measure 
with the NT principle is the examination of whether the taxes on imported 
products are higher that those on like domestic ones. If so, a finding that 
measure is not in compliance with Article III must be arrived at, since a 
distinction between the treatment of internal versus external products is clearly 
present.221 
                                                 
219 TREBILCOCK, note 203 above, p. 91. 
220 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, note 218 above, p. 22 
– 23. 
221 Id., page 25: “The only remaining issue under Article III:2, first sentence, is whether the 
taxes on imported products are "in excess of" those on like domestic products.  If so, then the 
Member that has imposed the tax is not in compliance with Article III.  Even the smallest 
amount of "excess" is too much.” 
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With respect to the issue of discrimination, the India – Measures Affecting the 
Automotive Sector222 case is notable. Indian measures imposed upon its 
automotive sector were at issue, namely an "indigenization" requirement 
whereby each car manufacturer was obliged to achieve local content of a 
minimum level of 50 to 70 percent of the components of cars manufactured 
domestically.223 The Panel determined that India’s program clearly violated the 
NT principle.224 
As mentioned previously, the NT principle is subject to a number of exceptions 
related to subsidies, including those contained in GATT 1994 Article III(8) with 
respect to government procurement.225 More importantly, the issue of whether a 
general conflict exists between the SCM Agreement and the GATT 1994 NT 
principle has been raised. In Indonesia – Autos, the Panel decided that no such 
conflict could be found: 
Article III [of GATT 1994] continues to prohibit 
discrimination between domestic and imported products in 
                                                 
222 India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, Report of the Panel, WT/DS146/R, 
WT/DS175/R, 21 December 2001. 
223 Id., para 2. 
224 Id., page 7.204. 
225 Which paragraph reads: “(a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, 
regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products 
purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view 
to use in the production of goods for commercial sale. (b) The provisions of this Article shall 
not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including payments to 
domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently 
with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of 
domestic products.” 
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respect of internal taxes and other domestic regulations, 
including local content requirements. It does not “proscribe” 
nor does it “prohibit” the provision of any subsidy per se. By 
contrast, the SCM Agreement prohibits subsidies which are 
conditional on export performance and on meeting local 
content requirement, provides remedies with respect to certain 
subsidies where they cause adverse effects to the interests of 
another Member and exempts certain subsidies from 
actionability under the SCM Agreement. In short, Article III 
prohibits discrimination between domestic and imported 
products while the SCM Agreement regulates the provision of 
subsidies to enterprises.226 
Hence in our view the Panel saw the two agreements as completely separate, 
dealing with separate issues, in separate ways and providing separate remedies. 
With respect to the FIT Program and Community CFT, both programs are 
potentially in violation of the NT principle, irrespective of a determination of 
the presence or not of a prohibited or actionable subsidy, due to their respective 
local content requirements. Analyzing solely the example of wind turbines, 
many countries produce similar turbines as those now available for production 
locally in Ontario and Québec.227 As such, these foreign turbines may be 
considered as “like” for the purposes of GATT 1994 Article III. Furthermore, a 
clear distinction between foreign and domestic products is provided, due to the 
“indigenization” or local content requirements present in both programs and 
                                                 
226 Indonesia – Autos, note 131 above, para. 14.33. 
227 We note Québec has a “winterization” requirement for turbines used in Community CFT 
facilities. See s. 1.4 of Community CFT requiring turbines to be able to withstand temperatures 
of -30°C. It is possible that other countries do not produce such turbines. We discuss the issue 
supra Part III, Section 4.2 with respect to technical barriers to trade.  
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discussed in detail above.228 The programs can therefore be viewed as treating 
comparable foreign products less favorably than their domestic counterparts, 
rendering them actionable under Article III. Notwithstanding, it is possible for a 
WTO member to legitimately violate the NT principle by relying on the most 
notable exception to both the MFN and NT principles: GATT 1994 Article XX. 
2.3 The “Chapeau” of GATT Article XX 
Article XX (general exceptions) of GATT 1994 provides that so long as a 
measure is not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, WTO law does not prevent the adoption or enforcement of 
measures necessary, among others, (i) to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health (Article XX(b)) or (ii) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption (Article XX(g)).229 
Article XX therefore calls for a two-tier test prior to determining whether a 
measure may benefit from the exception outlined therein. First, the measure 
                                                 
228 Infra Part II, Section 4.4.2. 
229 As noted infra Part II, Section 4.5 concerning actionable subsidies, the SCM Agreement also 
included exceptions rendered permissible subsidies ties to environmental assistance. That 
provision has since lapsed. Although the present Section’s analysis focuses more closes on 
using Article XX as an exception to a violation of GATT 1994 NT or MFN provisions, it is 
possible that a member could offer Article XX as a defense exempting the finding of an 
actionable subsidy under Article 5 of the SCM Agreement. 
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must fall under one of the two categories provided at paragraphs (b) and (g) of 
Article XX. Second, the introductory paragraph or “chapeau” of Article XX 
must be satisfied in that the measure is not discriminatory or detrimental to 
world trade. Hence, the “necessity” of the measure is the guiding principle 
required to arrive at a determination that a measure falls under the chapeau. 
DSB decisions have consistently required a detailed examination of the 
reasoning behind the measure, focusing on three principle analyses: “(i) the 
importance of the objective or common interest that is the target of the measure, 
(ii) the effectiveness of the measure at meeting the target, and (iii) the impact of 
the measure on international trade.”230 The DSB has therefore elaborated a cost-
benefit analysis of the measure as a basis for determining the likelihood that the 
measure can support environmental goals.231 
Article XX has successfully been used to defend against DSU actions 
contesting measures aimed at reducing the consumption of cigarettes, protecting 
dolphins, reducing the risks to human health posed by asbestos and waste tires, 
                                                 
230 GREEN, note 128 above, p. 408. 
231 Id. 
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and the conservation of tuna, salmon, herring, dolphins and turtles.232 Of 
particular relevance to the issue of renewable energy support mechanisms is the 
US – Gasoline case. The Panel found that a measure to reduce the consumption 
of gasoline in order to lower air pollution was within the range of those 
concerning the protection of human, animal and plant life or health mentioned 
in Article XX(b). Furthermore, the Panel determined that a policy to reduce the 
depletion of clean air was a policy to conserve a natural resource within the 
meaning of Article XX(g).233 Pursuant to this decision a WTO-UNEP report 
stated that: 
[…] some authors have noted that policies aimed at reducing 
CO2 emissions could fall under Article XX(b), as they intend 
to protect human beings from the negative consequences of 
                                                 
232 WTO SECRETARIAT, Trade and Climate Change, WTO-UNEP Report, Ludivine 
TAMIOTTI et al (eds), World Trade Organization, 2009, p. 107, citing: GATT Panel Report, 
Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R, adopted 
7 November 1990, BISD 37S/200; GATT Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports 
of Tuna, DS21/R, DS21/R, 3 September 1991, unadopted, BISD 39S/155; Appellate Body 
Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, 3243; Appellate Body 
Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 
December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, 1527; GATT Panel Report, United States – Prohibition of 
Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, L/5198, adopted 22 February 1982, 
BISD 29S/91; GATT Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon, L/6268, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/98 GATT Panel Report, 
United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R, DS21/R, 3 September 1991, 
unadopted, BISD 39S/155; GATT Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, DS29/R, 16 June 1994, unadopted; Appellate Body Report, United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 
1998, DSR 1998:VII, 2755; Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, 6481; GATT Panel Report, 
United States – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R,  11 October 1994, unadopted. 
233 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, Report 
of the Panel, 29 January 1996, para. 6.21 and 6.37. 
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climate change (such as flooding or sea-level rise), or under 
Article XX(g), as they intend to conserve not only the planet’s 
climate but certain plant and animal species that may 
disappear because of global warming.234 
The Appellate Body has however indicated that a balance must be maintained 
between a member’s rights to invoke Article XX and the substantive rights of 
other WTO members, since, as mentioned during the US – Shrimp case which 
analyzed the exception in detail, if “every WTO Member were free to pursue its 
own trade policy solutions to what it perceives to be environmental concerns, 
the multilateral trade system would cease to exist.”235 
As such, it may be possible for Canada to successfully repel an action brought 
against the FIT Program and/or Community CFT with respect to a violation of 
NT due to local content requirements by claiming that such programs are 
necessary to ensure, for example, abundant clean air or lower CO2 emissions, or 
even to prevent the overexploitation of exhaustible natural resources used in 
conventional power generation such as coal and oil. 
We can only speculate at the chances of success of such a defense, however we 
believe it may fail due to the Appellate Body’s concerns raised in US – Shrimp: 
these goals can arguably be arrived at without imposing local content 
                                                 
234 WTO SECRETARIAT, note 203 above, p. 108. 
235 United States – Import prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the 
Panel, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998), para 35. See extensive discussion of the case in 
RANCOURT, note 9 above. 
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restrictions that discriminate against foreign produced components, since 
allowing the import of foreign manufactured wind turbines, for instance, would 
logically not impact the environmental benefits associated with such programs. 
Canada would therefore be unlikely to satisfy the “necessity” component of the 
“chapeau”. 
Section 3 – GATS 
The GATS was one of the more impressive achievements of the Uruguay 
Round. Trade in services had become an increasing aspect of world trade and 
the GATT, designed exclusively for trade in goods, provided an insufficient 
regulatory framework.236 The GATS is nevertheless modeled on the GATT’s 
structure and seeks to liberalize trade in services. The SCM Agreement 
however does not apply to subsidies in the service sector. GATS Article XV 
deals with such subsidies, controversially providing that such subsidies are in 
no way actionable, but that a member can request consultations where it 
considers itself to have been adversely affected by another members’ subsidy.   
That is the extent of a member’s recourse: there is currently no legal remedy for 
the prevention of service industry subsidization and no dispute report has 
                                                 
236 Petros C. MAVROIDIS, note 108 above, p. 634; For a discussion on the relationship 
between the GATT and GATS, see Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, note 
167 above, p. 39. 
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discussed this practice.237 
With respect to renewable energy, electricity is generally classified as a good, 
not a service, even though its characteristics lend it to perhaps being considered 
a service.238 Unlike most goods, electricity is a process happening throughout 
the electricity transmission network’s wires simultaneously and must be 
generated more or less exactly as it is being used.239 Were it to be classified as a 
service in future DSB case-law, it is possible that both the Ontario and Québec 
programs be considered as falling outside the ambit of the SCM Agreement and 
WTO’s other provisions dealing with goods. 
Section 4 – The WTO’s Multilateral Agreements 
Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement contains numerous legal texts dealing with a 
variety of issues, including the SCM Agreement. Many of these agreements are 
extremely technical in nature, such as those agreements dealing with pre 
shipment inspection or rules of origin. Others, however, provide a great deal of 
substantive law. The following sections examine certain Annex 1A agreements, 
specifying, when applicable, their relationship with the SCM Agreement and 
potential applicability to Québec and Ontario renewable energy support 
                                                 
237 Id. 
238 See HS Nomenclature, governed by the Convention on the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System.  
239 COTTIER, note 18 above, p. 4. 
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mechanisms. 
4.1 TRIMs 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures240 (“TRIMs”) 
recognizes that certain domestic investment measures can restrict and distort 
trade in goods. 
TRIMs provides that no contracting party shall apply any investment measure 
inconsistent with Articles III (NT) and XI (prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions) of the GATT. To this end, an illustrative list of TRIMs agreed 
during the Uruguay Round negotiations to be inconsistent with these articles is 
annexed to the agreement. The list includes, among others, measures requiring 
the purchase by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any 
domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of 
volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of 
its local production.241 
Evidently, there is a potential overlap between TRIMs, the general NT 
provisions contained at GATT 1994 Article III and the SCM Agreement’s 
provisions on prohibited subsidies, since all local content provisions affect the 
                                                 
240 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 (15 April 1994), Article 5.1 and 6.2. 
241 TRIMs, Article 2.1. 
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import of foreign manufactured goods. Furthermore, similarly to TRIMs, 
Article III(4) of GATT 1994 specifically restricts measures that require an 
investor to use domestic content in manufactures.242  
The WTO’s Panel in the Indonesia – Autos case considered whether a measure 
covered by the SCM Agreement could also be subject to the TRIMs 
Agreement. The decision interprets the substantive provisions of TRIMs as 
applied to local content requirements placed upon manufacturers seeking to 
benefit from more favorable tax measures. The Panel analyzed a measure that 
conditioned the granting of customs duties and sales tax exemptions to 
imported products on whether Indonesia’s national car company had made a 
deal with the foreign exporter to assemble the car in-country. 
[…] if a Member were to apply a TRIM (in the form of local 
content requirement), as a condition for the receipt of a 
subsidy, the measure would continue to be a violation of the 
TRIMs Agreement if the subsidy element were replaced with 
some other form of incentive. By contrast, if the local content 
requirements were dropped, the subsidy would continue to be 
subject to the SCM Agreement, although the nature of the 
relevant discipline under the SCM Agreement might be 
affected. Clearly, the two agreements prohibit different 
measures. (our emphasis) 243 
The Panel determined that the SCM Agreement and TRIMs were not in 
                                                 
242 Petros C. MAVROIDIS, note 108 above, p. 839. 
243 Indonesia – Autos, note 131 above, para. 14.50-14.52. 
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conflict, as they cover different subject matters and do not impose mutually 
exclusive obligations.244  
The applicability to renewable energy support measures therefore becomes 
clear. Whereas the finding of a prohibited or actionable subsidy contained in the 
FIT Program or Community CFT is far from certain, the conditionality element 
linking local content to entry into the relevant program is not. A renewable 
energy developer must meet local content requirements prior to payment under 
the PPA awarded pursuant to both programs. Hence, Québec’s and Ontario’s 
renewable energy support mechanisms trigger all elements of the test set forth 
in TRIMs and outlined in the Indonesia – Autos case. A trade related 
investment measure exists: investment in the renewable energy facility is 
conditional upon entering into the relevant FIT Program or Community CFT 
contract, which itself is conditional on meeting local content requirements.  
Furthermore, the incentive does not need to be tied to the receipt of a subsidy or 
clear financial contribution and benefit as is the case under the SCM 
Agreement. Indonesia – Autos provides that the advantage made conditional on 
meeting a local content requirement may include a wide variety of incentives 
                                                 
244 Once again, we note the WTO DSB’s application of the general international treaty law 
interpretive method. Agreements will be interpreted in such a way as to avoid finding any 
conflict between them, either by providing that different texts complement each other or by 
finding that they deal with separate subject matters. See Part III, Section 1 hereto. 
    
110 
and advantages, other than subsidies. Finally, in the case of Québec, the 
requirement for wind turbine manufacturers to invest in the province by setting 
up local turbine manufacturing plants as a condition to providing turbines to 
Québec wind energy facilities is equally in violation of TRIMs. In our view, 
this renders these programs potentially actionable under TRIMS and subject to 
DSB disciplining. 
4.2 Technical Barriers to Trade 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade245 (“TBT”) seeks to ensure that 
technical regulations and standards, as well as testing and certification 
procedures, do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. The TBT’s Article 2.1 
reads: 
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, 
products imported from the territory of any Member shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
like products of national origin and to like products 
originating in any other country. 
Nevertheless, Article 2.2 recognizes that countries have the right to establish 
technical regulations necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life, 
health or the environment. Climate objectives may therefore be considered 
legitimate purposes for which technical standards are deployed. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
245 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, (15 April 1994). 
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these standards must not discriminate against other members’ products or create 
unnecessary obstacles to trade.246 The TBT therefore encourages countries to 
use international standards where these are appropriate, but it does not require 
them to change their levels of protection as a result of standardization.247 
As mentioned, the Community CFT requires all wind turbines used by bidders 
to be manufactured in the Gaspésie region of the province. The tender 
documentation further provides technical standards applicable to the turbines 
with respect to their ability to withstand cold climates.248 These technical 
requirements could be used as a defence against the Community CFT’s local 
content requirement’s with respect to turbines, in that sourcing cold climate-
appropriate turbines is necessary for the protection of safety, for example. 
Nevertheless, we believe this defence would be fairly easy to repel, since the 
necessity of such a measure is suspect, insofar as the Community CFT could 
have simply required bidders to source turbines certified to the applicable 
standards without imposing local content restrictions. The Community CFT 
requirements therefore may be considered as unnecessarily discriminating 
                                                 
246 Malena SELL et al, Emerging Issues in the Interface between Trade, Climate Change and 
Sustainable Energy, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, ICTSD 
Discussion Paper, May 2005, p. 16. 
247 TBT, Article 2.4 
248 Community CFT, s. 1.4: “The wind turbines and the other wind farm equipments must 
continue to operate normally at low temperatures, down to - 30°C […]. In this regard, a 
certification shall be produced by a certification organization accredited in the field of modern 
commercial wind turbines such as DEWI-Offshore and Certification Centre GmbH […]. 
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against foreign products. 
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With an open trade in corn and a fixed duty we should have 
every man in the country fully fed and happy, instead of our 
present situation in which so much distress exists - distress of 
our own producing. 
Joseph Hume 
The case for trade is not just monetary, but moral - not just a 
matter of commerce, but a matter of conviction. Economic 
freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create 
expectations of democracy. 
    George W. Bush, Speech, 17 May 2000 
Conclusion – The Morals of Support Mechanisms 
Joseph Hume touched so many years ago upon that most central goal of trade: 
the development and improvement of the human condition. Since subsidies, 
domestic restrictions and barriers to foreign investment disrupt international 
trade, thereby harming the development of many for the betterment of a few, 
they must be regulated and limited. 
The WTO Agreement seeks to do just that. Through its multiple provisions 
dealing with discrimination between WTO members and the use of subsidies, it 
seeks to prevent countries from adopting policies that negatively affect free 
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trade. Furthermore, the various WTO multilateral agreements seek to provide a 
complete framework through which all aspects of government policy can be 
evaluated so that they can be effectively regulated. Finally, the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system and provisions on countervailing duties seek to effect real 
change on members’ use and misuse of policy by disciplining those that may 
limit free trade. 
Our overview of many of the rules established by the WTO Agreement 
indicates that both Ontario’s FIT Program and Québec’s Community CFT are 
potentially actionable under WTO law. Hence, although they have not been 
challenged at the WTO level yet – perhaps due to the relative size of the sector, 
compared to other industries, such as automobiles249 – renewable energy 
support mechanisms may be disciplined as follows: 
(i) Where the program requires the use of local products instead of like 
foreign products, they may be pursued as a violation of GATT 1994 
Article III concerning NT. 
(ii) Where the program provides a subsidy, as defined in Articles I and 
                                                 
249 Vestas, the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturer, posted revenue of EUR 6.6 billion in 
2009, compared to Ford Motor Company’s $118 billion in revenue in 2009. See Vestas 2009 
Annual Report at 
http://www.vestas.com/files//Filer/EN/Investor/Company_announcements/2010/100210-
CA_UK_AR.pdf and Ford’s at http://www.ford.com/doc/2009_annual_report.pdf. 
    
115
II of the SCM Agreement, which causes an adverse effect to a 
fellow WTO members’ domestic industry, the program may be 
contested as an actionable subsidy under Article 5 of the SCM 
Agreement. 
(iii) Where the program conditions receipt of a subsidy, as defined in 
Articles I and II of the SCM Agreement, on the use of local content, 
it may be considered prohibited under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM 
Agreement. 
(iv) Where entry into the relevant program is contingent on the use of 
local content, regardless of whether a subsidy is provided or not, the 
program may be considered a violation of TRIMs and possibly TBT.  
Renewable energy support mechanisms are nevertheless laudable, since they 
may allow for local development and the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Without these subsidies, one can theorize as to whether the increased 
adoption of renewable energy production would have occurred. As such, 
members can present the following defenses in order to justify their renewable 
energy support mechanisms’ violation of WTO law: 
(i) Members may argue that the measure is necessary for the protection 
of (a) human, animal or plant life or health or (b) the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources, thereby rendering it a valid exception 
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to WTO trade rules pursuant to the “chapeau” of GATT 1994 
Article XX. 
(ii) Members may argue that the local content requirements are in fact 
legitimate technical barriers to trade pursuant to technical 
regulations and standards necessary for the protection of human, 
animal or plant life, health or the environment. 
(iii) Where the program does not contain local content restrictions, 
Members may argue that, notwithstanding the existence of a subsidy 
as defined in Articles I and II of the SCM Agreement, no adverse 
effect is caused to fellow WTO members domestic industries. 
(iv) Members may argue that electricity is a service, not a good, 
subjecting the programs to GATS discipline and rendering all WTO 
Agreement rules governing goods inapplicable. 
Considering a recent study estimating the total annual amount of subsidies 
provided to renewable energy generation (excluding hydro-electricity) at US 
$27 billion in OECD250 countries, we believe that renewable energy support 
                                                 
250 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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mechanisms will inevitably be tested before the WTO’s DSB.251 Indeed, the 
recent questions asked of Canada by Japan before the WTO’s Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties are the strongest indication yet that a 
dispute may be forthcoming.252  
Evidently however, the current WTO rules potential disciplining and limiting of 
renewable energy support mechanisms conflicts with the international 
community’s stated desire to avoid climate change and reduce carbon 
emissions. The Doha Round is therefore of utmost importance, since it allows 
trading nations to re-think and re-negotiate WTO law with a view to reconciling 
these important and discordant goals. For instance, it may be prudent to 
reinstate “green-light” subsidies for measures aimed at reducing carbon 
emissions. Alternatively, one can consider clarifying and expanding the scope 
of GATT 1994 Article XX, thereby creating an all-encompassing exception to 
any measure aimed at reducing the effects of climate change. Nevertheless, we 
believe local content restrictions should continue to be strictly prohibited and 
any justifiable subsidization of environmental programs must be structured in 
such a way as to prevent governments from pursuing trade distorting 
subsidization programs behind a veil of “green” and “clean” legislation.  
                                                 
251 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Relative 
Subsidies to Energy Sources: GSI estimates, Global Subsidies Initiative, 19 April 2010. 
252 See Annex 2 hereto. 
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Countries seem extremely guarded on the issue of continuing efforts to regulate 
subsidization programs and expanding limits on domestic content restrictions. 
As one author notes in his study of proposed SCM Agreement modifications, 
the amendments presented during the Doha Round may actually limit its 
effectiveness in controlling WTO members’ subsidy practice: 
“[…] the ASCM regime appears likely to be further weakened 
rather than bolstered. For subsidy discipline, the DDA is 
looking very much like a “Retrenchment Round”. The 
proposals tabled to date are overwhelmingly weighted toward 
loosening direct disciplines on subsidies and/or making it 
harder to use the CVD remedy (itself a key to discipline on 
subsidies).”253 
WTO members therefore seem to believe their programs will serve the 
domestic good and are less concerned with whether or not this will negatively 
impact global welfare.254  
More concerning is the fact that governments are beginning to frame their 
arguments with respect to their various domestic support programs around 
values. If a country values its local industry, it should be able to subsidize it to 
prevent it from failing. If a country values its environment, it should be able to 
subsidize its industries to make them “greener”. If a country values its people, it 
                                                 
253 MAGNUS, John R. “World Trade Organization Subsidy Discipline: Is This the 
‘Retrenchment Round’?”, (2004) 38(6) Journal of World Trade 985, p. 989. 
254 See WTO SECRETARIAT, note 5 above, for detailed illustrations and explanations on the 
various pretexts countries use to justify the disbursement of subsidies. 
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should be able to create conditions that force local development thereby 
guaranteeing employment and provide clean air. When we talk about support 
mechanisms, we are increasingly talking about values.  
Reading George W. Bush’s words above, it seems undeniable that the rhetoric 
in international trade has changed. The Doha Round’s current stalemate is, in 
our opinion, symptomatic of this. As current WTO Director-General Pascal 
Lamy notes, “trade restrictions will become more and more value-based.”255 
The danger however with providing value and morality based arguments is their 
inherent irrefutability. No one can judge another’s values and morals, and so no 
one can present arguments convincing enough to contest trade distorting 
practices founded on such considerations. International trade regulation can 
quickly come to a standstill. 
                                                 
255 WTO SECRETARIAT, The WTO is “a laboratory for harnessing globalization” – Lamy, 
News Release, 1 November 2006. 
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Table 1 – Ontario FIT Prices 
(source: OPA, 2010) 
 
  
   
 
Table 2 – Ontario Consumer Electricity Prices 
(source: Ontario Energy Board, 2010) 
 
  
   
 
Table 3 – Ontario Monthly Average Electricity Prices 
 (Source: Ontario Independent Electricity System Operator, 2010) 
Average Weighted Hourly Price (¢/kWh) 
Year Average Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2010 3.63 3.83 3.64 2.88 3.17 4.04 4.16             
2009 3.16 5.48 4.86 3.06 1.96 2.91 2.48 2.01 2.84 2.21 3.03 2.76 3.60 
2008 5.17 4.25 5.44 5.82 5.14 3.65 6.23 6.23 5.00 5.23 4.71 5.36 4.83 
2007 5.05 4.62 6.08 5.69 4.80 4.11 4.80 4.72 5.73 4.76 5.12 4.85 5.18 
2006 4.88 5.71 4.90 5.01 4.54 4.96 4.82 5.43 5.67 3.68 4.17 5.14 4.17 
2005 7.21 5.98 5.05 6.10 6.36 5.47 7.12 8.20 9.52 9.97 8.02 6.07 8.39 
2004 5.22 6.95 5.43 5.02 4.73 5.05 4.94 4.78 4.55 5.13 5.04 5.38 5.28 
2003 5.76 6.23 8.86 8.48 6.16 4.51 4.53 4.27 5.15 5.05 5.90 4.19 4.68 
2002 5.59 - - - - 3.00 3.71 6.20 6.94 8.31 5.09 5.12 5.93 
  
   
 
Annex 1 – Selected Definitions of Trade Policy Terms 
All definitions taken from Walter GOODE, Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms, 
World Trade Organization, Cambridge University Press, 4th edition, 2003. 
 
Actionable subsidies: a category of subsidies described in the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Subsidies may be 
actionable, and therefore illegal, if they cause injury to the domestic industry of 
another member, negate other commitments made under the GATT, or cause 
serious prejudice to the interests of another member. If such adverse effects 
exist, the country maintaining the subsidy must withdraw it or remove its 
adverse effects. 
 
Benefit: under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures this is a criterion necessary to establish whether a subsidy exists. The 
Agreement describes six types of governmental measures that may be 
considered benefits or subsidies. These are (a) a financial contribution by a 
government or public body, (b) a government practice involving a direct 
transfer of funds, (c) government revenue foregone or not collected, (d) 
provision by a government of goods and services other than infrastructure, (3) 
payments made by a government through a funding mechanism payments made 
through a private body on behalf of a government, and (f) any form of income 
or price support in the sense of GATT Article XVI (subsidies) which confers a 
benefit. 
 
Consultation:  the first stage in the WTO dispute settlement procedure, aimed 
at resolving issues cooperatively, sometimes through the good offices or 
mediation of a disinterested party. The fact-finding nature of consultation 
between parties often leads to a solution. If the consultations fail to settle a 
dispute within sixty days after a request has been made, the complaining party 
may request the establishment of a dispute settlement panel. The parties may go 
to a panel earlier if they conclude that the consultations will not settle the 
dispute. WTO members receiving a request for such consultations must 
therefore treat them seriously. They cannot use them to gain extended breathing 
space. 
 
Countermeasures:  the means available to WTO members for dealing with 
exceptional circumstances and alleged breaches of the rules fall into two main 
categories. The first is made up of trade remedies, also known as trade defence 
mechanisms and contingent protection. They include safeguards, anti-dumping 
measures and countervailing duties. This group of measures can be initiated by 
any WTO member as long as it follows the relevant rules. The second group of 
countermeasures, i.e. the suspension of concessions and obligations, can only 
  
   
 
be taken with the authorization of the Dispute Settlement Body. In other words, 
to obtain redress for an alleged breach of the rules by another member one has 
to launch a case. 
 
Countervailing duties:  action taken by the importing country, usually in the 
form of increased duties, to offset subsidies given to producers or exporters in 
the exporting country. GATT Article VI and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures set out the rules for imposing such duties. 
Countervailing duties can be applied under certain restrictive conditions and 
subject to material injury being caused to a domestic industry. 
 
Duty: a levy, tax or impost charged by governments within their entire 
jurisdiction on production, transactions and, less frequently, the ownership of 
an asset. The amount of duty levied is usually related to the value of the 
transaction, Customs duties, consisting of import and export tariffs, are such 
charges.  They are levied at the border. A WTO requirement is that duties must 
not used to discriminate against imported products once they have passed 
legally through the border. Whatever clear distinction there may have been once 
between a duty and a tax has now become blurred in day-to-day use. To the 
economist, their impact is the same, but for the lawyer and the tax administrator 
the distinction may be important. 
 
Domestic support: another term for assistance or subsidy. 
 
Export subsidies: government payments or other financial contributions by 
governments provided to domestic producers or exporters if they export their 
goods or services. They are illegal for manufactured products under the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. See also export 
incentives. 
 
Export incentives: measures adopted by governments to promote the 
expansion of exports by domestic companies. Such measures can include direct 
subsidies, bounties, reduces import tariffs for components where they are 
incorporated into exported products, taxation concession, etc. The Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties makes some types of export 
incentives illegal, including subsidies related to the export of products. 
 
Injury (and material injury): an adverse effect on domestic industry assumed 
to be caused by the actions of exporters from other countries, for example, 
through dumping, subsidies or import surges. In the case of dumping, action 
can be taken if there is material injury. In safeguards, serious injury must be 
threatening or have occurred. Both terms allow for a subjective assessment, but 
serious injury is deemed to be more grave than material injury. The WTO has 
a highly developed framework for the assessment of injury and any remedial 
  
   
 
action in the case of injury or threat of injury. 
 
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs, and Trade, which has been superseded 
as an international organisation by the WTO. An updated General Agreement is 
now one of the WTO’s agreements. The GATT entered into force on 1 January 
1948 as a provisional agreement and remained so until it was superseded by the 
WTO framework on 1 January 1995. It establishes multilateral obligations for 
trade in goods. Including most-favoured-nation treatment and national 
treatment, transparency, freedom of transit, anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties, customs valuation, import and export fees and formalities, marks of 
origin, quantitative restrictions, balance-of-payments provisions, subsidies, state 
trading enterprises, emergency action on imports (safeguards), customs unions 
and free-trade areas, etc. 
 
Local Content Requirements: sometimes also called mixing requirements.  
Governmental measures setting out certain minimum levels of locally made 
components to be incorporated in goods or services produced domestically.  
Minimum levels of local content may be set in the form of weight, volume, 
value, etc.  The aims of such programmes include, among others, encouraging 
the development of local industry, finding an assured market for an 
uncompetitive industry and the promotion of regional development.  All local 
content schemes entail a degree of protection for the supplies of the component 
in question and therefore a higher cost for consumers.  This is self-evident, 
since competitive industries have no need to search for captive markets.  
However, governments may decide that these costs are outweighed by the 
prospective benefits of the programme. GATT Article III:5 (National Treatment 
on Internal Taxation and Regulation) prohibits internal quantitative regulations 
relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or 
the mandatory use of domestic products. 
 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: this 
Agreement, sometimes known as the WTO Agreement, was adopted on 15 
April 1994 at the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting.  It established the World 
Trade Organization.  It also sets out, in four annexes, the multilateral and 
plurilateral agreements under its jurisdiction.  The Agreement entered into force 
on 1 January 1995.  Annex 1 contains the following multilateral agreements: 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Agreement on Agriculture, 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade [Customs Valuation] 1994, Agreement on Preshipment 
Inspection, Agreement on Rules of Origin, Agreement on Import Licensing 
  
   
 
Procedures, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the 
Agreement on Safeguards.  Annex 2 consists of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services.  Annex 3 is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights.  Annex 4 consists of the Understanding on 
Dispute Settlement, Trade Policy Review Mechanism and the WTO 
plurilateral trade agreements.  Appendix 1 to this Dictionary contains an 
outline of the provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement.  
 
Most-favoured-nation treatment: MFN.  This is the rule, usually established 
through a trade agreement, that a country gives each of the trading partners with 
which it has concluded relevant agreements the best treatment it gives to any of 
them in a given product.  MFN is not in itself an obligation to extend any 
favourable treatment to another party, nor is it an obligation to negotiate for 
better treatment.  The fundamental point of MFN therefore is equality of 
treatment of other countries, and in some older treatises it is indeed called 
“foreign parity”. 
 
National Treatment: the principle of giving others the same treatments as 
one’s own nationals. GATT Article III requires that imports be treated no less 
favourably than the same or similar domestically produced goods once they 
have passed customs.  GATTS Article XVII and TRIPS Article 3 also deal with 
national treatment for services and intellectual property protection.  In the older 
literature, this principle is sometimes called “inland parity”.  It is a simple 
proposition, but it has been the cause of many disputes, partly because a strict 
interpretation of national treatment may in fact disadvantage foreign suppliers. 
 
Notification: an obligation to report to the relevant body of the WTO the 
adoption of trade measures that might have an effect on the members of the 
agreement it administers.  Notifying promotes transparency and assists 
surveillance.  Notifying has no bearing on whether the measure itself will be 
judged to be in conformity with the rules. 
 
Non-Actionable Subsidies: a class of subsidies identified in the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  It includes assistance 
to research and development, assistance to disadvantaged regions and assistance 
to promote the adaptation of existing facilities to new, more burdensome, 
environmental requirements.  
 
Prohibited Subsidies: a concept used in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures to denote subsidies contingent on export 
performance or subsidies contingent on the use of domestic rather than 
imported goods.  WTO members are not allowed to maintain this type of 
subsidies. 
 
  
   
 
Subsidies: Financial or in-kind assistance by governments to producers or 
exporters of commodities, manufacturers and services.  There are two general 
types of subsidies: export and domestic. An export subsidy is a benefit 
contingent on exports conferred on a firm by the government. A domestic 
subsidy is a benefit not directly linked to exports.  Subsidies are paid for many 
reasons, including the need to prop up an inefficient production structure, the 
wish to raise the income of one sector, the wish to promote regional 
development, the aim to develop export markets, etc.  broadly, the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures defines subsidies as 
financial contributions by a government or public body, direct transfer of funds 
or potential transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, equity infusions), government 
revenue foregone or not collected, government provision of goods and services 
other than general infrastructure, payments to a funding mechanism or a private 
body to perform these functions, income or price support. Agricultural subsidies 
are covered by the Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
Specificity: a concept embodied in Article 2 of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  It is a test to determine whether a 
subsidy is available only to an enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or 
industries.  A subsidy is considered specific when the granting authority, or the 
legislation on which it operates, explicitly limits access to it to certain 
enterprises.  A subsidy may also be considered specific when there is use of a 
subsidy programme by a limited number of enterprises, predominant use by 
certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy 
to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by 
the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.  Depending on the type 
of subsidies and the impact they have, they may be prohibited subsidies, 
actionable subsidies or non-actionable subsidies.  Subsidies dependent on 
export performance are also considered specific.  They are always prohibited. 
 
TRIMS: Trade-Related Investment Measures.  These include export targets, 
import limitations, local-purchase requirements or local-content requirements, 
research and development requirements and similar conditions imposed on an 
enterprise as part of receiving permission to invest in another country. 
 
WTO: World Trade Organization, established on 1 January 1995 as the 
successor to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and its 
secretariat.  The GATT now is one of the agreements administered by the 
WTO. 
 

  
   
 
Annex 2 – Japan Questions to Canada on FIT Program 
 
SUBSIDIES 
 
Replies to Questions Posed by JAPAN256 Regarding the New  
and Full Notification of CANADA 
 
 The following communication, dated 8 June 2010, is being circulated at the request of 
the Delegation of Canada. 
_______________ 
 
 (i)   Is it a correct understanding that the OPA ensures the payment 
of the "contract price" if the suppliers of renewable energy run the 
Contract Facilities which are developed and constructed such that the 
Domestic Content Level is equal to or greater than the Minimum 
Required Domestic Content Level"? 
Reply 
 
 Under the Feed in Tariff program the OPA will enter into contracts with renewable 
energy suppliers.  The FIT program provides a price schedule for renewable generating 
facilities by technology (onshore wind, offshore wind etc.).  The FIT program includes a 
domestic content requirement for wind power projects with a capacity greater than 10kW and 
solar projects.   
 
 (ii)   Is it a correct understanding that the "contract price" is set to 
support the income of the suppliers or the price of renewable energy, 
which is traded at the market price without the FIT Programme? 
Reply 
 
 The FIT tariff is calculated so as to provide a price that will allow the generator to 
recover all of its capital and operating costs and earn a commercial return on equity.   
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 (iii)   Is the "contract price" higher than the market price?  
Reply 
 
 As indicated above, the FIT tariff is calculated so as to provide a price that will allow 
the generator to recover all of its capital and operating costs and earn a commercial return on 
equity.   
 
 (iv)   Is the OPA, established by the Electricity Restructuring Act, 
2004, a public body owned by the Government of Ontario? 
Reply 
 
 The Ontario Power Authority is a corporation without share capital (Electricity Act 
(25.1 (1)).  It has the capacity, rights, powers and privileges of a natural person (Electricity Act 
(25.2(4)).  It has the right to enter into contracts relating to the procurement of electricity supply 
and capacity using alternative energy sources or renewable energy sources to assist the 
Government of Ontario in achieving goals in the development and use of alternative or 
renewable energy technology and resources (25.2 (5) (c)).   
 
 (v)   Is it a correct understanding that the "contract price" is not 
applicable to suppliers who run the Contract Facilities which do not meet 
the Minimum Required Domestic Content Level? 
Reply 
 
 The contract price under FIT is applicable to projects meeting the program's eligibility 
requirements.  For wind power projects with a capacity greater than 10kW and solar projects, 
eligibility requirements include meeting a domestic content level.   
 
     (vi)  Are there any supplier who has met the Minimum Required 
Domestic Content Level since last October when the FIT programme was 
initiated?  If any, what percentage of FIT contractors has met it? 
Reply 
 
 In April 2010, 184 contracts were approved under the FIT program (contracts were 
approved earlier for smaller projects under the microfit and capacity exempt categories).  In 
agreeing to these contract conditions these suppliers have accepted the domestic content 
requirements.  Projects have not yet been built given approvals and construction requirements. 
__________ 
 
  
   
 
Annex 3 – SCM Agreement 
(see attached) 
 
  
AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
 
 
Members hereby agree as follows: 
 
 
PART I:  GENERAL PROVISIONS 
 
 
Article 1 
 
Definition of a Subsidy 
 
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within 
the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as "government"), 
i.e. where: 
 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans,  
and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan 
guarantees); 
 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. 
fiscal incentives such as tax credits) 1; 
 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or 
purchases goods; 
 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs 
a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in 
(i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the 
practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by 
governments; 
 
or 
 
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of 
GATT 1994; 
 
and 
 
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred. 
 
1.2 A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II or shall be 
subject to the provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is specific in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 2. 
 
 
                                                     
1 In accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of GATT 1994 (Note to Article XVI) and the 
provisions of Annexes I through III of this Agreement, the exemption of an exported product from duties or 
taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or 
taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy. 
  
Article 2 
 
Specificity 
 
2.1 In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1, is specific to 
an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to in this Agreement as "certain 
enterprises") within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following principles shall apply: 
 
(a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting 
authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such 
subsidy shall be specific. 
 
(b) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting 
authority operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions2 governing the 
eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that 
the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to.  
The criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other 
official document, so as to be capable of verification. 
 
(c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application 
of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe 
that the subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may be considered.  Such 
factors are:  use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, 
predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large 
amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has 
been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.3  In 
applying this  subparagraph, account shall be taken of the extent of diversification of 
economic activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the 
length of time during which the subsidy programme has been in operation. 
 
2.2 A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical 
region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be specific.  It is understood that the 
setting or change of generally applicable tax rates by all levels of government entitled to do so shall 
not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the purposes of this Agreement.   
 
2.3 Any subsidy falling under the provisions of Article 3 shall be deemed to be specific. 
 
2.4 Any determination of specificity under the provisions of this Article shall be clearly 
substantiated on the basis of positive evidence. 
 
 
PART II:  PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES 
 
 
Article 3 
 
Prohibition 
 
                                                     
2 Objective criteria or conditions, as used herein, mean criteria or conditions which are neutral, which 
do not favour certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, 
such as number of employees or size of enterprise. 
3 In this regard, in particular, information on the frequency with which applications for a subsidy are 
refused or approved and the reasons for such decisions shall  be considered. 
  
3.1 Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the 
meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited: 
 
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact4, whether solely or as one of several other 
conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I5; 
 
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods. 
 
3.2 A Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to in paragraph 1. 
 
 
Article 4   
 
Remedies 
 
4.1 Whenever a Member has reason to believe that a prohibited subsidy is being granted or 
maintained by another Member, such Member may request consultations with such other Member.
  
 
4.2 A request for consultations under paragraph 1 shall include a statement of available evidence 
with regard to the existence and nature of the subsidy in question. 
 
4.3 Upon request for consultations under paragraph 1, the Member believed to be granting or 
maintaining the subsidy in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as possible.  The 
purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually  
agreed solution. 
 
4.4 If no mutually agreed solution has been reached within 30 days6 of the request for 
consultations, any Member party to such consultations may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement 
Body ("DSB") for the immediate establishment of a panel, unless the DSB decides by consensus not 
to establish a panel. 
 
4.5 Upon its establishment, the panel may request the assistance of the Permanent Group of 
Experts7 (referred to in this Agreement as the "PGE") with regard to whether the measure in question 
is a prohibited subsidy.  If so requested, the PGE shall immediately review the evidence with regard to 
the existence and nature of the measure in question and shall provide an opportunity for the Member 
applying or maintaining the measure to demonstrate that the measure in question is not a prohibited 
subsidy.  The PGE shall report its conclusions to the panel within a time-limit determined by the 
panel.  The PGE's conclusions on the issue of whether or not the measure in question is a prohibited 
subsidy shall be accepted by the panel without modification. 
 
4.6 The panel shall submit its final report to the parties to the dispute.  The report shall be 
circulated to all Members within 90 days of the date of the composition and the establishment of the 
panel's terms of reference. 
                                                     
4  This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without having been 
made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export 
earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be 
considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision.  
5 Measures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall not be prohibited under this 
or any other provision of this Agreement. 
6 Any time-periods mentioned in this Article may be extended by mutual agreement. 
7 As established in Article 24. 
  
 
4.7 If the measure in question is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the panel shall recommend that 
the subsidizing Member withdraw the subsidy without delay.   In this regard, the panel shall specify in 
its recommendation the time-period within which the measure must be withdrawn.   
 
4.8 Within 30 days of the issuance of the  panel's report to all Members, the report shall be 
adopted by the DSB unless one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision 
to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. 
 
4.9 Where a panel report is appealed, the Appellate Body shall issue its decision within 30 days 
from the date when the party to the dispute formally notifies its intention to appeal.  When the 
Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 30 days, it shall inform the DSB in 
writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit 
its report.  In no case shall the proceedings exceed 60 days.  The appellate report shall be adopted by 
the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by 
consensus not  to adopt the appellate report within 20 days following its issuance to the Members.8 
 
4.10 In the event the recommendation of the DSB is not followed within the time-period specified 
by the panel, which shall commence from the date of adoption of the panel’s report or the Appellate 
Body’s report, the DSB shall grant authorization to the complaining Member to take appropriate9  
countermeasures, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.  
 
4.11 In the event a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), the arbitrator shall determine whether the 
countermeasures are appropriate.10 
 
4.12 For purposes of disputes conducted pursuant to this Article, except for time-periods 
specifically prescribed in this Article, time-periods applicable under the DSU for the conduct of such 
disputes shall be half the time prescribed therein.   
 
 
PART III:  ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES 
 
 
Article 5   
 
Adverse Effects 
 
 No Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.: 
 
(a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member11; 
 
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other 
Members under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of concessions bound under 
Article II of GATT 199412; 
                                                     
8 If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this 
purpose.  
9 This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact 
that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited.   
10 This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact 
that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited.   
11 The term "injury to the domestic industry" is used here in the same sense as it is used in Part V. 
  
 
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.13 
 
This Article does not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural products as provided in Article 13 
of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
 
Article 6 
 
Serious Prejudice 
 
6.1 Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 shall be deemed to exist in the 
case of: 
 
(a) the total ad valorem subsidization14 of a product exceeding 5 per cent15; 
 
(b) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an industry; 
 
(c) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an enterprise, other than one-time 
measures which are non-recurrent and cannot be repeated for that enterprise and 
which are given merely to provide time for the development of long-term solutions 
and to avoid acute social problems; 
 
(d) direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. forgiveness of government-held debt, and grants to 
cover debt repayment.16 
 
6.2 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, serious prejudice shall not be found if the 
subsidizing Member demonstrates that the subsidy in question has not resulted in any of the effects 
enumerated in paragraph 3.  
 
6.3 Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise in any case where one or 
several of the following apply: 
 
(a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product of 
another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member; 
 
(b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like product of 
another  Member from a third country market; 
 
(c) the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product 
as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market 
or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market; 
                                                                                                                                                                     
12 The term "nullification or impairment" is used in this Agreement in the same sense as it is used in the 
relevant provisions of GATT 1994, and the existence of such nullification or impairment shall be established in 
accordance with the practice of application of these provisions.  
13 The term "serious prejudice to the interests of another Member" is used in this Agreement in the 
same sense as it is used in paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994, and includes threat of serious prejudice. 
14 The total ad valorem subsidization shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions of 
Annex IV. 
15 Since it is anticipated that civil aircraft will be subject to specific multilateral rules, the threshold in 
this subparagraph does not apply to civil aircraft. 
16 Members recognize that where royalty-based financing for a civil aircraft programme is not being 
fully repaid due to the level of actual sales falling below the level of forecast sales, this does not in itself 
constitute serious prejudice for the purposes of this subparagraph. 
  
 
(d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing 
Member in a particular subsidized primary product or commodity17 as compared to 
the average share it had during the previous period of three years and this increase 
follows a consistent trend over a period when subsidies have been granted. 
 
6.4 For the purpose of paragraph 3(b), the displacement or impeding of exports shall include any 
case in which, subject to the provisions of paragraph 7, it has been demonstrated that there has been a 
change in relative shares of the market to the disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product (over an 
appropriately representative period sufficient to demonstrate clear trends in the development of the 
market for the product concerned, which, in normal circumstances, shall be at least one year).  
"Change in relative shares of the market" shall include any of the following situations:  (a) there is an 
increase in the market share of the subsidized product;  (b) the market share of the subsidized product 
remains constant in circumstances in which, in the absence of the subsidy, it would have declined;  
(c) the  market share of the subsidized product declines, but at a slower rate than would have been the 
case in the absence of the subsidy. 
 
6.5 For the purpose of paragraph 3(c), price undercutting shall include any case in which such 
price undercutting has been demonstrated through a comparison of prices of the subsidized product 
with prices of a non-subsidized like product supplied to the same market.  The comparison shall be 
made at the same level of trade and at comparable times, due account being taken of any other factor 
affecting price comparability.  However, if such a direct comparison is not possible, the existence of 
price undercutting may be demonstrated on the basis of export unit values. 
 
6.6 Each Member in the market of which serious prejudice is alleged to have arisen shall, subject 
to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Annex V, make available to the parties to a dispute arising under 
Article 7, and to the panel established pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 7, all relevant information 
that can be obtained as to the changes in market shares of the parties to the dispute as well as 
concerning prices of the products involved. 
 
6.7 Displacement or impediment resulting in serious prejudice shall not arise under paragraph 3 
where any of the following circumstances exist18 during the relevant period: 
 
(a) prohibition or restriction on exports of the like product from the complaining Member 
or on imports from the complaining Member into the third country market concerned; 
 
(b) decision by an importing government operating a monopoly of trade or state trading 
in the product concerned to shift, for non-commercial reasons, imports from the 
complaining Member to another country or countries; 
 
(c) natural disasters, strikes, transport disruptions or other force majeure substantially 
affecting production, qualities, quantities or prices of the product available for export 
from the complaining Member; 
 
(d) existence of arrangements limiting exports from the complaining Member; 
 
(e) voluntary decrease in the availability for export of the product concerned from the 
complaining Member (including, inter alia, a situation where firms in the 
                                                     
17 Unless other multilaterally agreed specific rules apply to the trade in the product or commodity in 
question.  
18 The fact that certain circumstances are referred to in this paragraph does not, in itself, confer upon 
them any legal status in terms of either GATT 1994 or this Agreement.  These circumstances must not be 
isolated, sporadic or otherwise insignificant. 
  
complaining Member have been autonomously reallocating exports of this product to 
new markets); 
 
(f) failure to conform to standards and other regulatory requirements in the importing 
country. 
 
6.8 In the absence of circumstances referred to in paragraph 7, the existence of serious prejudice 
should be determined on the basis of the information submitted to or obtained by the panel, including 
information submitted in accordance with the provisions of Annex V. 
 
6.9 This Article does not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural products as provided in 
Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
 
Article 7 
 
Remedies 
 
7.1 Except as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture, whenever a Member has 
reason to believe that any subsidy referred to in Article 1, granted or maintained by another Member, 
results in injury to its domestic industry, nullification or impairment or serious prejudice, such 
Member may request consultations with such other Member. 
 
7.2 A request for consultations under paragraph 1 shall include a statement of available evidence 
with regard to (a) the existence and nature of the subsidy in question, and (b) the injury caused to the 
domestic industry, or the nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice19 caused to the interests of 
the Member requesting consultations. 
 
7.3 Upon request for consultations under paragraph 1, the Member believed to be granting or 
maintaining the subsidy practice in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as possible.  
The purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually 
agreed solution. 
 
7.4 If consultations do not result in a mutually agreed solution within 60 days20, any Member 
party to such consultations may refer the matter to the DSB for the establishment of a panel, unless 
the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel.  The composition of the panel and its terms of 
reference shall be established within 15 days from the date when it is established.  
 
7.5 The panel shall review the matter and shall submit its final report to the parties to the dispute.  
The report shall be circulated to all Members within 120 days of the date of the composition and 
establishment of the panel’s terms of reference. 
 
7.6 Within 30 days of the issuance of the panel’s report to all Members, the report shall be 
adopted by the DSB21 unless one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision 
to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.  
 
                                                     
19 In the event that the request relates to a subsidy deemed to result in serious prejudice in terms of 
paragraph 1 of Article 6, the available evidence of serious prejudice may be limited to the available evidence as 
to whether the conditions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 have been met or not. 
20 Any time-periods mentioned in this Article may be extended by mutual agreement. 
21 If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this 
purpose. 
  
7.7 Where a panel report is appealed, the Appellate Body shall issue its decision within 60 days 
from the date when the party to the dispute formally notifies its intention to appeal.  When the 
Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60 days, it shall inform the DSB in 
writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit 
its report.  In no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days.  The appellate report shall be adopted by 
the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by 
consensus not  to adopt the appellate report within 20 days following its issuance to the Members.22 
 
7.8 Where a panel report or an Appellate Body report is adopted in which it is determined that 
any subsidy has resulted in adverse effects to the interests of another Member within the meaning of 
Article 5, the Member granting or maintaining such subsidy shall take appropriate steps to remove the 
adverse effects or shall withdraw the subsidy. 
 
7.9 In the event the Member has not taken appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects of the 
subsidy or withdraw the subsidy within six months from the date when the DSB adopts the panel 
report or the Appellate Body report, and in the absence of agreement on compensation, the DSB shall 
grant authorization to the complaining Member to take countermeasures, commensurate with the 
degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist, unless the DSB decides by consensus to 
reject the request. 
 
7.10 In the event that a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of Article 22 of 
the DSU, the arbitrator shall determine whether the countermeasures are commensurate with the 
degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist. 
 
 
PART IV:  NON-ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES 
 
Article 8 
 
Identification of Non-Actionable Subsidies 
 
8.1 The following subsidies shall be considered as non-actionable23: 
 
(a) subsidies which are not specific within the meaning of Article 2; 
 
(b) subsidies which are specific within the meaning of Article 2 but which meet all of the 
conditions provided for in paragraphs 2(a), 2(b) or 2(c) below. 
 
8.2 Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V, the following subsidies shall be 
non-actionable: 
 
(a) assistance for research activities conducted by firms or by higher education or 
research establishments on a contract basis with firms if:24 ,25 ,26   
                                                     
22 If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this 
purpose. 
23 It is recognized that government assistance for various purposes is widely provided by Members and 
that the mere fact that such assistance may not qualify for non-actionable treatment under the provisions of this 
Article does not in itself restrict the ability of Members to provide such assistance. 
24 Since it is anticipated that civil aircraft will be subject to specific multilateral rules, the provisions of 
this subparagraph do not apply to that product. 
25 Not later than 18 months after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures provided for in Article 24 (referred to in this Agreement as "the 
Committee")  shall review the operation of the provisions of subparagraph 2(a) with a view to making all 
necessary modifications to improve the operation of these provisions.  In its consideration of possible 
  
 
the assistance covers27 not more than 75 per cent of the costs of industrial research28 or 50 per cent of 
the costs of pre-competitive development activity29, 30; and provided that such assistance is limited 
exclusively to: 
 
(i) costs of personnel (researchers, technicians and other supporting staff 
employed exclusively in the research activity); 
 
(ii) costs of instruments, equipment, land and buildings used exclusively and 
permanently (except when disposed of on a commercial basis) for the 
research activity; 
 
(iii) costs of consultancy and equivalent services used exclusively for the research 
activity, including bought-in research, technical knowledge, patents, etc.;  
 
(iv) additional overhead costs incurred directly as a result of the research activity; 
 
(v) other running costs (such as those of materials, supplies and the like), 
incurred directly as a result of the research activity. 
 
(b) assistance to disadvantaged regions within the territory of a Member given pursuant 
to a general framework of regional development 31 and non-specific (within the 
meaning of Article 2) within eligible regions provided that: 
 
(i) each disadvantaged region must be a clearly designated contiguous 
geographical area with a definable economic and administrative identity; 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
modifications, the Committee shall carefully review the definitions of the categories set forth in this 
subparagraph in the light of the experience of Members in the operation of research programmes and the work 
in other relevant international institutions. 
26 The provisions of this Agreement do not apply to fundamental research activities independently 
conducted by higher education or research establishments.  The term "fundamental research" means an 
enlargement of general scientific and technical knowledge not linked to industrial or commercial objectives. 
27 The allowable levels of non-actionable assistance referred to in this subparagraph shall be established 
by reference to the total eligible costs incurred over the duration of an individual project. 
28 The term "industrial research" means planned search or critical investigation aimed at discovery of 
new knowledge, with the objective that such knowledge may be useful in developing new products, processes or 
services, or in bringing about a significant improvement to existing products, processes or services. 
29 The term "pre-competitive development activity" means  the translation of industrial research 
findings into a plan, blueprint or design for new, modified or improved products, processes or services whether 
intended for sale or use, including the creation of a first prototype which would not be capable of commercial 
use.  It may further include the conceptual formulation and design of products, processes or services alternatives 
and initial demonstration or pilot projects, provided that these same projects cannot be converted or used for 
industrial application or commercial exploitation.  It does not include routine or periodic alterations to existing 
products, production lines, manufacturing processes, services, and other on-going operations even though those 
alterations may represent improvements. 
30 In the case of programmes which span industrial research and pre-competitive development activity, 
the allowable level of non-actionable assistance shall not exceed the simple average of the allowable levels of 
non-actionable assistance applicable to the above two categories, calculated on the basis of all eligible costs as 
set forth in items (i) to (v) of this subparagraph. 
31 A "general framework of regional development" means that regional subsidy programmes are part of 
an internally consistent and generally applicable regional development policy and that regional development 
subsidies are not granted in isolated geographical points having no, or virtually no, influence on the 
development of a region. 
  
(ii) the region is considered as disadvantaged on the basis of neutral and 
objective criteria32, indicating that the region's difficulties arise out of more 
than temporary circumstances;  such criteria must be clearly spelled out in 
law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of verification; 
 
(iii) the criteria shall include a measurement of economic development which 
shall be based on at least one of the following factors: 
 
- one of either income per capita or household income per capita, or 
GDP per capita, which must not be above 85 per cent of the average 
for the territory concerned; 
 
- unemployment rate, which must be at least 110 per cent of the 
average for the territory concerned; 
 
as measured over a three-year period;  such measurement, however, may be a 
composite one and may include other factors. 
 
(c) assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities33 to new environmental 
requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints 
and financial burden on firms, provided that the assistance: 
 
(i) is a one-time non-recurring measure;  and 
 
(ii) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation;  and 
 
(iii) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, 
which must be fully borne by firms;  and 
 
(iv) is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's planned reduction of 
nuisances and pollution, and does not cover any manufacturing cost savings 
which may be achieved;  and 
 
(v) is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or 
production processes. 
 
8.3 A subsidy programme for which the provisions of paragraph 2 are invoked shall be notified in 
advance of its implementation to the Committee in accordance with the provisions of Part VII.  Any 
such notification shall be sufficiently precise to enable other Members to evaluate the consistency of 
the programme with the conditions and criteria provided for in the relevant provisions of paragraph 2.  
Members shall also provide the Committee with yearly updates of such notifications, in particular by 
supplying information on global expenditure for each programme, and on any modification of the 
                                                     
32 "Neutral and objective criteria" means criteria which do not favour certain regions beyond what is 
appropriate for the elimination or reduction of regional disparities within the framework of the regional 
development policy. In this regard, regional subsidy programmes shall include ceilings on the amount of 
assistance which can be granted to each subsidized project. Such ceilings must be differentiated according to the 
different levels of development of assisted regions and must be expressed in terms of investment costs or cost of 
job creation. Within such ceilings, the distribution of assistance shall be sufficiently broad and even to avoid the 
predominant use of a subsidy by, or the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to, certain 
enterprises as provided for in Article 2. 
33 The term "existing facilities" means facilities which have been in operation for at least two years at 
the time when new environmental requirements are imposed. 
  
programme.  Other Members shall have the right to request information about individual cases of 
subsidization under a notified programme.34 
 
8.4 Upon request of a Member, the Secretariat shall review a notification made pursuant to 
paragraph 3 and, where necessary, may require additional information from the subsidizing Member 
concerning the notified programme under review.  The Secretariat shall report its findings to the 
Committee.  The Committee shall, upon request, promptly review the findings of the Secretariat (or, if 
a review by the Secretariat has not been requested, the notification itself), with a view to determining 
whether the conditions and criteria laid down in paragraph 2 have not been met.  The procedure 
provided for in this paragraph shall be completed at the latest at the first regular meeting of the 
Committee following the notification of a subsidy programme, provided that at least two months have 
elapsed between such notification and the regular meeting of the Committee.  The review procedure 
described in this paragraph shall also apply, upon request, to substantial modifications of a 
programme notified in the yearly updates referred to in paragraph 3. 
 
8.5 Upon the request of a Member, the determination by the Committee referred to in 
paragraph 4, or a failure by the Committee to make such a determination, as well as the violation, in 
individual cases, of the conditions set out in a notified programme, shall be submitted to binding 
arbitration.   The arbitration body shall present its conclusions to the Members within 120 days from 
the date when the matter was referred to the arbitration body.  Except as otherwise provided in this 
paragraph, the DSU shall apply to arbitrations conducted under this paragraph. 
 
 
Article 9 
 
Consultations and Authorized Remedies 
 
9.1 If, in the course of implementation of a programme referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8, 
notwithstanding the fact that the programme is consistent with the criteria laid down in  that 
paragraph, a Member has reasons to believe that this programme has resulted in serious adverse 
effects to the domestic industry of that Member, such as to cause damage which would be difficult to 
repair, such Member may request consultations with the Member granting or maintaining the subsidy. 
 
9.2 Upon request for consultations under paragraph 1, the Member granting or maintaining the 
subsidy programme in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as possible.  The 
purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable solution. 
 
9.3 If no mutually acceptable solution has been reached in consultations under paragraph 2 within 
60 days of the request for such consultations, the requesting Member may refer the matter to the 
Committee. 
 
9.4 Where a matter is referred to the Committee, the Committee shall immediately review the 
facts involved and the evidence of the effects referred to in paragraph 1.  If the Committee determines 
that such effects exist, it may recommend to the subsidizing Member to modify this programme in 
such a way as to remove these effects.  The Committee shall present its conclusions within 120 days 
from the date when the matter is referred to it under paragraph 3.  In the event the recommendation is 
not followed within six months, the Committee shall authorize the requesting Member to take 
appropriate countermeasures commensurate with the nature and degree of the effects determined to 
exist. 
 
                                                     
34 It is recognized that nothing in this notification provision requires the provision of confidential 
information, including confidential business information. 
  
 
PART V:  COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
 
 
Article 10 
 
Application of Article VI of GATT 199435 
 
 Members shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the imposition of a countervailing duty36 
on any product of the territory of any Member imported into the territory of another Member is in 
accordance with the provisions of Article VI of GATT 1994 and the terms of this Agreement.  
Countervailing duties may only be imposed pursuant to investigations initiated37  and conducted in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
 
Article 11 
 
Initiation and Subsequent Investigation 
 
11.1 Except as provided in paragraph 6, an investigation to determine the existence, degree and 
effect of any alleged subsidy shall be initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of the 
domestic industry. 
 
11.2 An application under paragraph 1 shall include sufficient evidence of the existence of (a) a 
subsidy and, if possible, its amount, (b) injury within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as 
interpreted by this Agreement, and (c) a causal link between the subsidized imports and the alleged 
injury.  Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to 
meet the requirements of this paragraph.  The application shall contain such information as is 
reasonably available to the applicant on the following: 
 
(i) the identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of the domestic 
production of the like product by the applicant.  Where a written application is made 
on behalf of the domestic industry, the application shall identify the industry on 
behalf of which the application is made by a list of all known domestic producers of 
the like product (or associations of domestic producers of the like product) and, to the 
extent possible, a description of the volume and value of domestic production of the 
like product accounted for by such producers; 
 
                                                     
35 The provisions of Part II or III may be invoked in parallel with the provisions of Part V;  however, 
with regard to the effects of a particular subsidy in the domestic market of the importing Member, only one form 
of relief (either a countervailing duty, if the requirements of Part V are met, or a countermeasure under Articles 
4 or 7) shall be available. The provisions of Parts III and V shall not be invoked regarding measures considered 
non-actionable in accordance with the provisions of Part IV.  However, measures referred to in paragraph 1(a) 
of Article 8 may be investigated in order to determine whether or not they are specific within the meaning of 
Article 2.  In addition, in the case of a subsidy referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8 conferred pursuant to a 
programme which has not been notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 8, the provisions of Part III or 
V may be invoked, but such subsidy shall be treated as non-actionable if it is found to conform to the standards 
set forth in paragraph 2 of Article 8. 
36 The term "countervailing duty" shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of 
offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or export of any 
merchandise, as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article VI of GATT 1994. 
37 The term "initiated" as used hereinafter means procedural action by which a  Member formally 
commences an investigation as provided in Article 11. 
 
  
(ii) a complete description of the allegedly subsidized product, the names of the country 
or countries of origin or export in question, the identity of each known exporter or 
foreign producer and a list of known persons importing the product in question; 
 
(iii) evidence with regard to the existence, amount and nature of the subsidy in question; 
 
(iv) evidence that alleged injury to a domestic industry is caused by subsidized imports 
through the effects of the subsidies;  this evidence includes information on the 
evolution of the volume of the allegedly subsidized imports, the effect of these 
imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market and the consequent 
impact of the imports on the domestic industry, as demonstrated by relevant factors 
and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry, such as those listed 
in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 15. 
 
11.3 The authorities shall review the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the  
application to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation. 
 
11.4 An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph 1 unless the authorities have 
determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of support for, or opposition to, the 
application expressed38 by domestic producers of the like product, that the application has been made 
by or on behalf of the domestic industry.39  The application shall be considered to have been made "by 
or on behalf of the domestic industry" if it is supported by those domestic producers whose collective 
output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total production of the like product produced by that 
portion of the domestic industry expressing either support for or opposition to the application.  
However, no investigation shall be initiated when domestic producers expressly supporting the 
application account for less than 25 per cent of total production of the like product produced by the 
domestic industry. 
 
11.5 The authorities shall avoid, unless a decision has been made to initiate an investigation,  any 
publicizing of the application for the initiation of  an investigation. 
 
11.6 If, in special circumstances, the authorities concerned decide to initiate an investigation 
without having received a written application by or on behalf of a domestic industry for the initiation 
of such investigation, they shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of the existence of a 
subsidy, injury and causal link, as described in paragraph 2, to justify the initiation of an investigation. 
 
11.7 The evidence of both subsidy and injury shall be considered simultaneously (a) in the 
decision whether or not to initiate an investigation and (b) thereafter, during the course of the 
investigation, starting on a date not later than the earliest date on which in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement provisional measures may be applied. 
 
11.8 In cases where products are not imported directly from the country of origin but are exported 
to the importing Member from an intermediate country, the provisions of this Agreement shall be 
fully applicable and the transaction or transactions shall, for the purposes of this Agreement, be 
regarded as having taken place between the country of origin and the importing Member. 
 
11.9 An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be terminated 
promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of 
                                                     
38 In the case of fragmented industries involving an exceptionally large number of producers, 
authorities may determine support and opposition by using statistically valid sampling techniques. 
39 Members are aware that in the territory of certain Members employees of domestic producers of the 
like product or representatives of those employees may make or support an application for an investigation 
under paragraph 1. 
  
either subsidization or of injury to justify proceeding with the case.  There shall be immediate 
termination  in cases where the amount of a subsidy is de minimis , or where the volume of subsidized 
imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible.  For the purpose of this paragraph, the amount 
of the subsidy shall be considered to be de minimis if the subsidy is less than 1 per cent ad valorem. 
 
11.10 An investigation shall not hinder the procedures of customs clearance. 
 
11.11 Investigations shall, except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, and in no 
case more than 18 months, after their initiation. 
 
 
Article 12 
 
Evidence 
 
12.1 Interested Members and all interested parties in a countervailing duty investigation shall be 
given notice of the information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in 
writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in question. 
 
 12.1.1 Exporters, foreign producers or interested Members receiving questionnaires used in 
a countervailing duty investigation shall be given at least 30 days for reply.40  Due 
consideration should be given to any request for an extension of the 30-day period 
and, upon cause shown, such an extension should be granted whenever practicable. 
 
 12.1.2 Subject to the requirement to protect confidential information, evidence presented in 
writing by one interested Member or interested party shall be made available 
promptly to other interested Members or interested parties participating in the 
investigation. 
 
 12.1.3 As soon as an investigation has been initiated, the authorities shall provide the full 
text  of the written application received under paragraph 1 of Article 11 to the known 
exporters41 and to the authorities of the exporting Member and shall make it available, 
upon request, to other  interested parties involved.  Due regard shall be paid to the 
protection of confidential information, as provided for in paragraph 4. 
 
12.2. Interested Members and interested parties also shall have the right, upon justification, to 
present information orally.  Where such information is provided orally, the interested Members and 
interested parties subsequently shall be required to reduce such submissions to writing.  Any decision 
of the  investigating authorities can only be based on such information and arguments as were on the 
written record of this authority and which were available to interested Members and interested parties 
participating in the investigation, due account having been given to the need to protect confidential 
information. 
 
12.3 The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities for all interested 
Members and interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases, 
                                                     
40 As a general rule, the time-limit for exporters shall be counted from the date of receipt of the 
questionnaire, which for this purpose shall be deemed to have been received one week from the date on which it 
was sent to the respondent or transmitted to the appropriate diplomatic representatives of the exporting Member 
or, in the case of a separate customs territory Member of the WTO, an official representative of the exporting 
territory. 
41 It being understood that where the number of exporters involved is particularly high, the full text of 
the application should instead be provided only to the authorities of the exporting Member or to the relevant 
trade association who then should forward copies to the exporters concerned. 
  
that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 4, and that is used by the authorities in a countervailing 
duty investigation, and to prepare presentations on the basis of this information. 
 
12.4 Any information which is by nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure would 
be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its disclosure would have a 
significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom the  
supplier acquired the information), or which is provided on a confidential basis by parties to an 
investigation shall, upon good cause shown, be treated as such by the authorities.   Such information 
shall not be disclosed without specific permission of the party submitting it.42    
 
 12.4.1 The authorities shall require interested Members or interested parties 
providing confidential information to furnish non-confidential summaries 
thereof.  These summaries shall be in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable 
understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence.  
In exceptional circumstances, such Members or parties may indicate that such 
information is not susceptible of summary.  In such exceptional 
circumstances, a statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible 
must be provided. 
 
12.4.2 If the authorities find that a request for confidentiality is not warranted and if 
the supplier of the information is either unwilling to make the information 
public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or summary form, the 
authorities may disregard such information unless it can be demonstrated to 
their satisfaction from appropriate sources that the information is correct.43 
 
12.5 Except in circumstances provided for in paragraph 7, the authorities shall during the course of 
an investigation satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested 
Members or interested parties upon which their findings are based. 
 
12.6 The investigating authorities may carry out investigations in the territory of other Members as 
required, provided that they have notified in good time the Member in question and unless that 
Member objects to the investigation.   Further, the investigating authorities may carry out 
investigations on the premises of a firm and may examine the records of a firm if (a) the firm so 
agrees and (b) the Member in question is notified and does not object.   The procedures set forth in 
Annex VI shall apply to investigations on the premises of a firm.  Subject to the requirement to 
protect confidential information, the authorities shall make the results of any such investigations 
available, or shall provide disclosure thereof pursuant to paragraph 8, to the firms to which they 
pertain and may make such results available to the applicants. 
 
12.7 In cases in which any interested Member or interested party refuses access to, or otherwise 
does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the 
investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis 
of the facts available. 
 
12.8 The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested Members and 
interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision 
whether to apply definitive measures.   Such disclosure should take place in sufficient time for the 
parties to defend their interests. 
                                                     
42 Members are aware that in the territory of certain Members disclosure pursuant to a narrowly-drawn 
protective order may be required.  
43 Members agree that requests for confidentiality should not be arbitrarily rejected.   Members further 
agree that the investigating authority may request the waiving of confidentiality only regarding information 
relevant to the proceedings. 
  
 
12.9 For the purposes of this Agreement, "interested parties" shall include: 
 
(i) an exporter or foreign producer or the importer of a product subject to investigation, 
or a trade or business association a majority of the members of which are producers, 
exporters or importers of such product;  and 
 
(ii) a producer of the like product in the importing Member or a trade and business 
association a majority of the members of which produce the like product in the 
territory of the importing Member. 
 
This list shall not preclude Members from allowing domestic or foreign parties other than those 
mentioned above to be included as interested parties. 
 
12.10 The authorities shall provide opportunities for industrial users of the product under 
investigation, and for representative consumer organizations in cases where the product is commonly 
sold at the retail level, to provide information which is relevant to the investigation regarding 
subsidization, injury and causality. 
 
12.11 The authorities shall take due account of any difficulties experienced by interested parties, in 
particular small companies, in supplying information requested, and shall provide any assistance 
practicable. 
 
12.12 The procedures set out above are not intended to prevent the authorities of a Member from 
proceeding expeditiously with regard to initiating an investigation, reaching preliminary or final 
determinations, whether affirmative or negative, or from applying provisional or final measures, in 
accordance with relevant provisions of this Agreement. 
 
 
Article 13 
 
Consultations 
 
13.1 As soon as possible after an application under Article 11 is accepted, and in any event before 
the initiation of any investigation, Members the products of which may be subject to such 
investigation shall be invited for consultations with the aim of clarifying the situation as to the matters 
referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11 and arriving at a mutually agreed solution. 
 
13.2 Furthermore, throughout the period of investigation, Members the products of which are the 
subject of the investigation shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to continue consultations, with 
a view to clarifying the factual situation and to arriving at a mutually agreed solution.44 
 
13.3 Without prejudice to the obligation to afford reasonable opportunity for consultation, these 
provisions regarding consultations are not intended to prevent the authorities of a Member from 
proceeding expeditiously with regard to initiating the investigation, reaching preliminary or final 
determinations, whether affirmative or negative, or from applying provisional or final measures, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 
 
13.4 The Member which intends to initiate any investigation or is conducting such an investigation 
shall permit, upon request, the Member or Members the products of which are subject to such  
                                                     
44 It is particularly important, in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph, that no affirmative 
determination whether preliminary or final be made without reasonable opportunity for consultations having 
been given. Such consultations may establish the basis for proceeding under the provisions of Part II, III or X. 
  
investigation access to non-confidential evidence, including the non-confidential summary of 
confidential data being used for initiating or conducting the investigation. 
 
 
Article 14 
 
Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy in Terms 
of the Benefit to the Recipient 
 
 For the purpose of Part V, any method used by the investigating authority to calculate the 
benefit to the recipient conferred pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 1 shall be provided for in the 
national legislation or implementing regulations of the Member concerned and its application to each 
particular case shall be transparent and adequately explained.   Furthermore, any such method shall be 
consistent with the following guidelines: 
  
(a) government provision of equity capital shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, 
unless the investment decision can be regarded as inconsistent with the usual 
investment practice (including for the provision of risk capital) of private investors in 
the territory of that Member; 
 
(b) a loan by a government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless there is 
a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the loan pays on the 
government loan and the amount the firm would pay on a comparable commercial 
loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market.   In this case the benefit shall 
be the difference between these two amounts; 
 
(c) a loan guarantee by a government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, 
unless there is a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the guarantee 
pays on a loan guaranteed by the government and the amount that the firm would pay 
on a comparable commercial loan absent the government guarantee.   In this case the 
benefit shall be the difference between these two amounts adjusted for any 
differences in fees; 
 
(d) the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government shall not be 
considered as conferring a benefit unless the provision is made for less than adequate 
remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than adequate remuneration.   The  
adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to prevailing market 
conditions for the good or service in question in the country of provision or purchase 
(including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other 
conditions of purchase or sale). 
 
 
Article 15 
 
Determination of Injury45 
 
15.1 A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive 
evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the subsidized imports and 
                                                     
45 Under this Agreement the term "injury" shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material 
injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the 
establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 
  
the effect of the subsidized imports on prices in the domestic market for like products46 and (b) the 
consequent impact of these imports on the domestic producers of such products. 
 
15.2 With regard to the volume of the subsidized imports, the investigating authorities shall 
consider whether there has been a significant increase in subsidized imports, either in absolute terms 
or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member.   With regard to the effect of the 
subsidized imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a 
significant price undercutting by the subsidized imports as compared with the price of a like product 
of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a 
significant degree or to prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant 
degree.   No one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.    
 
15.3 Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to 
countervailing duty investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of 
such imports only if they determine that (a) the amount of subsidization established in relation to the 
imports from each country is more than de minimis as defined in paragraph 9 of Article 11 and the 
volume of imports from each country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment of the effects 
of the imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between the imported products 
and the conditions of competition between the imported products and the like domestic product. 
 
15.4 The examination of the impact of the subsidized imports on the domestic industry shall 
include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the 
industry, including actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, 
return on  investments, or utilization of capacity;  factors affecting domestic prices;  actual and 
potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise 
capital or investments and, in the case of agriculture, whether there has been an increased burden on 
government support programmes.  This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors 
necessarily give decisive guidance. 
 
15.5 It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects47 of subsidies,  
causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement.  The demonstration of a causal relationship 
between the subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an 
examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities.  The authorities shall also examine any 
known factors other than the subsidized imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic 
industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the subsidized 
imports.  Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volumes and prices of 
non-subsidized imports of the product in question, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of 
consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic 
producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic 
industry. 
  
15.6 The effect of the subsidized imports shall be assessed in relation to the domestic production of 
the like product when available data permit the separate identification of that production on the basis 
of such criteria as the production process, producers' sales and profits.  If such separate identification 
of that production is not possible, the effects of the subsidized imports shall be assessed by the 
examination of the production of the narrowest group or range of products, which includes the like 
product, for which the necessary information can be provided. 
 
                                                     
46 Throughout this Agreement the term "like product" ("produit similaire") shall be interpreted to mean 
a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such 
a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those 
of the product under consideration. 
47 As set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4. 
  
15.7 A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based on facts and not merely on 
allegation, conjecture or remote possibility.   The change in circumstances which would create a 
situation in which the subsidy would cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent.   In making 
a determination  regarding the existence of a threat of material injury, the investigating authorities 
should consider, inter alia, such factors as:   
 
(i) nature of the subsidy or subsidies in question and the trade effects likely to arise 
therefrom;   
 
(ii) a significant rate of increase of subsidized imports into the domestic market 
indicating the likelihood of substantially increased importation;   
 
(iii) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of the 
exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially increased subsidized exports to the 
importing Member's market, taking into account the availability of other export 
markets to absorb any additional exports;   
 
(iv) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or 
suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further 
imports;  and 
 
(v) inventories of the product being investigated.   
 
No one of these factors by itself can necessarily give decisive guidance but the totality of the factors 
considered must lead to the conclusion that further subsidized exports are imminent and that, unless 
protective action is taken, material injury would occur. 
 
15.8 With respect to cases where injury is threatened by subsidized imports, the application of 
countervailing measures shall be considered and decided with special care. 
 
 
Article 16 
 
Definition of Domestic Industry 
 
16.1 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "domestic industry" shall, except as provided in 
paragraph 2, be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to 
those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total  
domestic production of those products, except that when producers are related48 to the exporters or 
importers or are themselves importers of the allegedly subsidized product or a like product from other 
countries, the term "domestic industry" may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the producers. 
 
16.2. In exceptional circumstances, the territory of a Member may, for the production in question, 
be divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each market may be 
regarded as a separate industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their 
production of the product in question in that market, and  (b) the demand in that market is not to any 
                                                     
48 For the purpose of this paragraph, producers shall be deemed to be related to exporters or importers 
only if (a) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other;  or (b) both of them are directly or indirectly 
controlled by a third person;  or (c) together they directly or indirectly control a third person, provided that there 
are grounds for believing or suspecting that the effect of the relationship is such as to cause the producer 
concerned to behave differently from non-related producers.  For the purpose of this paragraph, one shall be 
deemed to control another when the former is legally or operationally in a position to exercise restraint or 
direction over the latter. 
  
substantial degree supplied by producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the territory.   
In such circumstances, injury may be found to exist even where a major portion of the total domestic 
industry is not injured, provided there is a concentration of subsidized imports into such an isolated 
market and provided further that the subsidized imports are causing injury to the producers of all or 
almost all of the production within such market. 
 
16.3 When the domestic industry has been interpreted as referring to the producers in a certain 
area,  i.e. a market as defined in paragraph 2, countervailing duties shall be levied only on the 
products in question consigned for final consumption to that area.   When the constitutional law of the 
importing Member does not permit the levying of countervailing duties on such a basis, the importing 
Member may levy the countervailing duties without limitation only if (a) the exporters shall have 
been given an opportunity to cease exporting at subsidized prices to the area concerned or otherwise 
give assurances pursuant to Article 18, and adequate assurances in this regard have not been promptly 
given, and (b) such duties cannot be levied only on products of specific producers which supply the 
area in question. 
 
16.4 Where two or more countries have reached under the provisions of paragraph 8(a) of 
Article XXIV of GATT 1994 such a level of integration that they have the characteristics of a single, 
unified market, the industry in the entire area of integration shall be taken to be the domestic industry 
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. 
 
16.5 The provisions of paragraph 6 of Article 15 shall be applicable to this Article. 
 
 
Article 17 
 
Provisional Measures 
 
17.1 Provisional measures may be applied only if:   
 
(a) an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 11,  a 
public notice has been given to that effect and interested Members and interested 
parties have been given adequate opportunities to submit information and make 
comments;    
 
(b) a preliminary affirmative determination has been made that a subsidy exists and that 
there is injury to a domestic industry caused by subsidized imports;  and 
 
(c) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being 
caused during the investigation.   
 
17.2 Provisional measures may take the form of provisional countervailing duties guaranteed by 
cash deposits or bonds equal to the amount of the provisionally calculated amount of subsidization. 
 
17.3 Provisional measures shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of 
the investigation. 
 
17.4 The application of provisional measures shall be limited to as short a period as possible, not 
exceeding four months.   
 
17.5 The relevant provisions of Article 19 shall be followed in the application of provisional 
measures. 
 
 
  
Article 18 
 
Undertakings 
 
18.1 Proceedings may49 be suspended or terminated without the imposition of provisional 
measures or countervailing duties upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings under which: 
 
(a) the government of the exporting Member agrees to eliminate or limit the 
subsidy or take other measures concerning its effects;  or 
 
(b) the exporter agrees to revise its prices so that the investigating  authorities are 
satisfied that the injurious effect of the subsidy is  eliminated.   Price 
increases under such undertakings shall not be higher  than necessary to 
eliminate the amount of the subsidy.     It is desirable  that the price increases 
be less than the amount of the subsidy if such  increases would be adequate to 
remove the injury to the domestic industry. 
 
18.2 Undertakings shall not be sought or accepted unless the authorities of the importing Member  
have made a preliminary affirmative determination of subsidization and injury caused by such 
subsidization and, in case of undertakings from exporters, have obtained the consent of the exporting 
Member.  
 
18.3 Undertakings offered need not be accepted if the authorities of the importing Member 
consider their acceptance impractical, for example if the number of actual or potential exporters is too 
great, or for other reasons, including reasons of general policy.  Should the case arise and where 
practicable, the authorities shall provide to the exporter the reasons which have led them to consider 
acceptance of an undertaking as inappropriate, and shall, to the extent possible, give the exporter an 
opportunity to make comments thereon. 
 
18.4 If an undertaking is accepted, the investigation of subsidization and injury shall nevertheless 
be completed if the exporting Member so desires or the importing Member so decides.  In such a case, 
if a negative determination of subsidization or injury is made, the undertaking shall automatically 
lapse, except in cases where such a determination is due in large part to the existence of an 
undertaking.  In such cases, the authorities concerned may require that an undertaking be maintained 
for a reasonable  period consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.  In the event that an 
affirmative determination of subsidization and injury is made, the undertaking shall continue 
consistent with its terms and the provisions of this Agreement. 
 
18.5 Price undertakings may be suggested by the authorities of the importing Member, but no 
exporter shall be forced to enter into such undertakings.   The fact that governments or exporters do 
not offer such undertakings, or do not accept an invitation to do so, shall in no way prejudice the 
consideration of the case.  However, the authorities are free to determine that a threat of injury is more 
likely to be realized if the subsidized imports continue. 
 
18.6 Authorities of an importing Member may require any government or exporter from whom an  
undertaking has been accepted to provide periodically information relevant to the fulfilment of such 
an undertaking, and to permit verification of pertinent data.   In case of violation of an undertaking, 
the  authorities of the importing Member may take, under this Agreement in conformity with its 
provisions, expeditious actions which may constitute immediate application of provisional measures 
using the best information available.  In such cases, definitive duties may be levied in accordance with 
this Agreement on products entered for consumption not more than 90 days before the application of 
                                                     
49 The word "may" shall not be interpreted to allow the simultaneous continuation of proceedings with 
the implementation of undertakings, except as provided in paragraph 4. 
  
such provisional  measures, except that any such retroactive assessment shall not apply to imports 
entered before the violation of the undertaking. 
 
 
Article 19 
 
Imposition and Collection of Countervailing Duties 
 
19.1 If, after reasonable efforts have been made to complete consultations, a Member makes a final 
determination of the existence and amount of the subsidy and that, through the effects of the subsidy, 
the subsidized imports are causing injury, it may impose a countervailing duty in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article unless the subsidy or subsidies are withdrawn. 
 
19.2 The decision whether or not to impose a countervailing duty in cases where all requirements 
for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the decision whether the amount of the countervailing duty 
to be imposed shall be the full amount of the subsidy or less, are decisions to be made by the 
authorities of the importing Member.   It is desirable that the imposition should be permissive in the 
territory of all Members, that the duty should be less than the total amount of the subsidy if such 
lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry, and that procedures 
should be established which would allow the authorities concerned to take due account of 
representations made by domestic interested parties50 whose interests might be adversely affected by 
the imposition of a countervailing duty.  
 
19.3 When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, such countervailing duty 
shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of 
such product from all sources found to be subsidized and causing injury, except as to imports from 
those sources which have renounced any subsidies in question or from which undertakings under the 
terms of this Agreement have been accepted.   Any exporter whose exports are subject to a definitive 
countervailing duty but who was not actually investigated for reasons other than a refusal to  
cooperate, shall be entitled to an expedited review in order that the investigating authorities promptly 
establish an individual countervailing duty rate for that exporter. 
 
19.4 No countervailing duty shall be levied51 on any imported product in excess of the amount of 
the subsidy found to exist, calculated in terms of subsidization per unit of the subsidized and exported 
product. 
 
 
Article 20 
 
Retroactivity 
 
20.1 Provisional measures and countervailing duties shall only be applied to products which enter 
for consumption after the time when the decision under paragraph 1 of Article 17 and paragraph 1 of 
Article 19, respectively, enters into force, subject to the exceptions set out in this Article. 
 
20.2 Where a final determination of injury (but not of a threat thereof or of a material retardation 
of the establishment of an industry) is made or, in the case of a final determination of a threat of 
injury, where the effect of the subsidized imports would, in the absence of the provisional measures, 
                                                     
50 For the purpose of this paragraph, the term "domestic interested parties" shall include consumers and 
industrial users of the imported product subject to investigation. 
51 As used in this Agreement "levy" shall mean the definitive or final legal assessment or collection of a 
duty or tax. 
  
have led to a determination of injury, countervailing duties may be levied retroactively for the period 
for which provisional measures, if any, have been applied. 
 
20.3 If the definitive countervailing duty is higher than the amount guaranteed by the cash deposit 
or bond, the difference shall not be collected.   If the definitive duty is less than the amount 
guaranteed by the cash deposit or bond, the excess amount shall be reimbursed or the bond released in 
an expeditious manner. 
 
20.4 Except as provided in paragraph 2, where a determination of threat of injury or material 
retardation is made (but no injury has yet occurred) a definitive countervailing duty may be imposed 
only from the date of the determination of threat of injury or material retardation, and any cash 
deposit made during the period of the application of provisional measures shall be refunded and any 
bonds released in an expeditious manner. 
 
20.5 Where a final determination is negative, any cash deposit made during the period of the 
application of provisional measures shall be refunded and any bonds released in an expeditious 
manner. 
 
20.6 In critical circumstances where for the subsidized product in question the authorities find that 
injury which is difficult to repair is caused by massive imports in a relatively short period of a product 
benefiting from subsidies paid or bestowed inconsistently with the provisions of GATT 1994 and of 
this Agreement and where it is deemed necessary, in order to preclude the recurrence of such injury, 
to assess countervailing duties retroactively on those imports, the definitive countervailing duties may 
be assessed on imports which were entered for consumption not more than 90 days prior to the date of 
application of provisional measures. 
 
 
Article 21 
 
Duration and Review of Countervailing Duties and Undertakings 
 
21.1 A countervailing duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to 
counteract subsidization which is causing injury. 
 
21.2 The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where 
warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the 
imposition of the definitive countervailing duty, upon request by any interested party which submits 
positive  information substantiating the need for a review.  Interested parties shall have the right to 
request the authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset 
subsidization, whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or 
varied, or both.  If, as a result of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine that the 
countervailing duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately. 
 
21.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, any definitive countervailing duty shall 
be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition (or from the date of the most 
recent review under paragraph 2 if that review has covered both subsidization and injury, or under this 
paragraph), unless the authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date on their own 
initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry within a 
reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to 
  
continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury.52  The duty may remain in force pending the 
outcome of such a review. 
 
21.4 The provisions of Article 12 regarding evidence and procedure shall apply to any review 
carried out under this Article.  Any such review shall be carried out expeditiously and shall normally 
be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review. 
 
21.5 The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to undertakings accepted under 
Article 18. 
 
Article 22 
 
Public Notice and Explanation of 
Determinations 
 
22.1 When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation  of 
an investigation pursuant to Article 11, the Member or Members the products of which are subject to 
such investigation and other interested parties known to the investigating authorities to have an 
interest therein shall be notified and a public notice shall be given. 
 
22.2 A public notice of the initiation of an investigation shall contain, or otherwise make available 
through a separate report53, adequate information on the following: 
 
(i) the name of the exporting country or countries and the product involved; 
 
(ii) the date of initiation of the investigation; 
 
(iii) a description of the subsidy practice or practices to be investigated; 
 
(iv) a summary of the factors on which the  allegation of injury is based; 
 
(v) the address to which representations by interested Members and interested 
parties should be directed;  and  
 
(vi) the time-limits allowed to interested Members and interested parties for 
making their views known. 
 
22.3 Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether affirmative or 
negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to Article 18, of the termination of such 
an undertaking, and of the termination of a definitive countervailing duty.  Each such notice shall set 
forth, or otherwise make available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and 
conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities.  
All such notices and reports shall be forwarded to the Member or Members the products of which are 
subject to such determination or undertaking and to other interested parties known to have an interest 
therein. 
 
22.4 A public notice of the imposition of provisional measures shall set forth, or otherwise make 
available through a separate report, sufficiently detailed explanations for the preliminary 
                                                     
52 When the amount of the countervailing duty is assessed on a retrospective basis, a finding in the 
most recent assessment proceeding that no duty is to be levied shall not by itself require the authorities to 
terminate the definitive duty. 
53 Where authorities provide information and explanations under the provisions of this Article in a 
separate report, they shall ensure that such report is readily available to the public. 
  
determinations on the existence of a subsidy and injury and shall refer to the matters of fact and law 
which have led to arguments being accepted or rejected.  Such a notice or report shall, due regard 
being paid to the requirement for the protection of confidential information, contain in particular: 
 
(i) the names of the suppliers or, when this is impracticable, the supplying 
countries involved; 
 
(ii) a description of the  product which is sufficient for customs purposes; 
 
(iii) the amount of subsidy established and the basis on which the existence of a 
subsidy has been determined; 
 
(iv) considerations relevant to the injury determination as set out in Article 15; 
 
(v) the main reasons leading to the determination. 
 
22.5 A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an affirmative 
determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the acceptance of an undertaking 
shall contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report, all relevant information on the 
matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures or the 
acceptance of an undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of 
confidential information.  In particular, the notice or report shall contain the information described in 
paragraph 4, as well as the reasons for the acceptance or rejection of relevant arguments or claims 
made by interested Members and by the exporters and importers. 
 
22.6 A public notice of the termination or suspension of an investigation following the acceptance 
of an undertaking pursuant to Article 18 shall include, or otherwise make available through a separate 
report, the non-confidential part of this undertaking. 
 
22.7 The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to the initiation and completion of 
reviews pursuant to Article 21 and to decisions under Article 20 to apply duties retroactively. 
 
 
Article 23 
 
Judicial Review 
 
 Each Member whose national legislation contains provisions on countervailing  duty 
measures shall maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, 
inter alia, of the prompt review of administrative actions relating to final determinations and reviews 
of  determinations within the meaning of Article 21.  Such tribunals or procedures shall be 
independent of the authorities responsible for the determination or review in question, and shall 
provide all interested parties who participated in the administrative proceeding and are directly and 
individually affected by the administrative actions with access to review. 
 
 
PART VI:  INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
Article 24 
 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
and Subsidiary Bodies 
 
  
24.1 There is hereby established a Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
composed of representatives from each of the Members.  The Committee shall elect its own Chairman 
and shall meet not less than twice a year and otherwise as envisaged by relevant provisions of this 
Agreement at the request of any Member.  The Committee shall carry out responsibilities as assigned 
to it under this Agreement or by the Members and it shall afford Members the opportunity of 
consulting on any matter relating to the operation of the Agreement or the furtherance of its 
objectives.  The WTO Secretariat shall act as the secretariat to the Committee. 
 
24.2 The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies as appropriate. 
 
24.3 The Committee shall establish a Permanent Group of Experts composed of five independent 
persons, highly qualified in the fields of subsidies and trade relations.  The experts will be elected by 
the Committee and one of them will be replaced every year.  The PGE may be requested to assist a 
panel, as provided for in paragraph 5 of Article 4.  The Committee may also seek an advisory opinion 
on the existence and nature of any subsidy. 
 
24.4 The PGE may be consulted by any Member and may give advisory opinions on the nature of 
any subsidy proposed to be introduced or currently maintained by that Member.  Such advisory 
opinions will be confidential and may not be invoked in proceedings under Article 7. 
 
24.5 In carrying out their functions, the Committee and any subsidiary bodies may consult with 
and seek information from any source they deem appropriate.  However, before the Committee or a 
subsidiary body seeks such information from a source within the jurisdiction of a Member, it shall 
inform the Member involved. 
 
 
PART VII:  NOTIFICATION AND SURVEILLANCE 
 
 
Article 25 
 
Notifications 
 
25.1 Members agree that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XVI of 
GATT 1994, their notifications of subsidies shall be submitted not later than 30 June of each year and 
shall conform to the provisions of paragraphs 2 through 6. 
 
25.2 Members shall notify any subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1, which is specific 
within the meaning of Article 2, granted or maintained within their territories. 
 
25.3 The content of notifications should be sufficiently specific to enable other Members to 
evaluate the trade effects and to understand the operation of notified subsidy programmes.  In this 
connection, and without prejudice to the contents and form of the questionnaire on subsidies54, 
Members shall ensure that their notifications contain the following information: 
 
(i) form of a subsidy (i.e. grant, loan, tax concession, etc.); 
 
(ii) subsidy per unit or, in cases where this is not possible, the total amount or the 
annual  amount budgeted for that subsidy (indicating, if possible, the average 
subsidy per unit in the previous year); 
 
                                                     
54 The Committee shall establish a Working Party to review the contents and form of the questionnaire 
as contained in BISD 9S/193-194. 
  
(iii) policy objective and/or purpose of a subsidy; 
 
(iv) duration of a subsidy and/or any other time-limits attached to it; 
 
(v) statistical data permitting an assessment of the trade effects of a subsidy. 
 
25.4 Where specific points in paragraph 3 have not been addressed in a notification, an explanation 
shall be provided in the notification itself. 
 
25.5 If subsidies are granted to specific products or sectors, the notifications should be organized 
by product or sector. 
 
25.6 Members which consider that there are no measures in their territories requiring notification 
under paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994 and this Agreement shall so inform the Secretariat in 
writing. 
 
25.7 Members recognize that notification of a measure does not prejudge either its legal status 
under GATT 1994 and this Agreement, the effects under this Agreement, or the nature of the measure 
itself. 
 
25.8 Any Member may, at any time, make a written request for information on the nature and 
extent of any subsidy granted or maintained by another Member (including any subsidy referred to in 
Part IV), or for an explanation of the reasons for which a specific measure has been considered as not 
subject to the requirement of notification. 
 
25.9 Members so requested shall provide such information as quickly as possible and in a 
comprehensive manner, and shall be ready, upon request, to provide additional information to the 
requesting Member.   In particular, they shall provide sufficient details to enable the other Member to  
assess their compliance with the terms of this Agreement.   Any Member which considers that such 
information has not been provided may bring the matter to the attention of the Committee. 
 
25.10 Any Member which considers that any measure of another Member having the effects of a  
subsidy has not been notified in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XVI of 
GATT 1994 and this Article may bring the matter to the attention of such other Member.   If the 
alleged subsidy is not thereafter notified promptly, such Member may itself bring the alleged subsidy 
in question to the notice of the Committee. 
 
25.11 Members shall report without delay to the Committee all preliminary or final actions taken 
with respect to countervailing duties.  Such reports shall be available in the Secretariat for inspection 
by other Members.  Members shall also submit, on a semi-annual basis, reports on any countervailing 
duty actions taken within the preceding six months.  The semi-annual reports shall be submitted on an 
agreed standard form. 
 
25.12 Each Member shall notify the Committee (a) which of its authorities are competent to initiate 
and conduct investigations referred to in Article 11 and (b) its domestic procedures governing the 
initiation and conduct of such investigations. 
 
 
Article 26 
 
Surveillance 
 
26.1 The Committee shall examine new and full notifications submitted under paragraph 1 of 
Article XVI of GATT 1994 and paragraph 1 of Article 25 of this Agreement at special sessions  held 
  
every third year.  Notifications submitted in the intervening years (updating notifications) shall be 
examined at each regular meeting of the Committee. 
 
26.2 The Committee shall examine reports submitted under paragraph 11 of Article 25 at each 
regular meeting of the Committee.    
 
 
PART VIII:  DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS 
 
 
Article 27 
 
Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members 
 
27.1 Members recognize that subsidies may play an important role in economic development 
programmes of developing country Members. 
 
27.2 The prohibition of paragraph 1(a) of Article 3 shall not apply to:   
 
(a) developing country Members referred to in Annex VII. 
 
(b) other developing country Members for a period of eight years from the date of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement, subject to compliance with the provisions in 
paragraph  4. 
 
27.3 The prohibition of paragraph 1(b) of Article 3 shall not apply to developing country Members 
for a period of five years, and shall not apply to least developed country Members for a period of 
eight years, from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
 
27.4 Any developing country Member referred to in paragraph 2(b) shall phase out its export 
subsidies within the eight-year period, preferably in a progressive manner.  However, a developing 
country Member shall not increase the level of its export subsidies55, and shall eliminate them within a 
period shorter than that provided for in this paragraph when the use of such export subsidies is 
inconsistent  with its development needs.  If a developing country Member deems it necessary to 
apply such subsidies beyond the 8-year period, it shall not later than one year before the expiry of this 
period enter into consultation with the Committee, which will determine whether an extension of this 
period is justified, after examining all the relevant economic, financial and development needs of the 
developing country Member in question.  If the Committee determines that the extension is justified, 
the developing country Member concerned shall hold annual consultations with the Committee to 
determine the necessity of  maintaining the subsidies.  If no such determination is made by the 
Committee, the developing country Member shall phase out the remaining export subsidies within 
two years from the end of the last authorized period.  
 
27.5 A developing country Member which has reached export competitiveness in any given 
product shall phase out its export subsidies for such product(s) over a period of two years.  However, 
for a developing country Member which is referred to in Annex VII and which has reached export  
competitiveness in one or more products, export subsidies on such products shall be gradually phased 
out over a period of eight years.   
 
27.6 Export competitiveness in a product exists if a developing country Member's exports of that 
product have reached a share of at least 3.25 per cent in world trade of that product for two 
                                                     
55 For a developing country Member not granting export subsidies as of the date of entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement, this paragraph shall apply on the basis of the level of export subsidies granted in 1986.  
  
consecutive calendar years.  Export competitiveness shall exist either (a) on the basis of notification 
by the developing country Member having reached export competitiveness, or (b) on the basis of a 
computation undertaken by the Secretariat at the request of any Member.  For the purpose of this 
paragraph, a product is defined as a section heading of the Harmonized System Nomenclature.  The 
Committee shall review the operation of this provision five years from the date of the entry into force 
of  the WTO Agreement. 
 
27.7 The provisions of Article 4 shall not apply to a developing country Member in the case of 
export  subsidies which are in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 2 through 5.  The relevant 
provisions in such a case shall be those of Article 7. 
 
27.8 There shall be no presumption in terms of paragraph 1 of Article 6 that a subsidy granted by a 
developing country Member results in serious prejudice, as defined in this Agreement.  Such serious 
prejudice, where applicable under the terms of paragraph 9, shall be demonstrated by positive 
evidence, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3 through 8 of Article 6. 
 
27.9 Regarding actionable subsidies granted or maintained by a developing country Member other 
than those referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 6, action may not be authorized or taken under 
Article 7 unless nullification or impairment of tariff concessions or other obligations under 
GATT 1994 is found to exist as a result of such a subsidy, in such a way as to displace or impede 
imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing developing country 
Member or unless injury to a domestic industry in the market of an importing Member occurs. 
 
27.10 Any countervailing duty investigation of a product originating in a developing country 
Member shall be terminated as soon as the authorities concerned determine that: 
 
(a) the overall level of subsidies granted upon the product in question does not exceed 
2 per cent of its value calculated on a per unit basis;  or 
 
(b) the volume of the subsidized imports represents less than 4 per cent of the total 
imports of the like product in the importing Member, unless imports from developing 
country Members whose individual shares of total imports represent less than 
4 per cent collectively account for more than 9 per cent of the total imports of the like 
product in the importing Member. 
 
27.11 For those developing country Members within the scope of paragraph 2(b) which have 
eliminated  export subsidies prior to the expiry of the period of eight years from the date of entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement, and for those developing country Members referred to in Annex VII, 
the number in  paragraph 10(a) shall be 3 per cent rather than 2 per cent.  This provision shall apply 
from the date that the elimination of export subsidies is notified to the Committee, and for so long as 
export subsidies are not granted by the notifying developing country Member.  This provision shall 
expire eight years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
 
27.12 The provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11 shall govern any determination of de minimis under 
paragraph 3 of Article 15. 
 
27.13 The provisions of Part III shall not apply to direct forgiveness of debts, subsidies to cover 
social costs, in whatever form, including relinquishment of government revenue and other transfer of 
liabilities when such subsidies are granted within and directly linked to a privatization programme of 
a developing country Member, provided that both such programme and the subsidies involved are 
granted for a limited period and notified to the Committee and that the programme results in eventual 
privatization of the enterprise concerned. 
 
  
27.14 The Committee shall, upon request by an interested Member, undertake a review of a specific 
export subsidy practice of a developing country Member to examine whether the practice is in 
conformity with its development needs. 
 
27.15 The Committee shall, upon request by an interested developing country Member, undertake a 
review of a specific countervailing measure to examine whether it is consistent with the provisions of 
paragraphs 10 and 11 as applicable to the developing country Member in question. 
 
 
PART IX:  TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
Article 28 
 
Existing Programmes 
 
28.1 Subsidy programmes which have been established within the territory of any Member before 
the date on which such a Member signed the WTO Agreement and which are inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement shall be: 
 
(a) notified to the Committee not later than 90 days after the date of entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement for such Member;  and 
 
(b) brought into conformity with the provisions of this Agreement within three years of 
the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for such Member and until then 
shall not be subject to Part II. 
 
28.2 No Member shall extend the scope of any such programme, nor shall such a programme be 
renewed upon its expiry. 
 
 
Article 29 
 
Transformation into a Market Economy 
 
29.1 Members in the process of transformation from a centrally-planned into a market, 
free-enterprise economy may apply programmes and measures necessary for such a transformation. 
 
29.2 For such Members, subsidy programmes falling within the scope of Article 3, and notified 
according to paragraph 3, shall be phased out or brought into conformity with Article 3 within a 
period of seven years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.  In such a case, 
Article 4 shall not apply.  In addition during the same period: 
 
(a) Subsidy programmes falling within the scope of paragraph 1(d) of Article 6 shall not 
be actionable under Article 7; 
 
(b) With respect to other actionable subsidies, the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 27 
shall apply. 
 
29.3 Subsidy programmes falling within the scope of Article 3 shall be notified to the Committee 
by the earliest practicable date after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.  Further 
notifications of such subsidies may be made up to two years after the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement. 
 
  
29.4 In exceptional circumstances Members referred to in paragraph 1 may be given departures 
from their notified programmes and measures and their time-frame by the Committee if such 
departures are deemed necessary for the process of transformation. 
 
 
PART X:  DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
 
Article 30 
 
 The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under 
this Agreement, except as otherwise specifically provided herein. 
 
 
PART XI:  FINAL PROVISIONS 
 
 
Article 31 
 
Provisional Application 
 
 The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 and the provisions of Article 8 and Article 9 shall 
apply for a period of five years, beginning with the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.  
Not later than 180 days before the end of this period, the Committee shall review the operation of 
those provisions, with a view to determining whether to extend their application, either as presently 
drafted or in a modified form, for a further period. 
 
 
Article 32 
 
Other Final Provisions 
 
32.1 No specific action against a subsidy of another Member can be taken except in accordance 
with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.56 
 
32.2 Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of this Agreement without 
the consent of the other Members. 
 
32.3 Subject to paragraph 4, the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to investigations, and 
reviews of existing measures, initiated pursuant to applications which have been made on or after the 
date of entry into force for a Member of the WTO Agreement. 
 
32.4 For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 21, existing countervailing measures shall be 
deemed to be imposed on a date not later than the date of entry into force for a Member of the WTO 
Agreement, except in cases in which the domestic legislation of a Member in force at that date already 
included a clause of the type provided for in that paragraph. 
 
32.5 Each Member shall take all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not 
later than the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, 
                                                     
56 This paragraph is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of GATT 1994, 
where appropriate. 
  
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this Agreement as they may apply to 
the Member in question. 
 
32.6 Each Member shall inform the Committee of any changes in its laws and regulations relevant 
to this Agreement and in the administration of such laws and regulations. 
 
32.7 The Committee shall review annually the implementation and operation of this Agreement, 
taking into account the objectives thereof.  The Committee shall inform annually the Council for 
Trade in Goods of developments during the period covered by such reviews. 
 
32.8 The Annexes to this Agreement constitute an integral part thereof.  
 
ANNEX I 
 
ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
 
 
(a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry contingent upon 
export performance. 
 
(b) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a bonus on exports. 
 
(c) Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by 
governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments. 
 
(d) The provision by governments or their agencies either directly or indirectly through 
government-mandated schemes, of imported or domestic products or services for use in the 
production of exported goods, on terms or conditions more favourable than for provision of 
like or directly  competitive products or services for use in the production of goods for 
domestic consumption, if (in the case of products) such terms or conditions are more 
favourable than those commercially available57 on world markets to their exporters. 
 
(e) The full or partial exemption remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct 
taxes58 or social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises.59 
                                                     
57 The term "commercially available" means that the choice between domestic and imported products is 
unrestricted and depends only on commercial considerations. 
58 For the purpose of this Agreement: 
 The term "direct taxes" shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all 
other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property; 
 The term "import charges" shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges not elsewhere 
enumerated in this note that are levied on imports; 
 The term "indirect taxes" shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, 
transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges; 
 "Prior-stage" indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in 
making the product; 
 "Cumulative" indirect taxes are multi-staged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for 
subsequent crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in a 
succeeding stage of production; 
 "Remission" of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes; 
 "Remission or drawback" includes the full or partial exemption or deferral of import charges. 
59 The Members recognize that deferral need not amount to an export subsidy where, for example, 
appropriate interest charges are collected. The Members reaffirm the principle that prices for goods in 
transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or under the same control should for 
tax purposes be the prices which would be charged between independent enterprises acting at arm's length. Any 
Member may draw the attention of another Member to administrative or other practices which may contravene 
  
 
(f) The allowance of special deductions directly related to exports or export performance, over 
and above those granted in respect to production for domestic consumption, in the calculation 
of the base on which direct taxes are charged. 
 
(g) The exemption or remission, in respect of the production and distribution of exported 
products, of indirect taxes58 in excess of those levied in respect of the production and 
distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption. 
 
(h) The exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes58 on goods or 
services used in the production of exported products in excess of the exemption, remission or deferral 
of like prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes on goods or services used in the  production of like 
products when sold for domestic consumption;  provided, however, that prior-stage cumulative 
indirect taxes may be exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products even when not exempted, 
remitted or deferred on like products when sold for domestic consumption, if the prior-stage 
cumulative indirect taxes are levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported 
product  (making normal allowance for waste).60   This item shall be interpreted in accordance with 
the guidelines on consumption of inputs in the production process contained in Annex II. 
 
(i) The remission or drawback of import charges58 in excess of those levied on imported inputs 
that are consumed in the production of the exported product (making normal allowance for 
waste);  provided, however, that in particular cases a firm may use a quantity of home market  
inputs equal to, and having the same quality and characteristics as, the imported inputs as a 
substitute for them in order to benefit from this provision if the import and the corresponding 
export operations both occur within a reasonable time period, not to exceed two years.   This  
item shall be interpreted in accordance with the guidelines on consumption of inputs in the 
production process contained in Annex II and the guidelines in the determination of 
substitution drawback systems as export subsidies contained in Annex III. 
 
(j) The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of export 
credit guarantee or insurance programmes, of insurance or guarantee programmes against 
increases in the cost of exported products or of exchange risk programmes, at premium rates 
which are inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes. 
 
(k) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by and/or acting under the 
authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which they actually have to 
pay for the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they borrowed on international capital 
markets in order to obtain funds of the same maturity and other credit terms and denominated 
in the same currency as the export credit), or the payment by them of all or part of the costs 
incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to 
secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms. 
 
Provided, however, that if a Member is a party to an international undertaking on official 
export credits to which at least twelve original Members to this Agreement are parties as of 
1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original 
                                                                                                                                                                     
this principle and which result in a significant saving of direct taxes in export transactions. In such 
circumstances the Members shall normally attempt to resolve their differences using the facilities of existing 
bilateral tax treaties or other specific international mechanisms, without prejudice to the rights and obligations 
of Members under GATT 1994, including the right of consultation created in the preceding sentence. 
 Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a Member from taking measures to avoid the double 
taxation of foreign-source income earned by its enterprises or the enterprises of another Member. 
60 Paragraph (h) does not apply to value-added tax systems and border-tax adjustment in lieu thereof;  
the problem of the excessive remission of value-added taxes is exclusively covered by paragraph (g). 
  
Members), or if in practice a Member applies the interest rates provisions of the relevant 
undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformity with those provisions shall not 
be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement. 
 
(l) Any other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the sense of 
Article XVI of GATT 1994. 
 
ANNEX II 
 
GUIDELINES ON CONSUMPTION OF INPUTS IN THE PRODUCTION PROCESS61 
 
 
I 
 
1. Indirect tax rebate schemes can allow for exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage 
cumulative indirect taxes levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product 
(making normal allowance for waste).   Similarly, drawback schemes can allow for the remission or  
drawback of import charges levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported 
product (making normal allowance for waste). 
 
2. The Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I of this Agreement makes reference to the 
term "inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product" in paragraphs (h) and (i).  
Pursuant to paragraph (h), indirect tax rebate schemes can constitute an export subsidy to the extent  
that they result in exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes in excess 
of the amount of such taxes actually levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the 
exported product.   Pursuant to paragraph (i), drawback schemes can constitute an export subsidy to 
the extent  that they result in a remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those actually 
levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product.   Both paragraphs 
stipulate that normal allowance for waste must be made in findings regarding consumption of inputs 
in the production of the exported product.   Paragraph (i) also provides for substitution, where 
appropriate. 
 
 
II 
 
 In examining whether inputs are consumed in the production of the exported product, as part 
of a countervailing duty investigation pursuant to this Agreement, investigating authorities should 
proceed on the following basis: 
 
1. Where it is alleged that an indirect tax rebate scheme, or a drawback scheme, conveys a 
subsidy by reason of over-rebate or excess drawback of indirect taxes or import charges on inputs 
consumed in the production of the exported product, the investigating authorities should first 
determine whether the government of the exporting Member has in place and applies a system or 
procedure to confirm which inputs are consumed in the production of the exported product and in 
what amounts.   Where such a system or procedure is determined to be applied, the investigating 
authorities should then examine the system or procedure to see whether it is reasonable, effective for 
the purpose intended, and based on generally accepted commercial practices in the country of export.   
The investigating authorities may deem it necessary to carry out, in accordance with paragraph 6 of 
Article 12, certain practical tests in order to verify information or to satisfy themselves that the system 
or procedure is being effectively applied. 
                                                     
61 Inputs consumed in the production process are inputs physically incorporated, energy, fuels and oil 
used in the production process and catalysts which are consumed in the course of their use to obtain the exported 
product. 
  
 
2. Where there is no such system or procedure, where it is not reasonable, or where it is 
instituted and considered reasonable but is found not to be applied or not to be applied effectively, a 
further examination by the exporting Member based on the actual inputs involved would need to be 
carried out in the context of determining whether an excess payment occurred.   If the investigating 
authorities deemed it necessary, a further examination would be carried out in accordance with 
paragraph 1. 
 
3. Investigating authorities should treat inputs as physically incorporated if such inputs are used 
in the production process and are physically present in the product exported.   The Members note that 
an input need not be present in the final product in the same form in which it entered the production 
process. 
 
4. In determining the amount of a particular input that is consumed in the production of the 
exported product, a "normal allowance for waste" should be taken into account, and such waste 
should be treated as consumed in the production of the exported product.   The term "waste" refers to 
that portion of a given input which does not serve an independent function in the production process, 
is not consumed in the production of the exported product (for reasons such as inefficiencies) and is 
not recovered, used or sold by the same manufacturer. 
 
5. The investigating authority's determination of whether the claimed allowance for waste is 
"normal" should take into account the production process, the average experience of the industry in 
the country of export, and other technical factors, as appropriate.   The investigating authority should 
bear in mind that an important question is whether the authorities in the exporting Member have 
reasonably calculated the amount of waste, when such an amount is intended to be included in the tax 
or duty rebate or remission. 
 
ANNEX III 
 
GUIDELINES IN THE DETERMINATION OF SUBSTITUTION 
DRAWBACK SYSTEMS AS EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
 
 
I 
 
 Drawback systems can allow for the refund or drawback of import charges on inputs which 
are consumed in the production process of another product and where the export of this latter product 
contains domestic inputs having the same quality and characteristics as those substituted for the 
imported inputs.  Pursuant to paragraph (i) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I, 
substitution drawback systems can constitute an export subsidy to the extent that they result in an 
excess drawback of the import charges levied initially on the imported inputs for which drawback is 
being claimed. 
 
 
II 
 
 In examining any substitution drawback system as part of a countervailing duty investigation 
pursuant to this Agreement, investigating authorities should proceed on the following basis: 
 
1. Paragraph (i) of the Illustrative List stipulates that home market inputs may be substituted for 
imported inputs in the production of a product for export provided such inputs are equal in quantity to, 
and have the same quality and characteristics as, the imported inputs being substituted.   The existence 
of a verification system or procedure is important because it enables the government of the exporting 
Member to ensure and demonstrate that the quantity of inputs for which drawback is claimed does not 
  
exceed the quantity of similar products exported, in whatever form, and that there is not drawback of 
import charges in excess of those originally levied on the imported inputs in question. 
 
2. Where it is alleged that a substitution drawback system conveys a subsidy, the investigating 
authorities should first proceed to determine whether the government of the exporting Member has in 
place and applies a verification system or procedure.   Where such a system or procedure is 
determined to be applied, the investigating authorities should then examine the verification procedures 
to see whether they are reasonable, effective for the purpose intended, and based on generally 
accepted commercial practices in the country of export.   To the extent that the procedures are 
determined to meet this test and are effectively applied, no subsidy should be presumed to exist.   It 
may be deemed necessary by the investigating authorities to carry out, in accordance with paragraph 6 
of Article 12, certain practical tests in order to verify information or to satisfy themselves that the 
verification procedures are being effectively applied. 
 
3. Where there are no verification procedures, where they are not reasonable, or where such 
procedures are instituted and considered reasonable but are found not to be actually applied or not 
applied effectively, there may be a subsidy.   In such cases a further examination by the exporting 
Member based on the actual transactions involved would need to be carried out to determine whether 
an excess payment occurred.   If the investigating authorities deemed it necessary, a further 
examination would be carried out in accordance with paragraph 2. 
 
4. The existence of a substitution drawback provision under which exporters are allowed to 
select particular import shipments on which drawback is claimed should not of itself be considered to 
convey a subsidy. 
 
5. An excess drawback of import charges in the sense of paragraph (i) would be  deemed to exist 
where governments paid interest on any monies refunded under their drawback schemes, to the extent 
of the interest actually paid or payable. 
 
ANNEX IV 
 
CALCULATION OF THE TOTAL AD VALOREM SUBSIDIZATION 
(PARAGRAPH 1(A) OF ARTICLE 6)62 
 
 
1. Any calculation of the amount of a subsidy for the purpose of paragraph 1(a) of Article 6 shall 
be done in terms of the cost to the granting government. 
 
2. Except as provided in paragraphs 3 through 5, in determining whether the overall rate of 
subsidization exceeds 5 per cent of the value of the product, the value of the product shall be 
calculated as the total value of the recipient firm's63 sales in the most recent 12-month period, for 
which sales data is available, preceding the period in which the subsidy is granted.64 
 
3. Where the subsidy is tied to the production or sale of a given product, the value of the product 
shall be calculated as the total value of the recipient firm's sales of that product in the most recent 12-
month period, for which sales data is available, preceding the period in which the subsidy is granted. 
 
                                                     
62 An understanding among Members should be developed, as necessary, on matters which are not 
specified in this Annex or which need further clarification for the purposes of paragraph 1(a) of Article 6. 
63 The recipient firm is a firm in the territory of the subsidizing Member. 
64 In the case of tax-related subsidies the value of the product shall be calculated as the total value of 
the recipient firm's sales in the fiscal year in which the tax-related measure was earned. 
  
4. Where the recipient firm is in a start-up situation, serious prejudice shall be deemed to exist if 
the overall rate of subsidization exceeds 15 per cent of the total funds invested.  For purposes of this  
paragraph, a start-up period will not extend beyond the first year of production.65 
 
5. Where the recipient firm is located in an inflationary economy country, the value of the 
product shall be calculated as the recipient firm's total sales (or sales of the relevant product, if the 
subsidy is tied) in the preceding calendar year indexed by the rate of inflation experienced in the 12 
months preceding the month in which the subsidy is to be given. 
 
6. In determining the overall rate of subsidization in a given year, subsidies given under 
different programmes and by different authorities in the territory of a Member shall be aggregated. 
 
7. Subsidies granted prior to the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the benefits of 
which are allocated to future production, shall be included in the overall rate of subsidization. 
 
8. Subsidies which are non-actionable under relevant provisions of this Agreement shall not be 
included in the calculation of the amount of a subsidy for the purpose of paragraph 1(a) of Article 6. 
 
 
ANNEX V 
 
PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING INFORMATION CONCERNING SERIOUS PREJUDICE 
 
 
1. Every Member shall cooperate in the development of evidence to be examined by a panel in 
procedures under paragraphs 4 through 6 of Article 7.  The parties to the dispute and any 
third-country Member concerned shall notify to the DSB, as soon as the provisions of paragraph 4 of 
Article 7 have  been invoked, the organization responsible for administration of this provision within 
its territory and the procedures to be used to comply with requests for information. 
 
2. In cases where matters are referred to the DSB under paragraph 4 of Article 7, the DSB shall, 
upon request, initiate the procedure to obtain such information from the government of the subsidizing 
Member as necessary to establish the existence and amount of subsidization, the value of total sales of 
the subsidized firms, as well as information necessary to analyze the adverse effects caused by the 
subsidized product.66  This process may include, where appropriate, presentation of questions to the 
government of the subsidizing Member and of the complaining Member to collect information, as 
well as to clarify and obtain elaboration of information available to the parties to a dispute through the 
notification procedures set forth in Part VII.67 
 
3. In the case of effects in third-country markets, a party to a dispute may collect information, 
including through the use of questions to the government of the third-country Member, necessary to 
analyse adverse effects, which is not otherwise reasonably available from the complaining Member  
or the subsidizing Member.   This requirement should be administered in such a way as not to impose 
an unreasonable burden on the third-country Member.   In particular, such a Member is not expected 
to make a market or price analysis specially for that purpose.   The information to be supplied is that 
which is already available or can be readily obtained by this Member (e.g. most recent statistics which 
                                                     
65 Start-up situations include instances where financial commitments for product development or 
construction of facilities to manufacture products benefiting from the subsidy have been made, even though 
production has not begun. 
66 In cases where the existence of serious prejudice has to be demonstrated. 
67 The information-gathering process by the DSB shall take into account the need to protect 
information which is by nature confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis by any Member 
involved in this process. 
  
have already been gathered by relevant statistical services but which have not yet been published, 
customs data concerning imports and declared values of the products concerned, etc.).   However, if a 
party to a dispute undertakes a detailed market analysis at its own expense, the task of the person or 
firm  conducting such an analysis shall be facilitated by the authorities of the third-country Member 
and such a person or firm shall be given access to all information which is not normally maintained 
confidential by the government. 
 
4. The DSB shall designate a representative to serve the function of facilitating the 
information-gathering process.  The sole purpose of the representative shall be to ensure the timely 
development of the information necessary to facilitate expeditious subsequent multilateral review of 
the dispute.  In particular, the representative may suggest ways to most efficiently solicit necessary 
information as well as encourage the cooperation of the parties. 
 
5. The information-gathering process outlined in paragraphs 2 through 4 shall be completed 
within 60 days of the date on which the matter has been referred to the DSB under paragraph 4 of 
Article 7.  The information obtained during this process shall be submitted to the panel established by 
the DSB in accordance with the provisions of Part X.  This information should include,  inter alia, 
data concerning the amount of the subsidy in question (and, where appropriate, the value of total sales 
of the subsidized firms), prices of the subsidized product, prices of the non-subsidized product, prices 
of other suppliers to the market, changes in the supply of the subsidized product to the market in 
question and changes in market shares.  It should also include rebuttal evidence, as well as such 
supplemental information as the panel deems relevant in the course of reaching its conclusions. 
 
6. If the subsidizing and/or third-country Member fail to cooperate in the information-gathering 
process, the complaining Member will present its case of serious prejudice, based on evidence 
available to it, together with facts and circumstances of the non-cooperation of the subsidizing and/or 
third-country Member.   Where information is unavailable due to non-cooperation by the subsidizing 
and/or third-country Member, the panel may complete the record as necessary relying on best 
information otherwise available. 
 
7. In making its determination, the panel should draw adverse inferences from instances of non- 
cooperation by any party involved in the information-gathering process. 
 
8. In making a determination to use either best information available or adverse inferences, the 
panel shall consider the advice of the DSB representative nominated under paragraph 4 as to the 
reasonableness of any requests for information and the efforts made by parties to comply with these 
requests in a cooperative and timely manner. 
 
9. Nothing in the information-gathering process shall limit the ability of the panel to seek such  
additional information it deems essential to a proper resolution to the dispute, and which was not 
adequately sought or developed during that process.   However, ordinarily the panel should not 
request additional information to complete the record where the information would support a 
particular party's position and the absence of that information in the record is the result of 
unreasonable non-cooperation by that party in the information-gathering process. 
 
ANNEX VI 
 
PROCEDURES FOR ON-THE-SPOT INVESTIGATIONS PURSUANT TO 
PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE 12 
 
 
1. Upon initiation of an investigation, the authorities of the exporting Member and the firms 
known to be concerned should be informed of the intention to carry out on-the-spot investigations. 
 
  
2. If in exceptional circumstances it is intended to include non-governmental experts in the 
investigating team, the firms and the authorities of the exporting Member should be so informed.  
Such non-governmental experts should be subject to effective sanctions for breach of confidentiality 
requirements. 
 
3. It should be standard practice to obtain explicit agreement of the firms concerned in the 
exporting Member before the visit is finally scheduled. 
 
4. As soon as the agreement of the firms concerned has been obtained, the investigating 
authorities should notify the authorities of the exporting Member of the names and addresses of the 
firms to be visited and the dates agreed. 
 
5. Sufficient advance notice should be given to the firms in question before the visit is made. 
 
6. Visits to explain the questionnaire should only be made at the request of an exporting firm.  In 
case of such a request the investigating authorities may place themselves at the disposal of the firm;  
such a visit may only be made if (a) the authorities of the importing Member notify the 
representatives of the government of the Member in question and (b) the latter do not object to the 
visit. 
 
7. As the main purpose of the on-the-spot investigation is to verify information provided or to 
obtain further details, it should be carried out after the response to the questionnaire has been received 
unless the firm agrees to the contrary and the government of the exporting Member is informed by the 
investigating authorities of the anticipated visit and does not object to it;  further, it should be standard 
practice prior to the visit to advise the firms concerned of the general nature of the information to be 
verified and of any further information which needs to be provided, though this should not preclude 
requests to be made on the spot for further details to be provided in the light of information obtained. 
 
8. Enquiries or questions put by the authorities or firms of the exporting Members and essential 
to a successful on-the-spot investigation should, whenever possible, be answered before the visit is 
made. 
 
ANNEX VII 
 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS REFERRED TO 
IN PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF ARTICLE 27 
 
 
 The developing country Members not subject to the provisions of paragraph 1(a) of Article 3 
under the terms of  paragraph 2(a) of Article 27 are: 
 
(a) Least-developed countries designated as such by the United Nations which are 
Members of the WTO. 
 
 (b) Each of the following developing countries which are Members of the WTO shall be 
subject to the provisions which are applicable to other developing country Members 
according to paragraph 2(b) of Article 27 when GNP per capita has reached 
$1,000 per annum68:  Bolivia, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. 
 
                                                     
68 The inclusion of developing country Members in the list in paragraph (b) is based on the most recent 
data from the World Bank on GNP per capita. 
